I don't understand where the tension is supposed to come in.
It just seems really weird to be able to correctly say that A caused B when, in fact, A had nothing to do with B. If that doesn't seem weird to you, then O.K.
The idea that causation is in the mind, not in the world is part of the Humean tradition
I think that's unclear; I side with those who think Hume was arguing for causal skepticism rather than some sort of subjectivism.
It just seems really weird to be able to correctly say that A caused B when, in fact, A had nothing to do with B. If that doesn't seem weird to you, then O.K.
This point is completely independent of whether causation is "in the mind" or not. Also, correlated things do have something to do with each other (by definition!). What is at issue is whether this something is "out in the world" or "in your head".
...I think that's unclear; I side with those who think Hume was arguing for causal skepticism rather than some sort of subje
Most people here seem to endorse the following two claims:
1. Probability is "in the mind," i.e., probability claims are true only in relation to some prior distribution and set of information to be conditionalized on;
2. Causality is to be cashed out in terms of probability distributions á la Judea Pearl or something.
However, these two claims feel in tension to me, since they appear to have the consequence that causality is also "in the mind" - whether something caused something else depends on various probability distributions, which in turn depends on how much we know about the situation. Worse, it has the consequence that ideal Bayesian reasoners can never be wrong about causal relations, since they always have perfect knowledge of their own probabilities.
Since I don't understand Pearl's model of causality very well, I may be missing something fundamental, so this is more of a question than an argument.