Anyone who categorically or near-categorically downvotes your contributions is unlikely to be swayed by a polite request for them not to do so.
Of course, but in this case it seemed deontologically necessary to request it anyway; I would feel guilty if I didn't even make a token effort to keep people from being needlessly self-defeating. This happens to me all the time: "if it's normally distributed then you should just straightforwardly optimize for the median outcome" versus "a heavy-tailed distribution is more accurate or at least acts as a better proxy for accuracy, we should optimize for rare but significant events on the tails". I feel like the latter is often the case but people systematically don't see it and subsequently predictably shoot their own feet off.
ETA: "To not forget scenarios consistent with the evidence, even at the cost of overweighting them; to prioritize low relative entropy over low expected absolute error, as a proxy for expected costs from error."
If you consider it important that certain contributions not be unfairly downvoted, and you consider it likely that making those contributions under your name will result in them being unfairly downvoted, it would seem to follow that you consider it important not to make those contributions under your name. No?
How do you notice when you're rationalizing? Like, what *actually* tips you off, in real life?
I've listed my cues below; please add your own (one idea per comment), and upvote the comments that you either: (a) use; or (b) will now try using.
I'll be using this list in a trial rationality seminar on Wednesday; it also sounds useful in general.