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VKS comments on Rationality Quotes April 2012 - Less Wrong
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Yes. There is a difference between speaking imprecisely because we don't know (yet) how to express it better, and speaking things unrelated to reality. The former is worth doing, because a good approximation can be better than nothing, and it can help us to avoid worse approximations.
Well, but what it that is meant by metaphysics? I've heard the word many times, seen its use, and I still don't know what I'm supposed to do with it.
Ok, so now I've read the Wikipedia article, and now I'm unconvinced that when people use the term they mean what it says they mean. I know at least some people who definitely used "metaphysical" in the sense of "spiritual". What do you mean by metaphysics?
Also unconvinced that it has any reason to be thought of as a single subject. I get the impression that the only reason these topics are together is that they feel "big".
But I will grant you that given Wiki's definition of metaphysics, there is no reason to think that it is in principle incapable of providing useful works. I revise my position to state that arguments should not be dismissed because they are metaphysical, but rather because they are bad. Furthermore, I suspect that "metaphysics" is just a bad category, and should, as much as possible, be expunged from one's thinking.
We may be moving too fast when we expunge metaphysics from our web-of-belief. Say you believe that all beliefs should pay rent in anticipated experiences. What experiences do you anticipate only because you hold this belief? If there aren't any, then this seems awfully like a metaphysical belief. In other words, it might not be feasible to avoid metaphysics completely. Even if my specific example fails, the metaphysicians claim to have some that succeed. Studying metaphysics has been on my to-do list for a long time (if only to be secure in my belief that we don't need to bother with it), but for some reason I never actually do it.
(LessWrong implicitly assumes certain metaphysics pretty often, e.g. when they talk about "simulation", "measure", "reality fluid", and so on; it seems to me that "anthropics" is a place where experience meets metaphysics. My preferred metaphysic for anthropics comes from decision theory, and my intuitions about decision theory come to a small extent from theological metaphysics and to a larger extent from theoretical computer science, e.g. algorithmic probability theory, which I figured is a metaphysic for the same reason that monadology is a metaphysic. ISTM that even if metaphysics aren't as fundamental as they pretend to be, they're still useful and perhaps necessary for organizing our experiences and intuitions so as to predict/understand prospective/counterfactual experiences in highly unusual circumstances (e.g. simulations).)
When some Lesswrong-users use 'metaphysics', they mean other people's metaphysics. This is much like how some Christians use the term 'religion'.
Hm... one rationale for such a designation might be: "A 'metaphysic' is a model that is at least one level of abstraction/generalization higher than my most abstract/general model; people who use different models than me seem to have higher-level models than I deem justified given their limited evidence; thus those higher-level models are metaphysical." Or something? I should think about this more.
Your theory is much nicer than mine. Mine essentially amounts to people believing "I understand reality, your beliefs are scientifically justified, he endorses metaphysical hogwash." Further, at least since the days of the Vienna Circle, some scientifically-minded individuals have used 'metaphysics' as a slur. (I mean, at least some of the Logical Positivists seriously claimed that metaphysical terms were nonsense, that is, having neither truth-value nor meaning.)
I have read Yudkowsky discuss matters of qualia and free will. This site contains metaphysics, straight up. I assume that anyone who dismisses metaphysics is either dismissing folk-usage of the term or is taking too much pride in their models of reality (that latter part does somewhat match your stipulative explanation.)
(Oh, I'm not sure if your joke was intentional, but I still think it is funny that some possible humans would reject metaphysics for being 'models' which are too 'abstract', 'of higher-level', and not 'justified' given the current 'evidence'.)
Just came across a comment by Deogolwulf in response to a comment on one of Mencius Moldbug's posts:
Oh, snap!
I couldn't find the original on a quick Google, but:
Which is to say, believing that something can be entirely explained in terms of something else doesn't absolve me from the need to deal with it. Even if I and the bull and my preference to remain alive can all be entirely captured by the sufficiently precise specification of a set of quarks, it doesn't follow that there exists no such person, no such bull, or no such preference.
The argument was a meta-level undermining argument supporting the necessity of metaphysical reasoning (of the exact sort that you're engaging in in your comment);—it wasn't an argument about the merits of reductionism. That would likely have been clearer had I included more context; my apologies.
Where is that quote from, out of curiosity ?
