The argument I tend to default to is, "if there were definitively no fundamental moral values, how would we expect the universe we observe to be different?" If we can't point to any way that moral objectivity constrains our expectations, then it becomes another invisible dragon.
The argument I tend to default to is, "if there were definitively no fundamental moral values, how would we expect the universe we observe to be different?"
If there were no mathematical truths, would the observable universe be different?
If we can't point to any way that moral objectivity constrains our expectations, then it becomes another invisible dragon.
If every intelligent entity just passively recorded facts, that would be valid. But agents act, and morality is about acting rightly.
One of the most annoying arguments when discussing AI is the perennial "But if the AI is so smart, why won't it figure out the right thing to do anyway?" It's often the ultimate curiosity stopper.
Nick Bostrom has defined the "Orthogonality thesis" as the principle that motivation and intelligence are essentially unrelated: superintelligences can have nearly any type of motivation (at least, nearly any utility function-bases motivation). We're trying to get some rigorous papers out so that when that question comes up, we can point people to standard, and published, arguments. Nick has had a paper accepted that points out the orthogonality thesis is compatible with a lot of philosophical positions that would seem to contradict it.
I'm hoping to complement this with a paper laying out the positive arguments in favour of the thesis. So I'm asking you for your strongest arguments for (or against) the orthogonality thesis. Think of trying to convince a conservative philosopher who's caught a bad case of moral realism - what would you say to them?
Many thanks! Karma and acknowledgements will shower on the best suggestions, and many puppies will be happy.