metaphysicist comments on How to Fix Science - Less Wrong

50 Post author: lukeprog 07 March 2012 02:51AM

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Comment author: metaphysicist 18 March 2012 01:23:17AM *  1 point [-]

In the second case, you only need to construct enough alternative outcomes to certify your claim. In the first case, you need to prove a universal statement about all possible theories.

All these arguments are at best suggestive. Our abductive capacities are such as to suggest that proving a universal statement about all possible theories isn't necessarily hard. Your arguments, I think, flow from and then confirm a nominalistic bias: accept concrete data; beware of general theories.

There are universal statements known with greater certainly than any particular data, e.g., life evolved from inanimate matter and mind always supervenes on physics.

Comment author: Tyrrell_McAllister 18 March 2012 03:09:51AM *  0 points [-]

I agree that

  1. some universal statements about all theories are very probable, and that

  2. some of our theories are more probable than any particular data.

I'm not seeing why either of these facts are in tension with my previous comment. Would you elaborate?

The claims I made are true of certain priors. I'm not trying to argue you into using such a prior. Right now I only want to make the points that (1) a Bayesian can coherently use a prior satisfying the properties I described, and that (2) falsificationism is true, in a weakened but precise sense, under such a prior.