Rationality Quotes March 2012
Here's the new thread for posting quotes, with the usual rules:
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- Do not quote yourself
- Do not quote comments/posts on LW/OB
- No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
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Comments (525)
--George Orwell, here
---Tim Ingold, “Clearing the Ground"
HULK EXPLAINS WHY WE SHOULD STOP IT WITH THE HERO JOURNEY SHIT
Naturally not. Harry would only do something that reckless if it was to save a general of the Dark Lord on the whim of his mentor. ;)
I of course agree with thatguy, with substitution of 'the most viable immediate' in there somewhere. It is a solution to all sorts of things.
If Eliezer Yudkowsky, the author, is lauding this statement, I think we can rule this out as Harry's solution.
As previously stated, Harry is not a perfect rationalist.
Neither is Eliezer Yudkowsky.
My philosophy is that it's okay to be imperfect, but not so imperfect that other people notice.
I propose that it's okay to be imperfect, but not so imperfect that reality notices.
This is a cool-sounding slogan that doesn't actually say anything beyond "Winning is good."
No, it says that practical degrees of excellence are just fine and you don't actually have to achieve philosophically perfect excellence to be sufficiently effective.
It's the difference between not being able to solve an NP-complete problem perfectly, and being able to come up with pretty darn close numerical approximations that do the practical job just fine. (I think evolution achieves a lot of the latter, for example.)
I agree with your version, but "not getting caught" as a proxy for "good enough" is, at least to humans, not just wrong but actively misleading.
This variant of when all you have is a hammer is seen often enough to merit a name.
"When all you have is a powered-up Patronus, every problem looks like storming Azkaban is the answer"?
I meant something along the lines of "When your hammer is too darn impressive, everything begins to look like a nail."
"The greatest lesson in life is to know that even fools are sometimes right."
-Winston Churchill
-Morpheus, Deus Ex
Yes, I know, generalization from fictional evidence and the dangers thereof, etc. . . I think it a genuine insight, though. Just remember that humans are (almost) never motivated by just one thing.
Explain for me?
Certainly. The idea is that God was invented not just to explain the world (the standard answer to that question) but also as a sort of model of how a particular group of people wanted to be governed. One of the theses of the game is that governments constitute a system for (attempting to) compensate for the inability of people to rationally govern themselves, and that God is the ultimate realization of that attempt. A perfect government with a perfect understanding of human nature and access to everyone's opinions and desires (but without any actual humans involved). Over time, of course, views of what 'God' should be like shift with the ambient culture.
I agree, with the caveat that humans usually (and probably in this case) do things for multiple complicated reasons rather than just one. Also the caveat that Deus Ex is a video game.
Interesting theory, and perhaps one that's got legs, but there's some self-reinforcement going on in the religious sphere that keeps it from being unicausal -- if we've got a religion whose vision of God (or of a god of rulership like Odin or Jupiter, or of a divine hierarchy) is initially a simple reflection of how its members want to be governed, I'd nonetheless expect that to drift over time to variants which are more memorable or more flattering to adherents or more conducive to ingroup cohesion, not just to those which reflect changing mores of rulership. Then group identity effects will push those changes into adherents' models of proper rulership, and a nice little feedback loop takes shape.
This probably helps explain some of the more blatantly maladaptive aspects of religious law we know about, although I imagine costly signaling plays an important role too.
If a sufficient number of people who wanted to stop war really did gather together, they would first of all begin by making war upon those who disagreed with them. And it is still more certain that they would make war on people who also want to stop wars but in another way. -G.I. Gurdjieff
-- nostrademons on Hacker news
That's a good quote! +1.
Unfortunately, for every rational action, there appears to be an equal and opposite irrational one: did you see bhousel's response?
Sigh.
Related to Schelling fences on slippery slopes:
— Thomas De Quincey
I don't get this quote, it strikes me as wit with no substance.
Me too, honestly.
