Rationality Quotes March 2012
Here's the new thread for posting quotes, with the usual rules:
- Please post all quotes separately, so that they can be voted up/down separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then go ahead and post them together.)
- Do not quote yourself
- Do not quote comments/posts on LW/OB
- No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
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Comments (525)
--George Orwell, here
Since I have just read that "the intelligentsia" is usually now used to refer to artists etc. and doesn't often include scientists, this isn't as bad as I first thought; but still, it seems pretty silly to me - trying to appear deep by turning our expectations on their head. A common trick, and sometimes it can be used to make a good point... but what's the point being made here? Ordinary people are more rational than those engaged in intellectual pursuits? I doubt that, though rationality is in short supply in either category; but in any case, we know the "ordinary man" is extremely foolish in his beliefs.
Folk wisdom and common sense are a favored refuge of those who like to mock those foolish, Godless int'lectual types, and that's what this reminds me of; you know, the entirely too-common trope of the supposedly intelligent scientist or other educated person being shown up by the homespun wisdom and plain sense of Joe Ordinary. (Not to accuse Orwell of being anti-intellectual in general - I just don't like this particular quote.)
This quote isn't just about seeming deep, it refers to a frequently observed phenomenon. I think two main reasons for it are that intellectuals are better at rationalizing beliefs they arrived at for non-smart reasons (there is even a theory that some intellectuals signal their intelligence by rationalizing absurd beliefs) and the fact that they're frequently in ivory towers where day to day reality is less available.
Depends on which type of anti-intellectualism you're referring to.
I remember Tetlock's Expert Political Judgment suggested a different mechanism for intelligence to be self-defeating: clever arguing. In a forecaster's field of expertise, they have more material with which to justify unreasonable positions and refute reasonable ones, and therefore they are more able to resist the force of reality.
---Tim Ingold, “Clearing the Ground"
-- Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind, quoted here
I'm still trying to decide whether going off to live in the metaphorical colonies orbiting the moon is to be considered a bad thing or a really awesome idea.
It really depends how many catgirls I'm allowed to bring.
I mean, realistic orbiting colonies done using present-day space technology would be horrifying death traps, but metaphorical orbiting colonies are the future of humanity. I'm really confused here.
"Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith, let us, to the end, dare to do our duty as we understand it" - Abraham Lincoln's words in his February 26, 1860, Cooper Union Address
If right makes might, is the might you see right? Since blight and spite can also make might, is it safe to sight might and think it right?
Now, an application for Bayes' Theorem that rhymes!! Sweet Jesus!
I love it! How about in response: Since blight and spite can make might, its just not polite by citing might to assume that there's right, the probabilities fight between spite, blight and right so might given blight and might given spite must be subtracted from causes for might if the order's not right!
You have no idea how hard I'm giggling right now. Or maybe you do, because I'm telling you about it. Well met, mathpoet!
(I hope that mathpoets become enough of a real thing to warrant an unhyphenated word.)
Check out this alliteration: "When you see an infinite regress, consider a clever quining."
Quintopia on #lesswrong.
Though I don't remember who said it.
HULK EXPLAINS WHY WE SHOULD STOP IT WITH THE HERO JOURNEY SHIT
Naturally not. Harry would only do something that reckless if it was to save a general of the Dark Lord on the whim of his mentor. ;)
I of course agree with thatguy, with substitution of 'the most viable immediate' in there somewhere. It is a solution to all sorts of things.
If Eliezer Yudkowsky, the author, is lauding this statement, I think we can rule this out as Harry's solution.
As previously stated, Harry is not a perfect rationalist.
Neither is Eliezer Yudkowsky.
My philosophy is that it's okay to be imperfect, but not so imperfect that other people notice.
I propose that it's okay to be imperfect, but not so imperfect that reality notices.
Reality* notices everything.
*and Chuck Norris
No way! Chuck Norris <died 20 years ago/collided with a semi-trailer/stood on a claymore mine/accidentally swallowed a black hole> and didn't notice!
This is a cool-sounding slogan that doesn't actually say anything beyond "Winning is good."
No, it says that practical degrees of excellence are just fine and you don't actually have to achieve philosophically perfect excellence to be sufficiently effective.
It's the difference between not being able to solve an NP-complete problem perfectly, and being able to come up with pretty darn close numerical approximations that do the practical job just fine. (I think evolution achieves a lot of the latter, for example.)
