Explicitly working out the probabilities for a situation is not always possible or desirable for real world situations. We're just not that smart.
You should not, however, take that to mean that decision theory cannot work at all. You should certainly, if you find yourself losing money, stop and do the math and find out if you're being dutch booked. You should certainly do the math on investments to find out if they have positive expected utility. Anywhere that you have real numbers, probability theory suddenly outstrips all the hazy heuristics you normally rely on.
It can even be applied closer to home. When I'm looking at whether or not to drop a class, I plot a probability distribution for my past grades, figure out the scores I need to pass, and compute, if I continue to perform at past levels, my probability of passing the class with the minimum grade to maintain my scholarships. Then I figure out how much money I would pay to suddenly, magically, have passed the class, how much money someone would have to pay me to take the class, and how much someone would have to pay me to do the paperwork to switch. If the math doesn't wash, I drop the class, study up over the break, and re-take it the next semester with a better utility forecast.
I would like to ask for help on how to use expected utility maximization, in practice, to maximally achieve my goals.
As a real world example I would like to use the post 'Epistle to the New York Less Wrongians' by Eliezer Yudkowsky and his visit to New York.
How did Eliezer Yudkowsky compute that it would maximize his expected utility to visit New York?
It seems that the first thing he would have to do is to figure out what he really wants, his preferences1, right? The next step would be to formalize his preferences by describing it as a utility function and assign a certain number of utils2 to each member of the set, e.g. his own survival. This description would have to be precise enough to figure out what it would mean to maximize his utility function.
Now before he can continue he will first have to compute the expected utility of computing the expected utility of computing the expected utility of computing the expected utility3 ... and also compare it with alternative heuristics4.
He then has to figure out each and every possible action he might take, and study all of their logical implications, to learn about all possible world states he might achieve by those decisions, calculate the utility of each world state and the average utility of each action leading up to those various possible world states5.
To do so he has to figure out the probability of each world state. This further requires him to come up with a prior probability for each case and study all available data. For example, how likely it is to die in a plane crash, how long it would take to be cryonically suspended from where he is in case of a fatality, the crime rate and if aliens might abduct him (he might discount the last example, but then he would first have to figure out the right level of small probabilities that are considered too unlikely to be relevant for judgment and decision making).
I probably miss some technical details and got others wrong. But this shouldn't detract too much from my general request. Could you please explain how Less Wrong style rationality is to be applied practically? I would also be happy if you could point out some worked examples or suggest relevant literature. Thank you.
I also want to note that I am not the only one who doesn't know how to actually apply what is being discussed on Less Wrong in practice. From the comments:
I can't help but agree.
P.S. If you really want to know how I feel about Less Wrong then read the post 'Ontological Therapy' by user:muflax.
1. What are "preferences" and how do you figure out what long-term goals are stable enough under real world influence to allow you to make time-consistent decisions?
2. How is utility grounded and how can it be consistently assigned to reflect your true preferences without having to rely on your intuition, i.e. pull a number out of thin air? Also, will the definition of utility keep changing as we make more observations? And how do you account for that possibility?
3. Where and how do you draw the line?
4. How do you account for model uncertainty?
5. Any finite list of actions maximizes infinitely many different quantities. So, how does utility become well-defined?