Jaynes has reservations about Bell's Theorem, and they made a fair amount of sense to me. And in general I find it good policy to trust him on how to properly interpret probabilistic reasoning.
If you're going to use an authority heuristic, at some point you also have to apply the heuristic "what does pretty much everyone else think?"
My impression is that most people take for granted that Bell was correct, and consider it a done deal. Another impression is that "pretty much everyone else" mistakenly takes ontological randomness as a conceptual given on a macro level, and there has yet to be conclusive evidence (see detector efficiency) that ontological randomness operates on a micro level.
I'm not saying he is right. I'm saying that I haven't seen any better probabilistic analysis of the issue than what I've seen from Jaynes, and the evidence so far doesn't conclusively prove him wrong.
Today's post, Bell's Theorem: No EPR "Reality" was originally published on 04 May 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Entangled Photons, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.