I agree with your version, but "not getting caught" as a proxy for "good enough" is, at least to humans, not just wrong but actively misleading.
This variant of when all you have is a hammer is seen often enough to merit a name.
"When all you have is a powered-up Patronus, every problem looks like storming Azkaban is the answer"?
I meant something along the lines of "When your hammer is too darn impressive, everything begins to look like a nail."
"The greatest lesson in life is to know that even fools are sometimes right."
-Winston Churchill
-Morpheus, Deus Ex
Yes, I know, generalization from fictional evidence and the dangers thereof, etc. . . I think it a genuine insight, though. Just remember that humans are (almost) never motivated by just one thing.
Explain for me?
Certainly. The idea is that God was invented not just to explain the world (the standard answer to that question) but also as a sort of model of how a particular group of people wanted to be governed. One of the theses of the game is that governments constitute a system for (attempting to) compensate for the inability of people to rationally govern themselves, and that God is the ultimate realization of that attempt. A perfect government with a perfect understanding of human nature and access to everyone's opinions and desires (but without any actual humans involved). Over time, of course, views of what 'God' should be like shift with the ambient culture.
I agree, with the caveat that humans usually (and probably in this case) do things for multiple complicated reasons rather than just one. Also the caveat that Deus Ex is a video game.
Interesting theory, and perhaps one that's got legs, but there's some self-reinforcement going on in the religious sphere that keeps it from being unicausal -- if we've got a religion whose vision of God (or of a god of rulership like Odin or Jupiter, or of a divine hierarchy) is initially a simple reflection of how its members want to be governed, I'd nonetheless expect that to drift over time to variants which are more memorable or more flattering to adherents or more conducive to ingroup cohesion, not just to those which reflect changing mores of rulership. Then group identity effects will push those changes into adherents' models of proper rulership, and a nice little feedback loop takes shape.
This probably helps explain some of the more blatantly maladaptive aspects of religious law we know about, although I imagine costly signaling plays an important role too.
Can you expand on this a little? I'm interested to see what in particular you're thinking of.
If a sufficient number of people who wanted to stop war really did gather together, they would first of all begin by making war upon those who disagreed with them. And it is still more certain that they would make war on people who also want to stop wars but in another way. -G.I. Gurdjieff
Great quote, but I think I would just go ahead and make trade embargoes on anyone who started a war... and anyone who didn't also embargo anyone who, etc.
Not saying it would work (getting enough people to agree just wouldn't happen) but not everyone who wants to stop war is stupid.
-- nostrademons on Hacker news
That's a good quote! +1.
Unfortunately, for every rational action, there appears to be an equal and opposite irrational one: did you see bhousel's response?
Sigh.
Related to Schelling fences on slippery slopes:
— Thomas De Quincey
I don't get this quote, it strikes me as wit with no substance.
I have always read it as intentionally ironic commentary on the 'slippery slope' more than anything else.
I read it more specifically as a parody of moral slipperyslopism, in which slight moral infractions lead to the worst sort of behavior.
Arguably, we live in an era strongly shaped by revulsion at moral slipperyslopism.
Me too, honestly.
Presumably the quote is from De Quincey's essay "On Murder Considered as one of the Fine Arts", and with that context & perspective in mind it has a tad more substance.
Said by a pub manager I know to someone who came into his pub selling lucky white heather:
"I'm running a business turning over half a million pounds a year, and you're selling lucky heather door to door. Doesn't seem to work, does it?"
Albert Jay Nock, The Theory of Education in the United States
--Daniel Kahneman in Thinking, Fast and Slow
-William Hazlitt, attacking phrenology.
This quote is itself an example of the phenomenon it describes since it stems from a desire to be able to separate true from false science without the hard and messy process of looking at the territory.
Also hindsight bias.
I don't see that in the quote - it seems to be an attempted explanation for the existence of pseudoscience, not a heuristic for identifying such.
The problem is that it's still false. A lot of false science was developed by people honestly trying to find true causes. I also suspect that a good deal of actual science was developed by people who accepted a cause without enough evidence out of a desire to have a cause for everything and got lucky.
Politics is the art of the possible. Sometimes I’m tempted to say that political philosophy is the science of the impossible.
