Wait a second, your objection doesn't really strongly counter my point, right? 'Cuz the author of the post wanted to maximize immortality, so saying that the FAI would have better things to do with its time would imply that the FAI wasn't applying the reversal test when it comes to keeping current humans alive. It seems that the FAI should either kill those living and replace them with something better, or revive the dead, otherwise it's being inconsistent. (I mean not necessarily, but still.) Also, if it doesn't resurrect those in graves or urns then it's not gonna resurrect cryonauts either, so cryonics is out. And your "rescue sim" argument doesn't seem strong; rescue sims might not be considered as good as running simulations of people who had died; high opportunity cost. So not being in a rescue sim could just mean that the FAI had better things to do, e.g. running simulations of previously-dead people in heaven or whatever. Am I missing something?

I'm trying to avoid assuming a metaphysic where simulations are assumed to be possible, because I'm not sure such metaphysics ultimately make sense. (Maybe you can guess my rationale: I think "measure" and "existence" and so on are very fuzzy, and I think if we reason in terms of decision theoretic significant-ness then it might turn that running a simulation of something doesn't double its "measure", and what matters is what already "actually existed/exists", i.e. what's already "actually significant".) If you don't assume a simulationist metaphysic then "rescue sims" are dubious, whereas reviving people who are known to have already existed seems more like a straightforward application of technology. If you take a sort of common-sense layman's perspective, reviving the dead sounds a lot less speculative than running an exact simulation of a mind on a computer in a way that will actually change the past. ...No?