Presumably the quote is from De Quincey's essay "On Murder Considered as one of the Fine Arts", and with that context & perspective in mind it has a tad more substance.
Said by a pub manager I know to someone who came into his pub selling lucky white heather:
"I'm running a business turning over half a million pounds a year, and you're selling lucky heather door to door. Doesn't seem to work, does it?"
Albert Jay Nock, The Theory of Education in the United States
--Daniel Kahneman in Thinking, Fast and Slow
-William Hazlitt, attacking phrenology.
-Douglas Adams
Chesterton, found here
-Douglas Adams
-Douglas Adams
-Charlie Munger
I'm surprised by how consistently misinterpreted the EMH is, even by people with the widest possible perspective on markets and economics. The EMH practically requires that some people make money by trading, because that's the mechanism which causes the market to become efficient. The EMH should really be understood to mean that as more and more money is leached out of the market by speculators, prices become better and better approximations to real net present values.
I've always thought of the Efficient Market Hypothesis as the anti-Tinkerbell: if everybody all starts clapping and believing in it, it dies.
See, for example, every bubble ever. "We don't need to worry about buying that thing for more than it seems to be worth, because prices are going up so we can always resell it for even more than that later!"
If they actually believed the market they were trading in was efficient they wouldn't believe that prices would continue to go up. They would expect them to follow the value of capital invested at that level of risk. Further - as applicable to any bubble that doesn't represent overinvestment in the entire stockmarket over all industries - they wouldn't jump on a given stock or group of stocks more than any other. They would buy random stocks from the market, probably distributed as widely as possible.
No, belief in an efficient market can only be used as a scapegoat here, not as a credible cause.
On the mind projection fallacy:
-John Stuart Mill
Every subjective feeling IS at least one thing - a bunch of neurons firing. Whether stored representational content activated in that firing has any connection to events represented happening outside the brain is another question.
--SMBC Theater - Death
--Gregory House, M.D. - S02E11 "Need to Know"
-- W. V. O. Quine
(1978). I expected this to be older.
― Cory Doctorow, For The Win
I interpret this to mean that often times questions are overlooked because the possibility of them being true seems absurd. Similar to the Sherlock Holmes saying, “When you have eliminated all which is impossible, then whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.”
I interpret it to mean that Cory Doctorow doesn't fully consider the implications of hindsight bias when it comes to predicting the merits of asking questions from a given class.
Usually asking stupid questions really is just stupid.
Hrm. Okay, I see your point, I think. I think there's some benefit in devoting a small portion of your efforts to pursuing outlying hypotheses. Probably proportional to the chance of them being true, I guess, depending on how divisible the resources are. If by "stupid", Doctorow means "basic", he might be talking about overlooked issues everyone assumed had already been addressed. But I guess probabilistically that's the same thing - its unlikely after a certain amount of effort that basic issues haven't been addressed, so its an outlying hypothesis, and should again get approximately as much attention as its likelihood of being true, depending on resources and how neatly they can be divided up. And maybe let the unlikely things bubble up in importance if the previously-thought-more-likely things shrink due to apparently conflicting evidence... A glaring example to me seems the abrahamic god's nonexplanatory abilities going unquestioned for as long as they did. Like, treating god as a box to throw unexplained things in and then hiding god behind "mysteriousness" begs the question of why there's a god clouded in mysteriousness hanging around.
When you've eliminated the impossible, if whatever's left is sufficiently improbable, you probable haven't considered a wide enough space of candidate possibilities.
Seems fair. The Holmes saying seems a bit funny to me now that I think about it, because the probability of an unlikely event changes to become more likely when you've shown that reality appears constrained from the alternatives. I mean, I guess that's what he's trying to convey in his own way. But, by the definition of probability, the likelihood of the improbable event increases as constraints appear preventing the other possibilities. You're going from P(A) to P(A|B) to P(A|(B&C)) to.. etc. You shouldn't be simultaneously aware that an event is improbable and seeing that no other alternative is true at the same time, unless you're being informed of the probability, given the constraints, by someone else, which means that yes, they appear to be considering more candidate possibilities (or their estimate was incorrect. Or something I haven't thought of...).
