Sure.
More generally, if I don't want to optimize X, but merely want to satisfy some threshold T for X, then I don't really care what the optimal way of doing X is in general, I care what way of doing X gets me across T most cheaply. If getting across T using process P1 costs effort E1 from where I am now, and P2 costs E2, and E2 > E1, and I don't care about anything else, I should choose E1.
The catch is, like a lot of humans, I also have a tendency to overestimate both the effectiveness of whatever I'm used to doing and the costs of changing to something else. So it's very easy for me to dismiss P2 on the grounds of an argument like the above even in situations where E1 > E2, or where it turns out that I do care about other things, or both.
There are some techniques that help with countering that tendency. For example, it sometimes helps to ask myself from time to time whether, if I were starting from scratch, I would choose P1 or P2. (E.g. "if I were learning to type for the first time, would I learn Dvorak or Qwerty?"). Asking myself that question lets me at least consider which process I think is superior for my purposes, even if I subsequently turn around and ignore that judgment due to status-quo bias.
That isn't great, but it's better than failing to consider which process I think is better.
Well said. In considering your response I notice that a process P as part of its cost E has room to include the cost of learning the process if necessary, something that was concerning me.
I am now considering a more complicated case.
You are in a team of people of which you are not the team leader. Some of the team are scientists, some are magical thinkers, you are the only Bayesian.
Given an arbitrary task which can be better optimised using Bayesian thinking, is there a way of applying a "Bayes patch" to the work of your teammates so that they...
Today's post, The Dilemma: Science or Bayes? was originally published on 13 May 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was The Failures of Eld Science, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.