I know that that's Hanson's quote, not yours, but the fact that you quote it indicates you agree with it to some extent.
A very fair assessment. (But I'll tell you what I disagree with in Hanson's view in a second.) I do think Hanson is correct that, in as far as evolutionary psychology has established anything, it has shown that evolution has provided for signaling and deception. If it enhances fitness for others to think you care about truth, evolution will tend to favor creating the impression to a greater extent than is warranted by the facts of your actual caring. See, for example, Robert Trivers recent book. Hanson maintains that the "far" mode (per construal-level theory--you can't avoid taking that into consideration in evaluating Hanson's position) evolved as a semi-separate mental compartment largely to accommodate signaling for purposes of status-seeking or ostentation. (The first part of my "Construal-level theory: Matching linguistic register to the case's granularity" provides a succinct summary of construal-level theory without Hanson's embellishments.)
I disagree with Hanson in his tendency to overlook the virtues of far thinking and overstate those of "near" thinking--his over-emphasis of signaling in the role of "far" thought. I disagree with Hanson in his neglect of the banefulness of moralism in general and religion in particular. Many of the virtues he paints religion as having reflect in-group solidarity and are bought at the expense of xenophobia and cultural extra-punitiveness. And also, as Eliezer Yudkowsky points out, falsehood has broader consequences that escape Hanson's micro-vision; forgoing truth produces a general loss of intellectual vitality.
But more than anything, I reject on ethical grounds Hanson's tacit position that what evolution cares about is what we should care about. If the ideal of truth was created for show, that shouldn't stop us from using it as a lever to get ourselves to care more about actual truth. (To me, a rationalist is above all one who values, even hyper-values, actual truth.) To put it bluntly, I don't see where Hanson can have further intellectual credibility after signaling that he doesn't seek truth in his far beliefs: those being the beliefs he posts about.
I am very happy to see your clarification, you write pretty much nothing I disagree with. I think the only place where we might disagree is the mechanism by which evolution accomplishes its goal of providing for signalling and deception. I believe that evolution usually gives us desires for things like truth and altruism which are, on some mental level, completely genuine. It then gives us problems like akrasia, laziness, and self-deception, which are not under full control of our conscious minds, and which thwart us from achieving our lofty goals when ...
We in the rationalist community have believed feasible a dual allegiance to instrumental and epistemic rationality because true beliefs help with winning, but semi-autonomous near and far modes raise questions about the compatibility of the two sovereigns' jurisdictions: false far beliefs may serve to advance near interests.
First, the basics of construal-level theory. See Trope and Liberman, "Construal-Level Theory of Psychological Distance" (2010) 117 Psychological Review 440. When you look at an object in the distance and look at the same object nearby, you focus on different features. Distal information is high-level, global, central, and unchanging, whereas local information is low-level, detailed, incidental, and changing. Construal-level theorists term distal information far and local information near, and they extend these categories broadly to embrace psychological distance. Dimensions other than physical distance can be conceived as psychological distance by analogy, and these other dimensions invoke mindsets similar to those physical distance invokes.
I discuss construal-level theory in the blogs Disputed Issues and Juridical Coherence, but Robin Hanson at Overcoming Bias has been one of the theory's most prolific advocates. He gives the theory an unusual twist when he maintains that the "far" mode is largely consumed with the management of social appearances.
With this twist, Hanson effectively drives a wedge between instrumental and epistemic rationality because far beliefs may help with winning despite or even because of their falsity. Hanson doesn't shrink from the implications of instrumental rationality coupled with his version of construal-level theory. Based on research reports that the religious lead happier and more moral lives, Robin Hanson now advocates becoming religious:
Perhaps, like me, you find religious beliefs about Gods, spirits, etc. to be insufficiently supported by evidence, coherence, or simplicity to be a likely approximation to the truth. Even so, ask yourself: why care so much about truth? Yes, you probably think you care about believing truth – but isn’t it more plausible that you mainly care about thinking you like truth? Doesn’t that have a more plausible evolutionary origin than actually caring about far truth? ("What Use Far Truth?")
Instrumental rationalists could practice strict epistemic rationality if they define winning as gaining true belief, but though no doubt a dedicated intellectual, even Hanson doesn't value truth that much, at least not "far" truth. Yet, how many rationalists have cut their teeth on the irrationality of religion? How many have replied to religious propaganda about the benefits of religion with disdain for invoking mere prudential benefit where truth is at stake? As an ideal, epistemic rationality, it seems to me, fares better than instrumental rationality.