Maybe he meant how a priori improbable it is?
Plutarch, found here
I'm also fond of:
Karkat's just full of these gems of almost-wisdom.
--Steve Sailer, here
Mustapha Mond evil?
Of course. He keeps the brave new world running. I don't think there are many takers here for the idea that Brave New World depicts a society we should desire and work for.
For all that it's fun to signal our horror at the ignorance/irrationality/stupidity of those in charge, I still think real-world 2012 Britain, USA, Canada and Australia are all better than Oceania circa 1984. For one thing, people are not very often written out of existence.
Or ... are they?
The quote states that the current establishment has no idea what's going on. How would they be competent enough in this state to band together, write people out of existence, then keep it a secret indefinitely?
The response was a joke.
At a certain point, conspiracy theories become indistinguishable from skeptical hypotheses.
-David Wong
-Posted outside the mathematics reading room, Tromsø University
From the homepage of Kim C. Border
-- Tim Minchin, Storm
That could just mean we're no good at solving mysteries that involve magic.
Also, I think there is a selection effect in so far as there are solved mysteries where the solution was magic; however, you'd probably argue that they were not solved correctly using no other evidence than that the solutions involved magic.
It depends what you mean by magic. Nowadays we communicate by bouncing invisible light off the sky, which would sure as hell qualify as "magic" to someone six hundred years ago.
The issue is that "magic", in the sense that I take Minchin to be using it, isn't a solution at all. No matter what the explanation is, once you've actually got it, it's not "magic" any more; it's "electrons" or "distortion of spacetime" or "computers" or whatever, the distinction being that we have equations for all of those things.
Take the witch trials, for example - to the best of my extremely limited knowledge, most witch trials involved very poorly-defined ideas about what a witch was capable of or what the signs of a witch were. If they had known how the accused were supposed to be screwing with reality, they wouldn't have called them "witches", but "scientists" or "politicians" or "guys with swords".
Admittedly all of those can have the same blank curiosity-stopping power as "magic" to some people, but "magic" almost always does. Which is why, once you've solved the mystery, it turns out to be Not Magic.
Consider something like this and notice that our modern "explanations" aren't much better.
And because of those damned atheists we can't even start a witch hunt to figure out who's responsible!
Sure we can.
We just need to rephrase "witch" in scientific terms.
(Also sorry about the political link, but with a topic like this that's inevitable).
UPDATE: This post goes into more details.
Lynne Murray
-- Evan V Symon, Cracked.com http://www.cracked.com/article_19669_the-5-saddest-attempts-to-take-over-country.html
Not completely serious, but think of it in relation to the sanity waterline...
-- G.B. Shaw, "Man and Superman"
Shaw evinces a really weird, teleological view of evolution in that play, but in doing so expresses some remarkable and remarkably early (1903) transhumanist sentiments.
I love that quote, but if it carries a rationality lesson, I fail to see it. Seems more like an appeal to the tastes of the audience here.
Yeah, you're correct. Wasn't thinking very hard.
I have to disagree; the lesson in the quote is "Win as hard as you can", which is very important if not very complicated.
I don't see the connection. If bringing a superior being to myself into existence is maximum win for me, that's not obvious. Not everyone, like Shaw's Don Juan, values the Superman.
Okay, I think I see what's going on. I originally interpreted "something better than myself" from the quote to include self-improvement. In context though, that's clearly not what it's implying.
Winston Churchill
Incidentally, you need a double-newline to break the quote bar.
-Carl Sagan, The Demon Haunted World
Steven Kaas
I think the original is instrumentally more useful. On hearing "the road to hell is paved with good intentions", one of my reactions is "I have good intentions, I'd better make sure I'm not on the road to hell". On hearing your version my first reaction is "whew, this doesn't apply to me, only to those people with bad epistemology".