I think part of the problem is different scenes of the word "reduce". Consider the following two statements:
1) All things ultimately reduce to quarks (nitpick: and leptons)
2) Quarks and leptons ultimately reduce to quantum wave functions.
3) Quantum wave functions ultimately reduce to mathematics.
4) All mathematics ultimately reduces to the ZFC axioms.
Notice that all these statements are true (I'm not quite sure about the first one) for slightly different values of "reduces".
Deogolwulf is the sort of fellow who uses 'proposition' while obviously meaning 'statement'. Also, some of the first paragraph is pure unreflective sophistry. Still, the second half:
Following this epistemic attack, I am imagining Deogolwulf holding up a mirror to TGGP's face and stating "No, TGGP, you are the metaphysics."
Agreed that Will's theory is nicer than yours. That said, with emphasis on "some," I think yours is true. Although the Christians I know are far more likely to use "religion" to refer to Christianity. (Still more so are the Catholics I know inclined to use "religion" to refer to Catholicism.)
I was just referring to some Protestants who will share such statements as "Christianity isn't a religion, it's a relationship" or "I hate religion too. That's why I believe in Jesus." Of course, most Protestants do not do this.
Ah, I see. The Christians I know are more prone to statements like "Religion is important, because it teaches people about the importance of Jesus' love."
What?
When someone on Lesswrong uses the term 'simulation', they are probably making some implicit metaphysical claims about what it means for some object(A) to be a simulation of some other object(B). (This particular subject often falls under the part of metaphysics known as ontology.)
The same applies to usage of most terms.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but "They are probably making some implicit metaphysical claims about what it means for some object(A) to be a simulation of some other object(B)." and "They are probably making some implicit claims about what it means for some object(A) to be a simulation of some other object(B)" mean exactly the same thing.
They do happen to mean the same thing. This is because the question "What does it mean for some y to be an x?" is a metaphysical question.
"They are probably making some aesthetic claim about why object(A) is more beautiful than object(B)" and "They are probably making some claim about why object(A) is more beautiful than object(B)" also mean the same thing.
Come to that, they both probably mean the same thing as "They are probably making some implicit claims about how some object(B) differs from some other object (A) it simulates," which eliminates the reference to meaning as well.
Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom - EY
Can you give any examples of modern metaphysics being useful?
Ontology begat early AI, which begat object-oriented programming.
I anticipate to experience more efficient thinking, because I will have to remember less and think about less topics, while achieving the same results.
What do you anticipate to experience after studying metaphysics (besides being able to signal deep wisdom)?
I anticipate understanding the abstract nature of justification, thus allowing me to devise better-justified institutions. I anticipate understanding cosmology and its role in justification, thus allowing me to understand how to transcend the contingent/universal duality of justification. I anticipate understanding infinities and their actuality/non-actuality and thus what role infinities play in justification. I anticipate graving new values on new tables with the knowledge gleaned from a greater understanding of justification—I anticipate seeing what both epistemology and morality are special cases and approximations of, and I anticipate using my knowledge of that higher-level structure to create new values. And so on.
You might be better off studying mathematics, then.
That too, yes. Algorithmic probability is an example of a field that is pretty mathematical and pretty metaphysical. It's the intellectual descendant of Leibniz's monadology. Computationalism is a mathematical metaphysic.
If you would be so kind as to try and tell me what you mean by "metaphysic", I would be much less confused.
By "metaphysic" I mean a high-level model for phenomena or concepts that you can't immediately falsify because, though the model explains all of the phenomena you are aware of, the model is also very general. E.g., if you look at a computer processor you can say "ah, it is performing a computation", and this constrains your anticipations quite a bit; but if you look at a desk or a chair and say "ah, it is performing a computation", then you've gotten into metaphysical territory: you can abstract away the concept of computation and apply it to basically everything, but it's unclear whether or not doing so means that computation is very fundamental, or if you're just overapplying a contingent model. Sometimes when theorizing it's necessary to choose a certain metaphysic: e.g., I will say that I am an instance of a computation, and thus that a computer could make an exact simulation of me and I would exist twice as much, thus making me less surprised to find myself as me rather than someone else. Now, such a line of reasoning requires quite a few metaphysical assumptions—assumptions about the generalizability of certain models that we're not sure do or don't break down—but metaphysical speculation is the best we can do because we don't have a way of simulating people or switching conscious experience flows with other people.
