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ChrisHallquist comments on How to Fix Science - Less Wrong
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What should I read to get a good defense of Bayesianism--that isn't just pointing out difficulties with frequentism, NHST, or whatever? I understand the math, but am skeptical that it can be universally applied, due to problems with coming up with the relevant priors and likelihoods.
It's like the problem with simple deduction in philosophy. Yes, if your premises are right, valid deductions will lead you to true conclusions, but the problem is knowing whether the premises used by the old metaphysicians (or modern ones, for that matter) are true. Bayesianism fails to solve this problem for many cases (though I'm not denying that you do sometimes know the relevant probabilities).
I do definitely plan on getting my hands on a copy of Richard Carrier's new book when it comes out, so if that's currently the best defense of Bayesianism out there, I'll just wait another two months.
Probability theory can be derived as the extension of classical logic to the case where propositions are assigned plausibilities rather than truth values,so it's not merely like the GIGO problem with simple deduction -- it's the direct inheritance of that problem.
You're right. I'll make sure to say "is the same problem" in the future.
A philosophical treatise of universal induction.
This doesnt seem particular generally actionable for testing scientific hypotheses (which is the general problem with proposing bayes as a way to fix science).
I suspect that using only valid deductions, while manipulating terms that already have real meanings attached to them, probably poses at least as great a problem as avoiding untrue premises.
I remember during a logic class I took, the teacher made an error of deduction, and I called her out on it. She insisted that it was correct, and every other student in the class agreed. I tried to explain the mistake to her after class, and wasn't able to get her to see the error until I drew a diagram to explain it.
It was only an introductory level class, but I don't get the impression that most practicing philosophers are at a higher standard.
You may want to check out John Earman's Bayes or Bust?.