I suspect that's a standard reaction to hearing of any cognitive bias.
“Hah, this article nails those assholes perfectly!”
-- some asshole
Interesting, my immediate reaction is "oh, I guess I need to seriously work on my epistemology rather than work on having better intentions as such".
-Seth Godin
A. I'm not entirely sure that things that used to be human nature no longer are. We deal with them, surpress them, sublimate, etc. Anger responses, fear, lust, possesiveness, nesting. The animal instincts of the human animal. How those manifest does indeed change, but not the "nature" of them.
B. We live (in the USA) in a long-term culture of anti-intellectualism. Obviously this doesn't mean it can't change... Sometimes it seems like it will (remember the days before nerd-chic?), but in a nominally democratic society, there will always be a minority of people who are relatively "intellectual" by definition, we should recognize that you don't have to overcome anti-intellectualism, you just have to raise the bar. While still anti-intellectual, in many ways even the intentionally uninformed know more than the average person did back in the day. (just like there will always be a minority of people who will be "relatively tall", even as the average height has tended to increased over the generations)
Which type of anti-intellectualism are you referring to?
I'm probably referring to all of the above. That's an interesting speciation of anti-intellectualism, but I am meaning it in the broad sense, because I've seen all of them.
If someone calls me a "liberal elitist", is it version 1, 3, or 5? Does the class issue also result in a gut reaction? Is the traditionalism directly related to the totalizing? I understand the differences as described in the article, but I'm not sure they are easily separable. Sometimes yes, but not always. So: A. I think the differences are interesting, and useful, but not always clearly delineated, and B. when generalizing about a group, I'm not sure it's necessary. If I say "New Yorkers really like dogs", it's probably not cricitcal which breed I mean. If I say "that person really likes his/her dog" then it matters more.
(and we all know that when you generalize about things it's like when you assume things: it makes a general out of I and, um, ze)
As relates to the original quote: which type was Godin referring to? He talks about being ashamed at being uninformed, which touches on 1 and 5, possibly 2, and interacts with 3. (pobre quatro) One of the things we've slowly seen is the other side: being unashamed at being informed...or politically unpunished, for that matter. Politicians want to be "regular people" because they are berated for using subclauses in sentences (John Kerry), for being a know-it-all (Gore), elitist (everyone, per Palin), destroying the fabric (Obama), utopiansim (the 90's Clintons), etc...
What really entertained me about this clause is that I spent a noticeable period of time trying to remember which of the many competing novel pronoun schemes "ze" was in, before realizing from context that it had to be a second-person pronoun and wondering why would we create a new second-person pronoun given that the English "you" is already ambiguous about gender and number and basically everything else, and only then did my parsing of the rest of the sentence catch up and make me realize it was a joke.
Interesting. If my experience is representative, then a sizable subset of Less Wrongers are what the author calls epistemic-skeptical anti-intellectuals.
It seems slightly odd that there are many on LessWrong whose justification for not looking deeply into the philosophy literature is that philosophers "are too prone to overestimate their own cleverness" and end up shooting their own philosophical feet off, but that subset of LessWrong doesn't seem to overlap much with those who are epistemic-skeptical anti-intellectuals in the more political sense. Admittedly my own view is that the former subset is basically wrong whereas the latter is basically right, but naively viewed the two positions would seem to go together much as they do with neoconservatives. ...I feel like I'm not carving up reality correctly.
-- Hans Moravec Time Travel and Computing
Not quiet, since you need time travel to establish the final timeline.
Extremely cool in an armchair-physicist sort of way, but what's the rationality?
•••
-Michael "Kayin" O'Reilly
One of my favorite things about many constructed languages is that they get rid of this distinction entirely. You don't have to worry about whether or not "Xify" is a so-called real word for any given value X, you only have to check if it X's type fits the pattern. This happens merely because it's a lot easier, when you're working from scratch anyways, to design the language that way than to have to come up with a big artificial list of -ify words.
