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Swimmer963 comments on Rationally Irrational - Less Wrong
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I would agree with you there, in the sense that social sciences very rarely have fundamental laws or absolute truths. But the problem with this view is thinking it's okay for two concepts to appear to be contradictory. Because they can't be contradictory on the level of atoms and molecules. People run on physics.
It's like saying that "Mary had chemotherapy for her cancer, and her cancer went into remission, but Joe had chemotherapy and he died anyway" is a paradox. The only reason that phrase appears contradictory is that information is being lost, lots of it. If you could look at the source code for the universe, you'd be able to see whether Joe's cancer had been at a more advanced stage than Mary's, or whether his tumor had genetic mutations making it harder to kill than Mary's, or whether his DNA predisposed him to more aggressive cancers, period. Or maybe Joe happened to catch pneumonia during his chemo, and Mary didn't.
Humans behave rationally in some situations. Under certain conditions, you give a human input and you get an output, and if you had somehow fed that same complex input to an advanced computer program designed to make rational decisions, it would have given the same output. In some situations, though, humans take input and you get an output that's different from the decision your computer program would make, i.e. irrational. But if you took apart the universe's source code for your human brain, you'd see that both decisions were the result of operations being done with neurons. The "irrational" decision doesn't appear in the brain out of nowhere; it's still processed in the brain itself.
The word for "all methods should get the same answer" is consilience. (I only found out recently this was the word for it.)
1.Atoms and molecules can't be contradictory 2.Humans are made up of atoms and molecules. 3.Therefore, humans can't be contradictory
A system as a whole contains properties that do not exist if you were to break it apart. The system does not exist if you break it apart. Atoms are not people, even if people come from atoms. Just as seeds are not trees, even though trees come from seeds. It is pragmatically useless to attempt to translate some statement about atoms into a statement about humans. You say atoms and molecules cannot be contradictory, they also cannot be smashed with a hammer, die from a lack of oxygen, or dance the tango. What atoms are or are not capable of is not detriment of what humans are or are not capable of. Secondly, I agree that contradictory statements arise from information being lost, but what I would add is that the loss of information is the process of language. To create and use language is to subjectively divide the totality of reality into decodable chunks. If you read my response to Arran_Stirton ‘s response I say more about this there.
I'm not disagreeing with the fact that you can make true contradictory statements about humans. Of course humans have properties that don't exist at the atomic level, and it's inevitable that the process of using words as levers for complex concepts results in information loss–if you didn't have some way of filtering out information, communication would be impossible.
But it's the statements you can make with language that are contradictory, not the humans themselves. You can claim that it's a paradox, but it's a very trivial and not very interesting kind of paradox.
If you accept that statements as much as if not more than biology are what define humans, then it become very interesting.
What's an example of a statement that defines humans more than biology? I still think that we're talking about a contradiction/paradox in the map, not the territory.
I guess the point I am trying to make is that for humans the map is the territory.
I think we've gotten down to the root of our disagreement here. Obviously you find that "for humans, the map is the territory" is a productive framework to do your analyses within. I don't know much about sociology, anthropology, or philosophy, but is this the standard theoretical framework in those fields?
The problem I have with it is that the territory is still there. It doesn't change depending on how accurate our map is. Yes, humans perceive the rest of the universe, including their own bodies, through a very narrow sensory window, and that information is then processed by messy, biased, thrown-together-by-evolution brain hardware. We can't step out of our heads and see the territory "as it really is". But we do have some information, and we can seek out more information, and we benefit from doing that, because the rest of the universe exists and will have its effects on us regardless of what we believe.
Now, I think what you might be trying to say is that what kind of map you have has an effect on what you do and think. I completely agree. Someone could state that 'humans are irrational', and if they believed it to be true, it might influence their behaviour, for example the way they treat other humans. Someone else could state that 'humans are rational', and that would affect the way they treat others, too. You could say that the map goes out and changes the territory in that particular example–the causal arrows run in both directions, rather than it being just the territory that is fed in to produce the map.
This is a useful point to make. But it's not the same as "the map is the territory." There's a lot of universe out there that no human knows about or understands, and that means it isn't on any maps yet, but you can't say that by definition it doesn't exist for humans. Hell, there are things about our own body that we don't understand and can't predict (why some respond differently to treatment than others, for example), but that doesn't mean that the atoms making up a human's tumour are confused about how to behave. The blank is on the map, i.e. our theories and understanding, and not in the territory, and it's a pretty irritating blank to have, which tons of people would like to be filled.
As a side note: I looked up the word 'paradox' on my desktop dictionary, and there are 3 different definitions offered.
I think #1 is the standard that most people keep in their head for the word, and #2 and #3 are closer to the way you were using it. Apparently they are all acceptable definitions!
