DuncanS comments on John Danaher on 'The Superintelligent Will' - Less Wrong

5 Post author: lukeprog 03 April 2012 03:08AM

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Comment author: DuncanS 03 April 2012 11:36:32PM 2 points [-]

The problem is that the utility isn't constant. If you, today are indifferent to what happens on future Tuesdays, then you will also think it's a bad thing that your future self cares what happens on that Tuesday. You will therefore replace your current self with a different self that is indifferent to all future Tuesdays, including the ones that it's in, thus preserving the goal that you have today.

Comment author: Manfred 04 April 2012 12:28:16AM 0 points [-]

Good point. I have to remember not to confuse expected utility with future utility.