Or, as the Language Log puts it:
It's Language Log, without the, goddammit!
Without the what? That isn't grammatical.
Without the fnord, of course.
Upvoted under the presumption that you're being ironic.
Swap out "grammar" and "style" for "morality" and "ethics"?
Found here.
--George F. Stigler, "Economics or Ethics?"
Scott Adams
Do the same with a Chiropractor and let me know if you get different results.
If you read the link, that's exactly the author's point
I was reading www.sciencebasedmedicine.org at the same time and my natural smart ass went for a walk. There's probably a creme for that somewhere.
-- Benjamin Franklin, Letter to Joseph Priestley, 8 Feb 1780
We've made really decent progress in only two hundred and thirty-odd years. We're ahead of schedule.
Benjamin Franklin sure knew how to use the caps. I miss the old days.
The Germans of his day put him to shame.
One of the first transhumanists?
The hard core of transhumanism goes back to at least the Middle Ages, possibly sooner.
Interesting. The particular philosophers you have in mind?
Primarily, I had the Arabic-speaking philosophical alchemists in mind, but there are others. If there is significant interest, then I will elaborate further.
Okay, 2 comments and 3 upvotes is good enough for a quick comment but not a discussion post.
By the "hard core of transhumanism" I mean the belief that humans could use reason to obtain knowledge of the natural world that we can use in order to develop technologies that will allow us to cure sickness, eliminate the need to labor, and extend our lifespans to greater-than-human levels and that we should do these things.
During the Islamic Golden Age, many thinkers combined Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism with knowledge from indigenous craft traditions into a form of alchemy that was refined using logic and laboratory experimentation (Jābir ibn Hayyān is probably the most famous of these thinkers). These philosophers and technologists believed that their theoretical system would allow them to perform transmutation of matter (turn one element into another) unlocking the ability to create almost any "machine" or medicine imaginable. This was thought to allow them to create al ixir (elixir) of Al Khidr fame which, in principle, could extend human life indefinitely and cure any kind of disease. Also of great interest was the attainment of takwin, which is artificial, laboratory-created "life" (even including the intelligent kind). It was hoped (by some) that these artificial creations (called a homunculus by Latin speakers and analogous to the Jewish golem) could do the work of humans the way angels do Allah's work. Not only could these AIs do our work for us, they could continue our scientific enterprise. According to William Newman, these AIs or robots "...of the pseudo-Plato and Jabir traditions could not only talk - it could reveal the secrets of nature." Sound familiar?
Was there any speculation about the Friendly takwin problem?
Not that I know of, but you would think they would have since they were familiar with how badly you could end up screwing yourself dealing with Jinn even though they would do exactly what you tell them to (literally). There are a great many Arabic texts that historians of science have yet to take a look at. Who knows, maybe we'll luck out and find the solution to the FAI problem in some library in Turkey.
Might also have been an attitude like a lot of people have today, along the lines of :
Interested.
I'm interested as well.
Put me down as "interested".
Does Imitation of Christ count as transhumanism, or is too ideologically distinct?
I would say no, because their isn't enough emphasis on technology as the means of achieving post-humanity.
[Taking the lyrics literally, the whole thing is a pretty sweet transhumanist anthem.]
Friedrich Nietzsche
I don't think that is a good description of what people mean by "faith".
For a better idea of the concept of faith start here.
It's not what people intend "faith" to mean, but nevertheless it often ends up being its effective definition. (EDIT: To clarify, by "it" I am referring to Nietzsche's definition.)
Friedrich Nietzsche, foreseeing the CEV-problem? (Just kidding, of course)
-David Deutsch, The Beginning of Infinity.
Of course there is. A proof of a mathematical proposition is just as much itself a mathematical object as the proposition being proved; it exists just as independently of physics. The proof as written down is a physical object standing in the same relation to the real proof as the digit 2 before your eyes here bears to the real number 2.
