Do you know Jon Williamson's work? It seems to give an answer to your question (but I've not read it yet). Here's the first paragraph of Section 9.1 “Mental yet Objective” of his book “Bayesian Nets and Causality”:

Epistemic causality embodies the following position. The causal relation is mental rather than physical: a causal structure is part of an agent’s representation of the world, just as a belief function is, and causal claims do not directly supervene on mind-independent features of the world. But causality is objective rather than subjective: some causal structures are more warranted than others on the basis of the agent’s background knowledge, so if two people disagree about what causes what, one may be right and the other wrong. Thus epistemic causality sits between a wholly subjective mental account and a physical account of causality, just as objective Bayesianism sits between strict subjectivism and physical probability.

Here's a link to his papers on causality. At least the fifth, “Causality”, contains an introduction to epistemic causality.