I think a gap in our communication is the type of map we visualize in our use of this analogy. When we say map, what type of map are you envisioning? This is just a guess, but to me it seems like you are imagining a piece of paper with topography, landmarks, and other various symbols marked out on it. It is from this conception of a map that you make the claim "the territory is still there." I imagine you see the individual of our analogy with their nose pressed into this type of parchment moving solely based on its markings and symbols. For you this is a bad choice of navigating, because the individual is ignoring the reality that is divorced from the parchment.
Is this an accurate portrayal of your position within this analogy?
When I say, "The map is the territory." I am not talking about piece of parchment with symbols on it. I literally mean that the map is the territory. As when you navigate by the moss on trees, or the stars in the sky.
When I say "the map is the territory" as in moss or stars, I am implying that humans do not have the type of agency/power over the map that the latter analogy implies. A map as a piece of paper is completely constructed through human will. a map that is the territory is not.
You say
By saying the map is the territory I am implying that it cannot be filled in; that humans do not construct the map, they just interpret it. There is nothing to be filled in. Do you see how these are radically different interpretations of map? I see this as the point of difference between us.
To answer some of your side questions- - This theory is the core of modern anthropology, but only some sub-divisons of the other mentioned fields. In philosophy it is highly controversial, because it questions the entire western project of philosophy and its purpose. - If you look back to my original post to arran, I state that there are multiple definitions of a paradox and all are acceptable. That what is fruitful is not trying to argue about which definition is correct, but to accept the plurality and try to learn a new point of reference from the one you have been trained in.
But if you close your eyes and envision your knowledge and understanding of a particular area–I don't know, different types of trees, or different types of cancer, or something–you're not referring to the territory. Not right at that moment. You're not out in the field holding leaves from 6 different types of North American trees, comparing the shape. You're not comparing cancerous to normal cells under a microscope. You're going by memory, by concepts and mental models and words. Humans are good at a lot of things because of that capacity to keep information in our head and navigate by it, instead of needing those leaves or slides right in front of us before we can think about them. I call those mental concepts a map. Do you call them something different?
Maybe you're trying to say that humans can't arbitrarily create maps. When you create your beliefs, it's because you go out there and look at leaves and say to yourself "wow, this one has lobes and looks a bit like a ladder...I'll call it "oak"." You don't sit at home and arbitrarily decide to believe that there is a kind of tree called an oak and then draw what you think an aesthetically pleasing oak leaf would look like. (Actually, there are some areas of human "knowledge" that are depressingly like this. Theology, anyone?)
Still, if you're later reading a book about insects and you read about the 'oak gall beetle' that infests oak trees and makes them produce galls, you don't have to go back to the forest and stand looking at a tree to know what the author's talking about it. You remember what an oak tree looks like, or at least the salient details that separate all oak trees from all maple and fir and tamarack trees. I'd call that navigating by the map.
You are not divorced from the territory. When you close your eyes the images and ideas you create are not magically outside of the territory they are the territory. In my analogy with the moss and stars the mental concepts are the moss and stars. Closing your eyes as opposed to seeing; reading a book as opposed to being there; these analogies setup an inside-outside dichotomy. I am saying this is a false dichotomy. The map is the territory.
What I am trying to say is that reading from a book vs. being there and closing your eyes vs looking are not opposites. They appear to be opposites due to the philosophical position engrained in our language. The map-territory divide is erroneous. The map is the territory; the territory is the map. There is no inner mental world and outer "real" world; this supposes a stratification of reality that simply does not exist. Our minds are not abstract souls or essential essences. The human brain and everything it does is a part of the territory.
Your position seems to be that "hard" science is impossible. I'm a big fan of Kuhn and Feyerabend, but it is possible to make accurate predictions about the future state of physical objects. If the map (my beliefs about physical objects) and the territory (physical objects) were indistinguishable, then there's no reason to ever expect accurate predictions. Given the accuracy of predictions, the overwhelmingly likely conclusion is that there is something outside and independent of our beliefs about the world.
This may help articulate the point of the map/territory metaphor. In short, the only completely accurate depiction of California is . . . the physical object California. But people tend to mistake maps of California for the thing itself. When they find an error in the map, they think something is wrong with California, not their image of California.
In an oversimplification yes.
I agree that it is possible to make accurate predictions about the future state of physical objects.
I don't follow your reasoning here. I see my beliefs as both derived from and directly impacting the "territory" they exist within. I don't see how this denies the possibility of accurate predictions.
I am familiar with this work, but the map/territory metaphor depicted here is inadequate for the purpose of what I am trying to convey. I disagree with the core ontological assumption being made here, namely a divide between the map and the territory.
I was under the impression that, according to you, this "something" is completely inaccessible to us, as evidenced by the incommensurability of our models. But maybe I'm wrong.