But perhaps in the context Deutsch isn't making that confusion. What scope and limitations on mathematical knowledge, conditioned by the laws of nature, does he draw out from these considerations?
The Pythagorean theorem isn't proved or or even checked by measuring right triangles and noticing that a^2 + b^2 = c^2. Is the Pythagorean theorem not knowledge?
It had damn well better be checked that way, because it rests on the assumption of flat space, which may or may not be true. The derivation from the axioms is not checked by empirical data; the axioms themselves are. If you don't check the axioms, you don't have knowledge, you have pretty equations on paper, unconnected to any fact. Pythagoras is just as much empirical knowledge as Einstein; it's just that the axioms are closer to being built-in to the human brain, so you get an illusion of Eternal Obviousness. Try explaining the flat-space axioms to squid beings from the planet Rigel, which as it happens has a gravity field twenty times that of Earth, and see how far you get. "There's only one parallel line through a given point", you say, and the squid explodes in scorn. "Of course there's more than one! Here, I'll draw them for you and you can see for yourself!"
I agree. Isn't deriving propositions from axioms what mathematics is?
I don't think Deutsch means that mathematical proofs are all inductive. I think he means that proofs are constructed and checked on physical computing devices like brains or GPGPUs; and that because of that mathematical knowledge is not in a different ontological category than empirical knowledge.
I feel quite confident saying that mathematics will never undergo paradigm shifts, to use the terminology of Kuhn.
The same is not true for empirical sciences. Paradigm shifts have happened, and I expect them to happen in the future.
It believe it already has. Consider the Weierstrass revolution. Before Weierstrass, it was commonly accepted that while continuous functions may lack a derivative at a set of discrete points, it still had to have a derivative somewhere. Then Weierstrass developed a counterexample, which I think satisfies the Kuhnian "anomaly that cannot be explained within the current paradigm."
Another quick example: during the pre-War period, most differential geometry was concerned with embedded submanifolds in Euclidean space. However, this formulation made it difficult to describe or classify surfaces -- I seem to believe but don't have time to verify that even deciding whether two sets of algebraic equations determine isomorphic varieties is NP-hard. Hence, in the post-War period, intrinsic properties and descriptions.
EDIT: I was wrong, or at least imprecise. Isomorphism of varieties can be decided with Grobner bases, the reduction of which is still doubly-exponential in time, as far as I can tell. Complexity classes aren't in my domain; I shouldn't have said anything about them without looking it up. :(
Wikipedia gives the acceptance of non-Euclidean geometry as a "classical case" of a paradigm shift. I suspect that there were several other paradigm shifts involved from Euclid's math to our math: for instance, coordinate geometry, or the use of number theory applied to abstract quantities as opposed to lengths of line segments.
Would the whole Russel's paradox incident count as a mathematical paradigm shift?
Mencius Moldbug, A gentle introduction to Unqualified Reservations (part 2) (yay reflection!)
— Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago
-- Dinosaur Comics
Diana Wynne Jones, Dark Lord of Derkholm
--Matt Yglesias
I found that very poignant, but I'm not sure I agree with his final claim. I think he's committing the usual mistake of claiming impossible what seems hard.
The first thought that I have when considering how to describe the economy without using normative language is that all of the values that are commonly measured (i.e. GDP, unemployment, etc.) are chosen to be measured because they are proxies for things that people value.
In fact, the whole study of economics seems to me like the study of things people value and how they are distributed. If you choose proxies for value you're having a profound effect on what gets measured (consider the recent discussions of statistical significance as a proxy for evidence) and if you try to list everything that everyone values you end up butting up against unsolved problems.
Is it even hard? JFDI, or as we might say here, shut up and do the impossible. Is "efficient" a tendentious word? Taboo it. Is discussion being confused by mixing normative and positive concepts? DDTT.
The quote smells like rationalising to me.
