Document comments on If epistemic and instrumental rationality strongly conflict - Less Wrong
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Comments (53)
I agree that the conclusion follows from the premises, but nonetheless it's hypothetical scenarios like this which cause people to distrust hypothetical scenarios. There is no Omega, and you can't magically stop believing in red pandas; when people rationalize the utility of known falsehoods, what happens in their mind is complicated, divorces endorsement from modeling, and bears no resemblance to what they believe they're doing to themselves. Anti-epistemology is a huge actual danger of actual life,
Technically you can; it's just that the easiest methods have collateral effects on your ability to do most other things.
If you're not talking about shooting yourself in the head, I don't know of any method I, myself, could use to stop believing in pandas.
Interesting given that you believe there is evidence that could convince you 2+2=3.
Given that you don't know of such a method, I would guess that you haven't tried very hard to find one.
I don't think this is a fair analogy. We're talking about ceasing to believe in red pandas without the universe helping; the 2+2=3 case had the evidence appearing all by itself.
I think I might be able to stop believing in red pandas in particular if I had to (5% chance?) but probably couldn't generalize it to most other species with which I have comparable familiarity. This is most likely because I have some experience with self-hacking. ("They're too cute to be real. That video looks kind of animatronic, doesn't it, the way they're gamboling around in the snow? I don't think I've ever seen one in real life. I bet some people who believe in jackalopes have just never been exposed to the possibility that there's no such thing. Man, everybody probably thinks it's just super cute that I believe in red pandas, now I'm embarrassed. Also, it just doesn't happen that a lot rides on me believing things unless those things are true. Somebody's going to an awful lot of effort to correct me about red pandas. Isn't that a dumb name? Wouldn't a real animal that's not even much like a panda be called something else?")
Alicorn is correct; and similarly, there is of course a way I could stop believing in pandas, in worlds where pandas never had existed and I discovered the fact. I don't know of anything I can actually do, in real life, over the next few weeks, to stop believing in pandas in this world where pandas actually do exist. I would know that was what I was trying to do, for one thing.
Not that hard. Jimmy will gladly help you.
Okay, so there's no such thing as jackalopes. Now I know.
Hee hee.
I wasn't making an analogy exactly. Rather, that example was used to point out that there appears to be some route to believing any proposition that isn't blatant gibberish. And I think Eliezer is the sort of person who could find a way to self-hack in that way if he wanted to; that more or less used to be his 'thing'.
Exactly - "red pandas" were clearly made up for Avatar: the Last Airbender.
No, in AtLA they're called "fire ferrets".