That's one possible explanation of "metaphysic"/"metaphysics", but honestly I should look into the relevant metaphilosophy—it's very possible that my explanation is essentially wrong or misleading in some way.
Why would generality be opposed to falsifiability? Wouldn't having a model be more general lead to easier falsifiability, given that the model should apply more broadly?
In order to tell whether something is performing a computation, you try to find some way to get the object to exhibit the computation it is (allegedly) making. So -- if I understand correctly -- then a model is metaphysical, in the things you write, if applying it to a particular phenomenon requires an interpretation step which may or may not be known to be possible. How does this differ from any other model, except that you're allowing yourself to be sloppy with it?
If you just replace "metaphysic" by "model", "metaphysical assumptions" by "assumptions about our models and their applicability", "metaphysical speculation" by "speculations based on our models", I think the things you're trying to say become clearer. If a bit less fancy-sounding.
If the thing I understood is the thing you tried to say.
Well, that's a "should" statement, so we cash it out in terms of desirable outcomes, e.g.:
Metaphysics can't even be a thing in a web of belief! It's more a box for a bunch of things, with a tag that says "Ooo". Unless you want to define it otherwise, or I'm more confused than I think I am. So the category only makes sense if you want to use it to describe your feelings for some given subject. Why would that be a good way to frame a field of study?
That's what I suspect is problem with metaphysics; not the things in the box, which are arbitrary, rather that the box messes up your filing system.
Conventional usage seems to be: speaking about deep intangible topics.
Which is a bad categegory, because it contains: abstract thinking + supernatural claims + complicated nonsense; especially the parts good for signalling wisdom.
It's a bit confusing in part because of its strange etymology. Originally, "meta" was used in the sense of "after", since "metaphysics" was the unnamed book that came after "physics" in the standard ordering of Aristotle's works. Later scholars accidentally connected that to something like our current usage of "meta", and a somewhat arbitrary field was born.
Metaphysics, as a category, has its constituents determined by the contingent events of history. The same could be said for the categories of philosophy and art. As such, 'metaphysics' is a convenient bucket whose constituents do not necessarily have similarities in structure. At best, I think one could say that they have a Wittgensteinian family-resemblance. However, I am only defending the academic usage of the term. (More information here.) The folk usage seems to hold that metaphysics is "somewhere between "crystal healing" and "tree hugging" in the Dewey decimal system."
Well that at least makes some sense. I was noticing that Wiki's definition and the definition implied by its examples were in conflict. I don't particularly see why the metaphysics bucket is convenient, though.
Is there any point in discussing metaphysics as anything other than a cultural phenomenon among philosophers?
Unless you are a cladist, 'reptile' is a bucket which contains crocodiles, lizards, and turtles, but does not contain birds and mammals. The word is still sometimes useful for communication.
It depends on your goals. I do not generally recommend it, however.
My claim was not about the general lack of utility of buckets. Briefly, the reptile bucket is useful because reptiles are similar to one another, and thus having a way to refer to them all is handy. There is apparently no such justification for "metaphysics", except in the sense that its contents are related by history. But this clearly isn't the use you want to make of this bucket.
The word 'similar' is often frustratingly vague. However, crocodiles and birds share a more recent common ancestor than crocodiles and turtles.
The word is nonetheless used. I do agree with you that it is frustrating that the word's usage is historically determined.
Well then the term reptile is somewhat deceptive in evolutionary biology, and based more on some consensus about appearance. Fine. Whatever. The point is that the word metaphysics isn't evocative in that way or any way, except in the context of its historical usage. As such, it cannot inform us in any way about any subject that isn't the phenomenon of its acceptance as a field, and is not even a useful subject heading, being a hodgepodge. We can choose whether to continue to use it, and I don't see why we should.
Within the field of philosophy, the usage is a fairly normal term, much like 'reptile' or 'sex' are normal terms for most people. Much of my vocabulary comes from that field and I am most comfortable using its terms. 'Metaphysics' is one of many problematic terms which are evocative to me, because I understand how these terms are used. Asking someone who studies philosophy to stop using 'metaphysics' is like asking someone who studies biology to stop using 'species'.
However, it is your prerogative to use whatever terms you prefer. I am sure that we are both trying to be pragmatic.