It's trivial to put any act-based moral theory in simple deontological terms. Simply see what act the theory would recommend, and then insist that all must follow the rule "Subject S must take action A at time T".
As was helpfully alluded to at the end of the second paper, virtue ethics can't necessarily be consequentialized. In particular, some virtue/character ethics proponents suggest that acts are not the proper purview of ethics - those variations of virtue ethics do not necessarily provide any concrete recommendations as to whether one action is preferred to another, in general or in a particular situation. Rather, on some views, virtue ethics tries to answer "What is a good man?" or "What is the good life?" - questions that simply are not addressed by an act-based ethics.
Hm.
I can certainly see how "Everyone must take those actions that they most expect to improve the state of the world" can be treated as a restatement of certain kinds of nominally non-rule-based moral systems in terms of rules.
But trying to restate that principle as a set of rules governing what specific acts specific individuals must perform at specific times strikes me as far from trivial.
This was demonstrated, in a certain limited way, in Peterson (2009). See also Lowry & Peterson (2011).
The Peterson result provides an "asymmetry argument" in favor of consequentialism:
Another argument in favor of consequentialism has to do with the causes of different types of moral judgments: see Are Deontological Moral Judgments Rationalizations?
Update: see Carl's criticism.