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MileyCyrus comments on Schelling fences on slippery slopes - Less Wrong
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Comments (189)
Couldn't the alien argue that slippery slopes slip both ways? If we start allowing Holocaust denial, soon it will be legal to yell "fire!" in a theater.
You know... if I actually yelled "Fire!" in a theater I think I'd just end up with people looking at me like I was a dick.
The example when coined almost certainly was a reference to the famous Italian Hall Disaster in which it seems 73 people died because of someone falsely yelling "fire".
If you shout from the middle of the crowd - probably so. If you enter - visibly exhalirated - just to shout "Fire!", there is a risk.
Fire suppression systems have gotten better, we don't overcrowd theaters anymore, and we now use electricity for lighting instead of burning things, so fires are less common and not as dangerous.
Real life, 2007 -- 100 dead.
Real life, 2013 -- 242 dead.
Reality is more complicated than that. Grandparent is right about deaths from fire in many parts of the world. The following deals with the fire death rate from 1979 to 1992.
-- "Fire Death Rate Trends: An International Perspective"
For the US in particular, this trend has continued into the present.
We leave as an exercise to the reader what exactly the flaw in your argument was.
(By convention there the reference is to 'grandparent', not 'parent'. Context is sufficient here to correct the meaning but in less clear circumstances it would be misleading.)
Fixed.
Single datapoints rarely matter with these kinds of things. The overall statistics strongly support the grandparent's point.
"These kinds of things" are public perception and, in particular, public perception of risks and what to be afraid of. For these kinds of things single datapoints matter a great deal. Prime example: 9/11.
Public perception of risks notoriously does not care about statistics.
I see, I took you to be responding only to jkaufman's comment.
Since rare dangers typically get more publicity than common dangers, we might even expect that under many circumstances public angst may increase as the actual danger decreases (due to the remaining incidents getting overreported).
This. This this this. I feel like the "fire in a crowded theater" example is a pretty painfully outdated one. If you imagine a more crowded theater made of dry wood with no sprinklers/fire extinguishers, it becomes a lot more reasonable to expect people to panic at the thought of a fire.
I think the prevalence of the "falsely shouting fire in theater" quote is a product of usage of that quote in an important freedom speech decision (that ultimately ruled against free speech).
Thomblake suggests convincingly that the quote was referencing a then recent disaster, but you are correct that the circumstances in theaters today are so different that the quote lacks the same impact as when it was written. In other words, the same legal reasoning today would probably be supported by a more culturally relevant example.
For what it is worth, the legal standard on liability for possible harm from speech is different (and more speech protective) than the decision in the Schenk case from which the quote originates.
Yes, but the danger of a false call of "Fire!" lies in the subsequent stampede (and, even if no one is hurt, the inevitable disruption of everyone's prior activity).
Wedrifid was saying that people aren't that likely to stampede or even evacuate if someone yells "fire" now. I think he's right. If I started shouting "fire" right now I think the people around me would think I'd snapped and would at the least ask what I was seeing that they weren't.
(If I actually wanted people to listen to me I would start by asking "do you smell fire?" to the person next to me. Two people shouting fire is much less likely to be someone hallucinating.)
Nowadays you might also get charged with making terrorist threats.
Speaking of nowadays, screaming "It's a bomb, it's going to blow" is probably going to be much more effective at creating stampedes...
Or, for that matter, held without charge or trial.
Or perhaps "Look! It's Justin Bieber and he's taking his shirt off!".
Any theatre offering access to the public should be able to evacuate all patrons safely in the event of a real fire, thus someone falsely yelling "fire!" simply inconveniences people and should be banned by the owner. There is no need to get the police involved and have this ridiculous example as legitimisation on limits on free speech in a public arena.
There are limits that should be upheld, but not necessarily by police (e.g. someone being slandered could sue rather than have the slanderer arrested.) Incitement to violence may be banned as a pragmatic measure, but that would be my Schelling point (and even then I'm not 100% sure...)
Being able to evacuate all patrons with sufficient safety is not necessarily the same thing as being able to evacuate all patrons with perfect safety.
A theater than can protect its patrons against a real fire doesn't necessarily equal a theater that can protect its patrons against a false fire.
Nor do I find it more reasonable to ban businesses that are incapable of protecting all patrons against the repercussions of all types of lying. I find it far more reasonable, and much of a "Schelling point" to ban spreading knowingly false information.
That's effectively a matter of degree -- you're just saying that the punishment should be a fine instead of a prison sentence. It's not really a difference in kind.
That is a patently false statement.
And thus the slippery slope becomes a teflon cliff.
One is criminal and the other is civil? One is a dispute between two (equal under the law) individuals in front of a (supposedly) impartial judge and the other is the state versus an individual? Quite a lot of difference really.
How do you know this? In the case of a true fire, fire extinguishers may activate, fire exits might automatically open, or perhaps the theater's army of flying robots would come and carry everyone to safety. Or perhaps the theater is designed from such materials that it can't catch fire.
