I know that's your idea, I'm saying it's stupid. If I torture you every night and wipe your memory before morning, are you just indifferent to that? I could add this to the torture: "I asked your daylight self after the mindwipe if it would be wrong to do what I'm doing to you, and he said no, because by black-box reasoning torturing you now doesn't matter, so long as I erase the effects by morning."

ETA: Maybe it's harsh to call it stupid when your original scenario wasn't about deliberately ignoring torture inside the black box. It was just an innocent exercise in being copied and then one of you deleted.

But you cannot presume that the person who anticipates surviving with certainty is correct, just because a copy of them certainly survives to get the bigger payoff. Your argument is: hey cryonics skeptic, here we see someone with a decision procedure which identifies the original with its copies, and it gets the bigger payoff; so judged by the criterion of results obtained ("winning") this is the superior attitude, therefore the more rational attitude, and so your objection to cryonics is irrational.

However, this argument begs the question of whether the copy is the same person as the original. A decision procedure would normally be regarded as defective if it favors an outcome because of mistaken identity - because person X gets the big payoff, and it incorrectly identifies X with the intended beneficiary of the decision making. And here I might instead reason as follows: that poor fool who volunteers for iterated russian roulette, the setup has fooled him into thinking that he gets to experience the payoff, just because a copy of him does.

As I recently wrote here, there is a "local self", the "current instance" of you, and then there may be a larger "extended self" made of multiple instances with which your current instance identifies. In effect, you are asking people to adopt a particular expansive identity theory - you want them to regard their copies as themselves - because it means bigger payoffs for them in your thought-experiment. But the argument is circular. For someone with a narrow identity theory ("I am only my current instance"), to run the gauntlet of iterated russian roulette really is to make a mistake.

The scenario where we torture you and then mindwipe you is not an outright rebuttal of an expansive attitude to one's own personal identity, but it does show that the black-box argument is bogus.