If there are two nearly identical copies of me in the same place, why is there no further interaction between them
Your two copies differ by states of many neurons, that's billions of particles. They are not "nearly identical".
It is tempting to think about "one different thought" or "one different perception" as very small changes. But on particle level those are huge changes. A small change on a particle level is something you can't notice, and therefore you can't notice as those copies of you interact... and when the small change becomes big enough, your copies are already decoherent.
Today's post, On Being Decoherent was originally published on 27 April 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Where Experience Confuses Physicists, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.