John Holbo
Chesterton, found here
-Douglas Adams
-Douglas Adams
-Douglas Adams
On the mind projection fallacy:
-John Stuart Mill
Every subjective feeling IS at least one thing - a bunch of neurons firing. Whether stored representational content activated in that firing has any connection to events represented happening outside the brain is another question.
-Charlie Munger
I'm surprised by how consistently misinterpreted the EMH is, even by people with the widest possible perspective on markets and economics. The EMH practically requires that some people make money by trading, because that's the mechanism which causes the market to become efficient. The EMH should really be understood to mean that as more and more money is leached out of the market by speculators, prices become better and better approximations to real net present values.
I've always thought of the Efficient Market Hypothesis as the anti-Tinkerbell: if everybody all starts clapping and believing in it, it dies.
See, for example, every bubble ever. "We don't need to worry about buying that thing for more than it seems to be worth, because prices are going up so we can always resell it for even more than that later!"
That's pretty much the thesis of Markets are Anti-Inductive by EY.
If they actually believed the market they were trading in was efficient they wouldn't believe that prices would continue to go up. They would expect them to follow the value of capital invested at that level of risk. Further - as applicable to any bubble that doesn't represent overinvestment in the entire stockmarket over all industries - they wouldn't jump on a given stock or group of stocks more than any other. They would buy random stocks from the market, probably distributed as widely as possible.
No, belief in an efficient market can only be used as a scapegoat here, not as a credible cause.
--Gregory House, M.D. - S02E11 "Need to Know"
Thought it was a duplicate of this superior quote, but it wasn't.
--SMBC Theater - Death
-Captain Kirk
Nonsense. I just threw Schrodinger's cat outside the future light cone. In your Everett branch is the cat alive or dead?
Ok, sure, having a physics where faster than light and even (direct) time travel are possible makes things easier.
Both?
No.
Well, in this case the universal wavefunction does factorise into a product of two functions 𝛙(light cone)𝛙(cat), where 𝛙(cat) has an "alive" branch and "dead" branch, but 𝛙(light cone) does not. I'd rather identify with 𝛙(light cone) than 𝛙(light cone × cat) [i.e. 𝛙(universe)], but whatever.
The point you were trying to make is correct anyway, either way.
"Temporarily" can be quite a long time... So when can we expect to probe plank-energy physics solidly enough to really test how quantum gravity works? :)
-- W. V. O. Quine
Did anyone ever track down the catalogue in question?
(Did the university in question later offer degrees in alternative medicine?)
(1978). I expected this to be older.
― Cory Doctorow, For The Win
I interpret this to mean that often times questions are overlooked because the possibility of them being true seems absurd. Similar to the Sherlock Holmes saying, “When you have eliminated all which is impossible, then whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.”
I interpret it to mean that Cory Doctorow doesn't fully consider the implications of hindsight bias when it comes to predicting the merits of asking questions from a given class.
Usually asking stupid questions really is just stupid.
But the expected return on asking a stupid question is still positive.
Asking stupid questions costs status.
From a slightly different perspective we could say that asking 'silly' questions (even good silly questions) costs status while asking stupid questions can potentially gain status in those cases where the people who hear you ask are themselves stupid (or otherwise incentivised to appreciate a given stupid gesture).
And this sort of thing is why some of us think all this 'status' talk is harmful.
It doesn't go away if you stop talking about it.
Personally, I think Robin Hanson tends to treat status as a hammer that turns all issues into nails; it's certainly possible to overuse a perspective for analyzing social interaction. But that doesn't mean that there aren't cases where you can only get a meaningful picture of social actions by taking it into consideration.
No, but worrying about status can keep you from getting answers to your 'stupid' questions.
This is partly why nerds have largely internalized the "there are no stupid questions" rule. See Obvious Answers to Simple Questions by isaacs of npm fame.
Nowadays, I can ask a question of the entire WEIRD world without losing any status. There are still some that just aren't worth wasting my time on. For example: Is the moon actually a moose?
No, not with even the slightest semblance of opportunity cost being taken into account.
I'd say there are probably cases where people have gotten hurt by not asking "stupid" questions.
Also, I think we need to dissolve what exactly a stupid question is?
Almost certainly. I am also fairly confident that there is someone who has been hurt because he did look before crossing the road.
But does the negative utility from the situations "find out, get hurt from it" outweight "don't find out, get hurt from it?"
