Stuart_Armstrong comments on Should logical probabilities be updateless too? - Less Wrong

9 Post author: cousin_it 28 March 2012 10:02AM

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Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 28 March 2012 05:22:35PM 3 points [-]

No - if the universe punishes you for behaving some way (e.g. adding a precomittment stage), then doing that is dominated. There are no dominant strategies against all possible states of the universe.

Comment author: jsalvatier 28 March 2012 06:34:43PM 0 points [-]

Fair enough, but perhaps there proofs that it dominates unless you are punished specifically for doing it?

How sure are people that "do what you would have precommitted to doing" is a good strategy? Wanting to build it into the decision theory seems to suggest very high certainty.

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 28 March 2012 07:38:28PM 2 points [-]

Well, it seems obvious that it's true - but tricky to formalise. Subtle problems like agent simulates predictor (when you know more than Omega) and maybe some diagonal agents (who apply diagonal reasoning to you) seem to be relatively believable situations. It's a bit like Godel's theorem - initially, the only examples were weird and specifically constructed, but then people found more natural examples.

But "do what you would have precommitted to doing" seems to be much better than other strategies, even if it's not provably ideal.