(Almost) every moral theory can be represented by a utility function

lukeprog

This was demonstrated, in a certain limited way, in Peterson (2009). See also Lowry & Peterson (2011).

The Peterson result provides an "asymmetry argument" in favor of consequentialism:

Consequentialists can account for phenomena that are usually thought of in nonconsequentialist terms, such as rights, duties, and virtues, whereas the opposite is false of nonconsequentialist theories. Rights, duty or virtue-based theories cannot account for the fundamental moral importance of consequences. Because of this asymmetry, it seems it would be preferable to become a consequentialist – indeed, it would be virtually impossible not to be a consequentialist.

Another argument in favor of consequentialism has to do with the causes of different types of moral judgments: see Are Deontological Moral Judgments Rationalizations?

Update: see Carl's criticism.

This was demonstrated, in a certain limited way, in Peterson (2009). See also Lowry & Peterson (2011).

The Peterson result provides an "asymmetry argument" in favor of consequentialism:

Consequentialists can account for phenomena that are usually thought of in nonconsequentialist terms, such as rights, duties, and virtues, whereas the opposite is false of nonconsequentialist theories. Rights, duty or virtue-based theories cannot account for the fundamental moral importance of consequences. Because of this asymmetry, it seems it would be preferable to become a consequentialist – indeed, it would be virtually impossible not to be a consequentialist.

Another argument in favor of consequentialism has to do with the causes of different types of moral judgments: see Are Deontological Moral Judgments Rationalizations?

Update: see Carl's criticism.

Yeah, that thought crossed my mind after I posted my comment. This may be what the authors are talking about. I envisioned the problem a little differently though - consequentialism does seem to only need an ordinal ranking, while deontological theories just need to put actions in categories "good" and "bad" depending on context - at least based on my understanding of the terms.

Actually, neither of the papers that Luke linked to seem to discuss whether consequentialist theories can be represented deontologically. They seem more interested in the reverse question.

Did you mean to say that consequentialism needs a cardinal ranking, rather than an ordinal one? A two-category ranking is certainly an ordinal one!

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(Almost) every moral theory can be represented by a utility function

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(Almost) every moral theory can be represented by a utility function

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