Isn't the heuristic More Knowledge => Better Decisions quite powerful?
Get to the stupid questions after all the sensible questions have been exhausted if, for some reason, the expected utility of the next least stupid question is still positive.
I think we need to find out what we mean by stupid and sensible questions.
Of course one should in any given situation perform the experiments (ask questions) that gives highes expected information (largest number of bits) yield, I.E. ask if it is a vertebrae before you ask if it is a dog. What I think we disagree upon is the nature of a stupid question.
And now, it seems I cannot come up with a good definition of a stupid question as anything I previously would refer to as a "stupid question" can be equally reduced to humility.
Hrm. Okay, I see your point, I think. I think there's some benefit in devoting a small portion of your efforts to pursuing outlying hypotheses. Probably proportional to the chance of them being true, I guess, depending on how divisible the resources are. If by "stupid", Doctorow means "basic", he might be talking about overlooked issues everyone assumed had already been addressed. But I guess probabilistically that's the same thing - its unlikely after a certain amount of effort that basic issues haven't been addressed, so its an outlying hypothesis, and should again get approximately as much attention as its likelihood of being true, depending on resources and how neatly they can be divided up. And maybe let the unlikely things bubble up in importance if the previously-thought-more-likely things shrink due to apparently conflicting evidence... A glaring example to me seems the abrahamic god's nonexplanatory abilities going unquestioned for as long as they did. Like, treating god as a box to throw unexplained things in and then hiding god behind "mysteriousness" begs the question of why there's a god clouded in mysteriousness hanging around.
When you've eliminated the impossible, if whatever's left is sufficiently improbable, you probable haven't considered a wide enough space of candidate possibilities.
Seems fair. The Holmes saying seems a bit funny to me now that I think about it, because the probability of an unlikely event changes to become more likely when you've shown that reality appears constrained from the alternatives. I mean, I guess that's what he's trying to convey in his own way. But, by the definition of probability, the likelihood of the improbable event increases as constraints appear preventing the other possibilities. You're going from P(A) to P(A|B) to P(A|(B&C)) to.. etc. You shouldn't be simultaneously aware that an event is improbable and seeing that no other alternative is true at the same time, unless you're being informed of the probability, given the constraints, by someone else, which means that yes, they appear to be considering more candidate possibilities (or their estimate was incorrect. Or something I haven't thought of...).
Maybe he meant how a priori improbable it is?
That sounds right.
-David Wong
Why did this quote get down-voted by at least two people? I thought it was much, much better than the other quote I posted this month, which is currently sitting pretty at 32 karma despite not adding anything we didn't already know from the Human's Guide to Words sequence.
I upvoted it. The main point is sound as a point of plain logic. However I suspect it isn't quite clear enough and so prone to pattern matching to various political ideologies.
Although not directly contradictory, the idea expressed in the quote is somewhat at odds with libertarianism, which is popular on LW.
Is this true? I mean, isn't that universally recognized as a mind killer?, just like most other political philosophies?
Are there any demographical studies of LW's composition in personspace?
Well, it's true and it's false.
It's popular "on" LW in the sense that many of the people here identify as libertarians.
It's not popular "on" LW, in the sense that discussions of libertarianism are mostly unwelcome.
And, yes, the same is true of many other political philosophies.
The closest things we have to those are probably the mid-2009 and late 2011 surveys. People could fill in their age, gender, race, profession, a few other things, and...politics!
The politics question had some default categories people could choose: libertarian, liberal, socialist, conservative & Communist. In 2009, 45% ticked the libertarian box, and in 2011, 32% (among the people who gave easy-to-categorize answers). Although those obviously aren't majorities, libertarianism is relatively popular here.
Political philosophies are like philosophies in general, I think. However mind-killy they are, a person can't really avoid having one; if they believe they don't have one, they usually have one they just don't know about.
Can one say "I've never gotten that form of help?" And does "I think that help will hurt you in the long run" fall under "I think you're lying about needing help"?
At best, it would fall under "you are mistaken about needing help".
-- the character Sherkaner Underhill, from A Fire Upon the Deep, by Vernor Vinge.
If people believe traditions are valuable, they should anticipate that searching the past for more traditions is valuable. But we don't see that; we see most past traditions (paradoxically!) rejected with "things are different now".
