Sorry, that wasn't what I meant to convey! My point is that if you weaken the conditions for a theory being "consequentialism" enough, then obviously you'll eventually be able to get everything in under that umbrella. But that may not be an interesting fact, it may in fact be nearly trivial. If you broaden the notion of consequences enough, and allow the good to be indexed to the agent we're thinking about, then yes, you can make everyone a consequentialist. But that shouldn't be that surprising. And all the major differences between, say, utilitarianism and Kantianism would remain.
Who is weakening the conditions for a theory being "consequentialism"? The thing described by Peterson seems perfectly in line with consequentialism. And his point about asymmetry among moral theories remains.
This was demonstrated, in a certain limited way, in Peterson (2009). See also Lowry & Peterson (2011).
The Peterson result provides an "asymmetry argument" in favor of consequentialism:
Another argument in favor of consequentialism has to do with the causes of different types of moral judgments: see Are Deontological Moral Judgments Rationalizations?
Update: see Carl's criticism.