Sometimes it’s rational to seek more information before acting, but sometimes you need to just act on what you think you know. You have to weigh the cost of getting more information with the expected value of that information.
How does this change anything? You are still left with an expected utility calculation. In this case it is the expected utility of gathering more information.
From the article:
If intuition will give you better results than slow, deliberative reasoning, then rationally you should use intuition.
Again, this changes nothing. In this case you will have to calculate the expected utility of using your intuition. Which seems just as impossible to me. All you can possible do is to use your intuition to decide if you should use your intuition.
Consider someone told you that their intuition says that they should not act on the information they have about risks from AI and that the value of seeking more information is too low because they don't expect to find any information that would change their mind at this point. Then how could you possible come to an agreement with them about risks from AI if you both rely on your intuitions?
The post you linked to talks a lot about "winning". But if you define rationality in terms of winning, then how exactly are you going to figure out what is "rational" without any information about how reliable your intuitions or heuristics are in a special situation?
The article seems to argue against a frequentist approach when it is the only way to decide which is the winning strategy. Otherwise, if you are not willing to wait for new information, you rely on your intuition in any case, whether your choice is to use the principle of expected utility or to rely on your intuition.
In other words, if a frequentist approach is impossible you could as well just say that you "feel" you are right. Not that it is rational to do it.
All you can possible do is to use your intuition to decide if you should use your intuition.
Yes, you have to start with something more basic than expected utility calculation, or you run into an infinite regress. Expected utility calculations are tools and you use them to achieve your goals more effectively. If you want to shoot yourself in the foot, nobody can prevent you from doing so.
...Consider someone told you that their intuition says that they should not act on the information they have about risks from AI and that the value of seeking more infor
I would like to ask for help on how to use expected utility maximization, in practice, to maximally achieve my goals.
As a real world example I would like to use the post 'Epistle to the New York Less Wrongians' by Eliezer Yudkowsky and his visit to New York.
How did Eliezer Yudkowsky compute that it would maximize his expected utility to visit New York?
It seems that the first thing he would have to do is to figure out what he really wants, his preferences1, right? The next step would be to formalize his preferences by describing it as a utility function and assign a certain number of utils2 to each member of the set, e.g. his own survival. This description would have to be precise enough to figure out what it would mean to maximize his utility function.
Now before he can continue he will first have to compute the expected utility of computing the expected utility of computing the expected utility of computing the expected utility3 ... and also compare it with alternative heuristics4.
He then has to figure out each and every possible action he might take, and study all of their logical implications, to learn about all possible world states he might achieve by those decisions, calculate the utility of each world state and the average utility of each action leading up to those various possible world states5.
To do so he has to figure out the probability of each world state. This further requires him to come up with a prior probability for each case and study all available data. For example, how likely it is to die in a plane crash, how long it would take to be cryonically suspended from where he is in case of a fatality, the crime rate and if aliens might abduct him (he might discount the last example, but then he would first have to figure out the right level of small probabilities that are considered too unlikely to be relevant for judgment and decision making).
I probably miss some technical details and got others wrong. But this shouldn't detract too much from my general request. Could you please explain how Less Wrong style rationality is to be applied practically? I would also be happy if you could point out some worked examples or suggest relevant literature. Thank you.
I also want to note that I am not the only one who doesn't know how to actually apply what is being discussed on Less Wrong in practice. From the comments:
I can't help but agree.
P.S. If you really want to know how I feel about Less Wrong then read the post 'Ontological Therapy' by user:muflax.
1. What are "preferences" and how do you figure out what long-term goals are stable enough under real world influence to allow you to make time-consistent decisions?
2. How is utility grounded and how can it be consistently assigned to reflect your true preferences without having to rely on your intuition, i.e. pull a number out of thin air? Also, will the definition of utility keep changing as we make more observations? And how do you account for that possibility?
3. Where and how do you draw the line?
4. How do you account for model uncertainty?
5. Any finite list of actions maximizes infinitely many different quantities. So, how does utility become well-defined?