replacing vague as crap TDT with less-vague UDT and UDT2

As I've figured out while writing the last few posts, TDT hasn't been explained well, but it is a genuinely formalizable theory. (You'll have to trust me until Part III or check the decision-theory mailing list.) But it's a different theory from ADT and UDT, and the latter ones are preferable.

Well, it seems hopeless to me, maybe it also seems hopeless to him.

If you take the maxim that human values are complex, then you need mind uploads to run CEV, not just that, but heavily (and likely unethically) processed mind uploads that are being fed hypothetical situations (That's a way to make it non vague). Clearly that's not what you want. If you take the possibility that agreeable moral system could result from some rather simple principles, then in a very wide range of possible estimates of likehood vs complexity, you have to focus your effort first on the simple principles because they have better expected payoff per thought-time even if their probability may be lower.

edit: Specific example. You could e.g. advocate a requirement whereby for all AIs it must be proved they can't self improve their hardware (e.g. would either not touch their hardware or would wirehead), and work to develop a framework that ensures this. That may be a very low hanging fruit because various self modifying stuff seem to be hard to keep from wireheading. This results in less AI risk. Not seeing any effort of this kind from SIAI though (due to them being too focussed on telling how the AI won't wirehead, will self improve at hardware level, and will kill us all)