(Almost) every moral theory can be represented by a utility function

lukeprog

This was demonstrated, in a certain limited way, in Peterson (2009). See also Lowry & Peterson (2011).

The Peterson result provides an "asymmetry argument" in favor of consequentialism:

Consequentialists can account for phenomena that are usually thought of in nonconsequentialist terms, such as rights, duties, and virtues, whereas the opposite is false of nonconsequentialist theories. Rights, duty or virtue-based theories cannot account for the fundamental moral importance of consequences. Because of this asymmetry, it seems it would be preferable to become a consequentialist – indeed, it would be virtually impossible not to be a consequentialist.

Another argument in favor of consequentialism has to do with the causes of different types of moral judgments: see Are Deontological Moral Judgments Rationalizations?

Update: see Carl's criticism.

This was demonstrated, in a certain limited way, in Peterson (2009). See also Lowry & Peterson (2011).

The Peterson result provides an "asymmetry argument" in favor of consequentialism:

Consequentialists can account for phenomena that are usually thought of in nonconsequentialist terms, such as rights, duties, and virtues, whereas the opposite is false of nonconsequentialist theories. Rights, duty or virtue-based theories cannot account for the fundamental moral importance of consequences. Because of this asymmetry, it seems it would be preferable to become a consequentialist – indeed, it would be virtually impossible not to be a consequentialist.

Another argument in favor of consequentialism has to do with the causes of different types of moral judgments: see Are Deontological Moral Judgments Rationalizations?

Update: see Carl's criticism.

I don't think so, if I understand Alicorn correctly.

Alicorn says that a "consequentialist doppelganger"

applies the following transformation to some non-consequentialist theory X:

What would the world look like if I followed theory X?

You ought to act in such a way as to bring about the result of step 1.

But that's not what Peterson is doing. Instead, his approach (along with several previous, incomplete and failed attempts to do this) merely captures whatever rules and considerations the deontologist cares about in what a decision-theoretic ... (read more)

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(Almost) every moral theory can be represented by a utility function

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(Almost) every moral theory can be represented by a utility function

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