But it seems like Eliezer is presupposing a kind of consequentialism of rationality, both in that article and in general with the maxim "rationalists should win!"

Seems that way. Disclaimer: IHAPMOE (I have a poor model of Eliezer).

He [no longer speaking of Eliezer] simply brainwashes himself into using his Practically Ideal Moral Code because over the long run, this will be for the best according to his initial, consequentialist values.

See for example my comment on why trying to maximize happiness should increase your utility more than trying to maximize your utility would. If happiness is the derivative of utility, then maximizing happiness over a finite time period maximizes the increase in utility over that time-period. If you repeatedly engage in maximizing your happiness over a timespan that's small relative to your lifespan, at the end of your life you'll have attained a higher utility than someone who tried to maximize utility over those time-periods.

Must satisfy a publicity condition. That is, widespread acceptance of this set of principles should be conducive to cooperation and not lead to the same self-serving abuse problem that consequentialism has.

This variant on Kant's maxim seems still to be universally adhered to by moralists; yet it's wrong. I know that's a strong claim.

The problem is that everybody has different reasoning abilities. A universal moral code, from which one could demand that it satisfy the publicity condition, must be one that is optimal for EY and for chimpanzees.

If you admit that it may be more optimal for EY to adopt a slightly more sophisticated moral code than the chimpanzees do, then satisfaction of the publicity condition implies suboptimality.