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Dmytry comments on Cryonics without freezers: resurrection possibilities in a Big World - Less Wrong
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I think you're misunderstanding me, see edit. The point I am making is not so much about his values, but about his expectations of subjective experience.
Yvain's expectations of subjective experience actually seem sane to me. Only his values (and so expected decisionmaking) are weird.
Well, my argument is that you can propose a battery of possible partial quantum suicide set ups involving a machine that partially destroys you (e.g. you are anaesthetised and undergo lobotomy with varying extent of cutting, or something of this sort such as administration of a sublethal dose of neurotoxin). At some point, there's so little of you left that you're as good as dead; at some other point, there's so much of you left that you don't really expect to be quantum-saved. Either he has some strange continuous function inbetween, that I am very curious about, or he has a discontinuity, which is weird. (and I am guessing a discontinuity but i'd be interested to hear about function)