That sounds like mind projection fallacy. That the observer does not know about the events doesn't mean they don't exist.
"Exist" should be a taboo word, until you can explain it in terms of other QM concepts.
For a thing to exist, it means that thing is part of the reality that embeds our minds and our experience, whether or not that thing has an effect on our minds and our experience. Of course when I say something exists, it is a prediction of my model of reality. And you might ask how I can defend my model in favor of an alternative that says different things about events with no effect on my experience, and my answer would be that I prefer models that use the same rules whether or not I am looking, in which my reducible mind is not treated as ontologically fundamental.
Today's post, Science Doesn't Trust Your Rationality was originally published on 14 May 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
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