Yglesias seems to be committing an error here by confusing technical jargon with common English. Efficient has a very specific meaning in economics (well, two specific meanings, depending on what kind market you're talking about). The word efficient is not meant to refer to universal goodness and it's a mistake to treat it as if it were.
Yeah, agreed. It's entirely possible to describe a system of economic agents without using such value-laden terns (though in some cases we may have to make up new terms). We don't do it, mostly because we don't want to. Which IMHO is fine; there's no particular reason why we should.
--Joseph de Maistre, Les soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg, Ch. I
I think this quote implies that most false opinions were deliberately invented to further someone's agenda, and I don't think that's true. People's brains just aren't optimised for forming true opinions.
(This is something of a sore point with me, as I've met too many religious people who challenge atheism with "What? You think [famously good guy X] was lying?")
And if you say that "guilty" here means not bothering to properly investigate before forming an opinion, then those who continue circulating it are equally guilty for not bothering to investigate before accepting an opinion.
Which exemplifies why "faith" isn't about belief in propositions so much as it is about trust in individuals (including imagined or possible individuals). Many religionists will even tell you so out front: that while the creed is important, having a trust relationship with God (or Jesus, or the Church, or a guru, etc.) is what their faith is all about.
Some guilt also falls onto those who are not eager enough to verify those opinions or the money they circulate.
The man on the top (at the beginning) is NOT guilty for everything.
To my way of thinking, it's quite possible for me to be fully responsible for a chain of events (for example, if they would not have occurred if not for my action, and I was aware of the likelihood of them occurring given my action, and no external forces constrained my choice so as to preclude acting differently) and for other people upstream and downstream of me to also be fully responsible for that chain of events. This is no more contradictory than my belief that object A is to the left of object B from one perspective and simultaneously to the right of object A from another. Responsibility is not some mysterious fluid out there in the world that gets portioned out to individuals, it's an attribute that we assign to entities in a mental and/or social model.
You seem to be claiming that models wherein total responsibility for an event is conserved across the entire known causal chain are superior to mental models where it isn't, but I don't quite see why i ought to believe that.
-- Neil DeGrasse Tyson
Fits this one, two out of three.
--Alain de Botton
The Princess Bride:
Man in Black: Inhale this, but do not touch.
Vizzini: [sniffs] I smell nothing.
Man in Black: What you do not smell is called iocane powder. It is odorless, tasteless, dissolves instantly in liquid, and is among the more deadlier poisons known to man.
[He puts the goblets behind his back and puts the poison into one of the goblets, then sets them down in front of him]
Man in Black: All right. Where is the poison? The battle of wits has begun. It ends when you decide and we both drink, and find out who is right... and who is dead.
[Vizzini stalls, then eventually chooses the glass in front of the man in black. They both drink, and Vizzini dies.]
Buttercup: And to think, all that time it was your cup that was poisoned.
Man in Black: They were both poisoned. I spent the last few years building up an immunity to iocane powder.
Vizzini of the Princess Bride, on the dangers of reasoning in absolutes - both logically ("this is proof it's not in my goblet") and propositionally (the implicit assumption Vizzini has that one and only one wine goblet is poisoned - P or ~P, as it were)
I don't agree that Vizzini is trying to reason in logical absolutes. He talks like he is, but he doesn't necessarily believe the things he's saying.
Man in Black: You're trying to trick me into giving away something. It won't work.
Vizzini: It has worked! You've given everything away! I know where the poison is!
My interpretation is that he really is trying to trick the man.
Later he distracts the man and swaps the glasses around; then he pretends to choose his own glass. He makes sure the man drinks first. I think he's reasoning/hoping that the man would not deliberately drink from the poisoned cup. So when the man does drink he believes his chosen cup is safe. If the man had been unwilling to drink, Vizzini would have assumed that he now held the poisoned glass, and perhaps resorted to treachery.
He's overconfident, but he's not a complete fool.
