Well, true, a graph implies a discreteness that does not correlate closely to a continuous configuration space. I actually think of it as the probability of finding yourself in that volume of configuration space being influenced by "significant" amplitudes slowing from more than one other volume of configuration space, although even that is not a great explanation as it suggests a ticking of a discrete time parameter. A continuously propagating wavefront is probably a much better analogy. Or we can just go into calculus mode and consider boxes of configuration space which we then shrink down arbitrarily while taking a limit value. But sometimes it's just easier to think "branches" ;-)
I'm tapping out.
Nobody seems to think EY's exposition is an issue, and you're the second person who's tried -- and I can't understand the motivation for this -- to explain the underlying QM to me in vague metaphors that neither reflect the underlying theory nor present a pedagogical simplification.
Today's post, On Being Decoherent was originally published on 27 April 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
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This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Where Experience Confuses Physicists, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
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