This implication is true, but the premise typically is not. The conservative defense of tradition-for-tradition's-sake isn't really a defense of all traditions, it's a defense of long-term-stable, surviving traditions. Don't think, "It's old; revere it." Think, "It's working; don't break it." For traditions which weren't working well enough to be culturally preserved with no searching necessary, this heuristic doesn't apply. To the contrary, if it turned out that there was no correlation between how long a tradition survives and how worthwhile it is, then there would be no point in giving a priori respect to any traditions.
Hmm...my subjective impression is that people that talk a lot about tradition actually are more interested in history than people who don't.
My subjective impression is that people who talk a lot about tradition are more interested in "the past" than they are interested in "history". e.g. the history of our nation does not bear out the traditional idea that everyone is equal. Or for that matter, the tradition of social mobility in our country, or the tradition of a wedding veil, or the tradition of Christmas caroling v. wassailing, etc.
--Steve Sailer, here
Mustapha Mond evil?
Of course. He keeps the brave new world running. I don't think there are many takers here for the idea that Brave New World depicts a society we should desire and work for.
For all that it's fun to signal our horror at the ignorance/irrationality/stupidity of those in charge, I still think real-world 2012 Britain, USA, Canada and Australia are all better than Oceania circa 1984. For one thing, people are not very often written out of existence.
Or ... are they?
The quote states that the current establishment has no idea what's going on. How would they be competent enough in this state to band together, write people out of existence, then keep it a secret indefinitely?
The response was a joke.
At a certain point, conspiracy theories become indistinguishable from skeptical hypotheses.
Plutarch, found here
5-Second Films looks at past self and present self (NSFW written language).
I'm also fond of:
Karkat's just full of these gems of almost-wisdom.
Me: "The BOFH stories are just stories and certainly not role models. Ha! Ha! Baseball bat, please."
Boss: "The DNS stuff is driving me batty, but I'm not sure who needs taking into a small room and battering."
Me: "Your past self."
Boss: "Yeah, he was a right twat."
(I was thinking of Karkat, too.)
-Posted outside the mathematics reading room, Tromsø University
From the homepage of Kim C. Border
--Dara O'Briain
Duplicate: http://lesswrong.com/r/all/lw/9pk/rationality_quotes_february_2012/5tm0
-- Tim Minchin, Storm
That could just mean we're no good at solving mysteries that involve magic.
Also, I think there is a selection effect in so far as there are solved mysteries where the solution was magic; however, you'd probably argue that they were not solved correctly using no other evidence than that the solutions involved magic.
It depends what you mean by magic. Nowadays we communicate by bouncing invisible light off the sky, which would sure as hell qualify as "magic" to someone six hundred years ago.
The issue is that "magic", in the sense that I take Minchin to be using it, isn't a solution at all. No matter what the explanation is, once you've actually got it, it's not "magic" any more; it's "electrons" or "distortion of spacetime" or "computers" or whatever, the distinction being that we have equations for all of those things.
Take the witch trials, for example - to the best of my extremely limited knowledge, most witch trials involved very poorly-defined ideas about what a witch was capable of or what the signs of a witch were. If they had known how the accused were supposed to be screwing with reality, they wouldn't have called them "witches", but "scientists" or "politicians" or "guys with swords".
Admittedly all of those can have the same blank curiosity-stopping power as "magic" to some people, but "magic" almost always does. Which is why, once you've solved the mystery, it turns out to be Not Magic.
Consider something like this and notice that our modern "explanations" aren't much better.
And because of those damned atheists we can't even start a witch hunt to figure out who's responsible!
Sure we can.
We just need to rephrase "witch" in scientific terms.
(Also sorry about the political link, but with a topic like this that's inevitable).
UPDATE: This post goes into more details.
I think Tim Minchin was using "magic" the same way most people use "magic" - meaning ontologically basic mental things
To be fair, I've never asked him. But he included homoeopathy, which its practitioners claim isn't mental.
So he was using magic in the sense of "disagrees with current scientific theory", in that case the initial quote is circular.
And wrong. E.g., the perihelion precession of Mercury turned out to be caused by all matter being able to warp space and time by its very existence. We like to call that Not Magic, but it's magic in the sense of disagreeing with established scientific theory, and in the sense of being something that, if explained to someone who believed in Newtonian physics, would sound like magic.
