Vladimir_Nesov comments on Decision Theories: A Semi-Formal Analysis, Part I - Less Wrong

21 Post author: orthonormal 24 March 2012 04:01PM

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Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 30 March 2012 08:12:49PM *  0 points [-]

my suspicion is that using standard off-the-shelf logics won't work here: you will at least need to limit the application of the inference rules e.g. so that they can be applied only up to a maximum finite number of times (and so the set of theorems is not closed under logical inference)

This happens automatically, because (1) only the statements contributing to the decision matter, and there's a finite number of them, and (2) presence of the things like the diagonal step/chicken rule in the decision algorithm implies that inferring of absurdity doesn't happen. So we can prove that it's not the case that an agent can infer absurdity, even though it's free to use any first order inference it wants, and even though absurdity does follow from the axioms (in the setting without provability oracle).

In the setting with provability oracle, agent's algorithm is constructed in such a way that its axioms become sufficiently weak that the impossible counterfactuals (from the point of view of a stronger theory) remain consistent according to the theory used by the agent, and so in that setting the impossible worlds have actual models.