Excuse me? The concept of "knowing lie" isn't a good enough Schelling Point for you?
I'm in favour of banning the act of falsely shouting "Fire" in a theater, for the exact same reason that I'm in favour of banning the act of giving poison to other people while calling it "orange juice"
I don't think you'd have any opposition to treating the latter an act of murder, why are you against treating the former likewise an act of murder?
This is a legalism, a difference in labelling, nothing else.
Again mere legalism. In practical terms, it's the same, at least from the point of view of the accused -- you get accused for something, someone is accusing you, if you're found guilty you get punished. Simple as that.
I believe there actually is a salient distinction between the two. Namely, whereas the harm in the poisoning is the act of placing the poison in the drink and giving it to another person, the act in shouting "Fire!" is in the believing that there is no fire and the harm resulting from the shout. While the distinction would not amount to much for an all-knowing god, in reality it would probably prove difficult to establish what the person shouting expected the result to be, and to determine whether he had believed there was a fire or not. Punishing alarmist statements is indeed a potential slippery slope - if someone shouts "Earthquake!" in the middle of a crowded street and pedestrians panic and someone ends up in the traffic, shall we prosecute this shouter too? Or what if someone proclaims that the nation is under imminent threat of nuclear attack and this results in massive economic disruption as people try to hoard survival-type goods?
The problem here is that it is difficult for a court to assess whether the person actually believed what they said, and whether they anticipated (perhaps a priori rationally) that there would be no negative consequences of their proclamation.
It may also interest you to know that the original "shouting fire in a crowded theater" claim was part of a judicial ruling written by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in which the Supreme court unanimously ruled that it was a violation of the Espionage Act of 1917, to distribute flyers opposing the draft during World War I, which I think is a suitable example of its slippery slope potential. My general impression is that while there have been real instances of deaths caused by such shouts, most of these occurred before recent times, although I am not too confident in this.
Courts do this all the time. Further, there's a well developed set of doctrines about when a person is held responsible for consequences that the person did not actually anticipate.
More generally, the quote about falsely shouting fire is not intended to support a particular test for the limits of freedom of speech. Rather, the quote makes the point that speech is not unlimited.I can agree that Schneck's conviction should have been overturned without believing that no pure speech can have legal consequences.
As an aside, the current test in the United States is imminent lawless action, a much more pro-speech standard. Nonetheless, a knowing false statement likely to lead to multiple injuries is almost certainly punishable by the criminal law.
Thanks, that helps update my knowledge of the current standards. I certainly agree that what you say is reasonable, however I do not think that a potential for a slippery slope effect can be eliminated through carefully formulated test or doctrines (merely substantially reduced). For example, it is conceivable that in emergencies the fact that we now accept some restrictions on free speech will make it much easier to accept further restrictions and thus make unreasonable restriction more likely.
Whether that is a reasonable compromise depends on the actual danger of "pure speech" causing negative consequences, on alternative ways of mitigating them, and on the actual degree of the slipperiness of the slope. Personally, based on my current knowledge, I would prefer to pursue various alternatives before resorting to criminal legal action, however that's dependent on actual facts and has little to do with the main topic being discussed.
This distinction breaks down very quickly. Consider Hustler v. Falwell, which limited the scope of civil remedies because enforcement of those remedies violated freedom of speech.
Or, more recently, Phelps v. Snyder, where the Court overturned a jury verdict for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on Fred Phelps's First Amendment protected funeral protest.
Limiting the scope of a civil remedy is somewhat removed from the distinctions between civil and criminal, no?
No. If you really believe the public/private distinction is solid, then the First Amendment has nothing to do with private (i.e. civil) disputes. So Hustler should have come out the other way.
In general, American law has really struggled with the public/private distinction. I would say this is because the distinction is not rigorously meaningful - although I doubt most judges would frame it quite that way.
Regardless of the framing, American law recognizes that the situation of "two equal individuals before an impartial judge" includes the fact that the judge is an arm of government, exercising government power. What that means in practice is less clear.
Compare Shelley v. Kraemer ("That the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is a proposition which has long been established by decisions of this Court.") with Schiavo v. Schiavo (holding that a state judge ordering the removal of a feeding tube is not state action).
I've heard it argued this way.
I've also started an argument on some other forum, to test some ideas, with regards to the 'harm principle' (in law). Most of the laws of free countries do conform to harm principle, even though it is not in constitution and a few laws don't (usually for quite bad reason and with very ineffective enforcement). But if you try to bring it up you get slippery slope arguments along the lines of "if we start legalizing harmless behaviours we'd have to legalize driving on other side of the road". Try talking to authoritarians and you can see them argue the slippery slopes the other way.
It must be noted though that there's much longer way to slip in the direction of disallowing speech, than in the direction of allowing speech.