I wouldn't say it would sound like magic. It would sound weird and inexplicable, but magic doesn't just sound inexplicable, it sounds like reality working in a mentalist, top-down sort of way. It sounds like associative thinking, believing that words or thoughts can act on reality directly, or things behaving in agentlike ways without any apparent mechanism for agency.
Relativity doesn't sound magical; in fact, I'd even say that it sounds antimagical because it runs so counter to our basic intuitions. Quantum entanglement does sound somewhat magical, but it's still well evidenced
Interesting. I hadn't thought about that. Now that I think about it, you're right; most fictional magic does act on things that are fundamental concepts in people's minds, rather than on things that are actually fundamental.
That said, I still say it all sounds like magic. I couldn't tell you exactly what algorithm my brain uses to come up with "sounds like magic", though.
I didn't just have fictional magic in mind; concepts like sympathetic magic are widespread, maybe even universal in human culture. Humans seem to have strong innate intuitions about the working of magic.
It's possible, but when I first heard it I honestly thought he meant "fundamentally mysterious stuff".
-- Evan V Symon, Cracked.com http://www.cracked.com/article_19669_the-5-saddest-attempts-to-take-over-country.html
Not completely serious, but think of it in relation to the sanity waterline...
Lynne Murray
Reminds me of a Bateson quote.
-- G.B. Shaw, "Man and Superman"
Shaw evinces a really weird, teleological view of evolution in that play, but in doing so expresses some remarkable and remarkably early (1903) transhumanist sentiments.
I love that quote, but if it carries a rationality lesson, I fail to see it. Seems more like an appeal to the tastes of the audience here.
I have to disagree; the lesson in the quote is "Win as hard as you can", which is very important if not very complicated.
I don't see the connection. If bringing a superior being to myself into existence is maximum win for me, that's not obvious. Not everyone, like Shaw's Don Juan, values the Superman.
Okay, I think I see what's going on. I originally interpreted "something better than myself" from the quote to include self-improvement. In context though, that's clearly not what it's implying.
Yeah, you're correct. Wasn't thinking very hard.
Winston Churchill
Incidentally, you need a double-newline to break the quote bar.
Thank you, I've rewritten it now.
-Charles Dodgeson(Lewis Carrol), Through the Looking Glass
Isn't Humpty Dumpty wrong, if the goal is intelligible conversation?
Absolutely. But if the goal is to establish dominance, as Humpty Dumpty (appears to) suggest, its technique often works.
At first when I posted it I think I was thinking of it as kind of endorsing a pragmatic approach to language usage. I mean, it hurts communication to change the meanings of words without telling anyone, but occasionally it might be useful to update meanings when old ones are no longer useful. It used to be that a "computer" was a professional employed to do calculations, then it became a device to do calculations with, now its a device to do all sorts of things with.
But I feel like that's kind of a dodge - you're absolutely right when you say changing the meanings arbitrarily (or possibly to achieve a weird sense of anthropomorphic dominance over it) harms communication, and should be avoided, unless the value of updating the sense of the word outweighs this.
It's also a useful way to establish a nonweird sense of dominance over my conversational partner.
Steven Kaas
I think the original is instrumentally more useful. On hearing "the road to hell is paved with good intentions", one of my reactions is "I have good intentions, I'd better make sure I'm not on the road to hell". On hearing your version my first reaction is "whew, this doesn't apply to me, only to those people with bad epistemology".
I suspect that's a standard reaction to hearing of any cognitive bias.
“Hah, this article nails those assholes perfectly!”
-- some asshole
Interesting, my immediate reaction is "oh, I guess I need to seriously work on my epistemology rather than work on having better intentions as such".
Or different values to the damner's, which may or may not count as "bad intentions" depending on your semantic preferences.
-Carl Sagan, The Demon Haunted World
-- Hans Moravec Time Travel and Computing
Not quiet, since you need time travel to establish the final timeline.
Extremely cool in an armchair-physicist sort of way, but what's the rationality?
Fair point -- I actually wasn't 100% convinced myself it fits here... Reason for posting it anyway was that (a) it somehow reminded me of the omega/2-boxes problem (i.e., the paradoxal way how present and past seem to influence each other), (b) Hans Moravec work touches on so many of the AI/transhumanist themes common in LW and (c) I found it such a clever observation that I thought people here would appreciate.
Not sure if that's enough reason, but that's how it went.
I guess 'it all adds up to normality', but that's a stretch.