(I don't have strong confidence in this analysis, because he's a minor character in a movie.)
That the Man in Black describes it as a battle of wits - and not a puzzle - agrees with you.
-- Niels Henrik Abel, on how he developed his mathematical ability.
--Morris Raphael Cohen, quoted by Cohen in "The Earth Is Round (p < 0.05)"
--Diane Duane, High Wizardry
Robert Heinlein, Stranger In A Strange Land
Wait, Google says nobody's posted this joke on LessWrong before?
...
A philosopher, a scientist, and a mathematician are travelling through Scotland, gazing out the window of the train, when they see a sheep.
"Ah," says the philosopher, "I see that Scottish sheep are black."
"Well," says the scientist, "at least we see that some Scottish sheep are black."
"No," says the mathematician, "we merely know that there exists at least one sheep in Scotland which is black on at least one side."
"Actually," says the stage magician, "we merely know that there exists something in Scotland which appears to be a sheep which is black on at least one side when viewed from this spot."
--Alain de Botton
(Perhaps this individual quote is insightful (I can't tell), but this sort of causal analysis leads to basic confusions of levels of organization more often than it leads to insight.)
Adolfo Bioy Casares (my translation)
-- Douglas Adams
Why don't they just play tag with each other? Sounds like it would be fun.
Because they're jerks.
Indeed. The kind of people who would go "Whee! Let's play tag!" in this situation do not find themselves in Hell (at least in this particular one) in the first place.
-- Reg Braithwaite (raganwald)
--Gregory Cochran, in a comment here
This has 6 karma points, so I'm left curious about whether people have anything in mind about what real intellectuals shouldn't know.
Real intellectuals shouldn't know the details of fictional worlds. They shouldn't know the private business of their neighbors. They shouldn't know more about sports than is necessary for casual conversation on the matter (though no less either). They shouldn't know how to lie, how to manipulate people, they shouldn't know much about how to make money, they shouldn't know much about concrete political affairs unless that is their business. They shouldn't know too much about food or the maintenance of their health.
Real intellectuals should be able to play an instrument, but not very well. They shouldn't know too much about crimes, mental disorders, disasters, diseases, or wars. They should know the broad strokes of history, but not the details unless that is their primary business.
Real intellectuals should enjoy music, but never study it, unless that is their primary business. Most essentially, real intellectuals shouldn't know what they don't have the time or inclination to know well.
Is this meant to be funny?
Seemed serious and somewhat reasonable to me.
Real intellectuals shouldn't know things that science doesn't know.
Then science would have nothing to learn from them.
My immediate thought was a 'real intellectual' shouldn't fill their brain with random useless information, (e.g. spend their time reading tvtropes).
I could be interpreting it entirely wrong, but I'd guess this is the list Cochran had in mind:
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I interpret the quote as saying that to be a "good intellectual" one needs to not know the problems with the positions "good intellectuals" are expected to defend.
Also good, from that comment's OP:
Razib Khan
Yes but I didn't at first want to post that because it is slightly political. Though I guess the rationality core does outweigh any mind-killing.
You have a Rationality Core, too?
Mine tastes kind of like nougat.
On our kind not cooperating:
Michelle Obama
Sounds like a counter to "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake." (Attributed but seemingly falsely to Napoleon Bonaparte)
Natalie Wolchover
I saw on TV some kid lose convincingly against a RPS champion when the kid had been given a prepared (random) list of moves to make ahead of time. That can't be explained by strategy - it was either coincidence or it's possible to cheat by seeing which way your opponent's hand is unfolding and change your move at the last moment.
Or the losers were unintentionally signaling their moves beforehand.
The latter is definitely possible. Back when I was still playing RPS as a kid, I was fairly good at it; enough for somewhere upwards of 70% of my plays to be wins.
You don't want to change your move at the last moment though so much as you want to keep your hand in a plausibly formless configuration you can turn into a move at the last moment. Less likely to be called out for cheating.