Suppose someone has built a self-improving AI, and it's the only one in existence (hence they have a "monopoly"). Then there might be two possibilities, either it's Friendly, or not. In the former case, how would it be rational to publish the source code and thereby allow others to build UFAIs? In the latter case, a reasonable defense might be to forcibly shut down the UFAI if it's not too late. What would publishing its source code accomplish?
Edit: Is the idea that the UFAI hasn't taken over the world yet, but for some technical or political reason it can't be shut down, and the source code is published because many UFAIs are for some reason better than a single UFAI?
I don't think the FAI / UFAI distinction is particularly helpful in this case. That framework implies that this is a property of the machine itself. Here we are talking about the widespread release of a machine with a programmable utility function. Its effects will depend on the nature and structure society in which it is released into (and the utility functions that are used with it) - rather than being solely attributes of the machine itself.
If you are dealing with a secretive monopolist, nobody on the outside is going to know what kind of machine they...
...has finally been published.
Contents:
The issue consists of responses to Chalmers (2010). Future volumes will contain additional articles from Shulman & Bostrom, Igor Aleksander, Richard Brown, Ray Kurzweil, Pamela McCorduck, Chris Nunn, Arkady Plotnitsky, Jesse Prinz, Susan Schneider, Murray Shanahan, Burt Voorhees, and a response from Chalmers.
McDermott's chapter should be supplemented with this, which he says he didn't have space for in his JCS article.