Thoughts on the Singularity Institute (SI)
This post presents thoughts on the Singularity Institute from Holden Karnofsky, Co-Executive Director of GiveWell. Note: Luke Muehlhauser, the Executive Director of the Singularity Institute, reviewed a draft of this post, and commented: "I do generally agree that your complaints are either correct (especially re: past organizational competence) or incorrect but not addressed by SI in clear argumentative writing (this includes the part on 'tool' AI). I am working to address both categories of issues." I take Luke's comment to be a significant mark in SI's favor, because it indicates an explicit recognition of the problems I raise, and thus increases my estimate of the likelihood that SI will work to address them.
September 2012 update: responses have been posted by Luke and Eliezer (and I have responded in the comments of their posts). I have also added acknowledgements.
The Singularity Institute (SI) is a charity that GiveWell has been repeatedly asked to evaluate. In the past, SI has been outside our scope (as we were focused on specific areas such as international aid). With GiveWell Labs we are open to any giving opportunity, no matter what form and what sector, but we still do not currently plan to recommend SI; given the amount of interest some of our audience has expressed, I feel it is important to explain why. Our views, of course, remain open to change. (Note: I am posting this only to Less Wrong, not to the GiveWell Blog, because I believe that everyone who would be interested in this post will see it here.)
I am currently the GiveWell staff member who has put the most time and effort into engaging with and evaluating SI. Other GiveWell staff currently agree with my bottom-line view that we should not recommend SI, but this does not mean they have engaged with each of my specific arguments. Therefore, while the lack of recommendation of SI is something that GiveWell stands behind, the specific arguments in this post should be attributed only to me, not to GiveWell.
Summary of my views
- The argument advanced by SI for why the work it's doing is beneficial and important seems both wrong and poorly argued to me. My sense at the moment is that the arguments SI is making would, if accepted, increase rather than decrease the risk of an AI-related catastrophe. More
- SI has, or has had, multiple properties that I associate with ineffective organizations, and I do not see any specific evidence that its personnel/organization are well-suited to the tasks it has set for itself. More
- A common argument for giving to SI is that "even an infinitesimal chance that it is right" would be sufficient given the stakes. I have written previously about why I reject this reasoning; in addition, prominent SI representatives seem to reject this particular argument as well (i.e., they believe that one should support SI only if one believes it is a strong organization making strong arguments). More
- My sense is that at this point, given SI's current financial state, withholding funds from SI is likely better for its mission than donating to it. (I would not take this view to the furthest extreme; the argument that SI should have some funding seems stronger to me than the argument that it should have as much as it currently has.)
- I find existential risk reduction to be a fairly promising area for philanthropy, and plan to investigate it further. More
- There are many things that could happen that would cause me to revise my view on SI. However, I do not plan to respond to all comment responses to this post. (Given the volume of responses we may receive, I may not be able to even read all the comments on this post.) I do not believe these two statements are inconsistent, and I lay out paths for getting me to change my mind that are likely to work better than posting comments. (Of course I encourage people to post comments; I'm just noting in advance that this action, alone, doesn't guarantee that I will consider your argument.) More
Intent of this post
I did not write this post with the purpose of "hurting" SI. Rather, I wrote it in the hopes that one of these three things (or some combination) will happen:
- New arguments are raised that cause me to change my mind and recognize SI as an outstanding giving opportunity. If this happens I will likely attempt to raise more money for SI (most likely by discussing it with other GiveWell staff and collectively considering a GiveWell Labs recommendation).
- SI concedes that my objections are valid and increases its determination to address them. A few years from now, SI is a better organization and more effective in its mission.
- SI can't or won't make changes, and SI's supporters feel my objections are valid, so SI loses some support, freeing up resources for other approaches to doing good.
Which one of these occurs will hopefully be driven primarily by the merits of the different arguments raised. Because of this, I think that whatever happens as a result of my post will be positive for SI's mission, whether or not it is positive for SI as an organization. I believe that most of SI's supporters and advocates care more about the former than about the latter, and that this attitude is far too rare in the nonprofit world.
Does SI have a well-argued case that its work is beneficial and important?
I know no more concise summary of SI's views than this page, so here I give my own impressions of what SI believes, in italics.
- There is some chance that in the near future (next 20-100 years), an "artificial general intelligence" (AGI) - a computer that is vastly more intelligent than humans in every relevant way - will be created.
- This AGI will likely have a utility function and will seek to maximize utility according to this function.
- This AGI will be so much more powerful than humans - due to its superior intelligence - that it will be able to reshape the world to maximize its utility, and humans will not be able to stop it from doing so.
- Therefore, it is crucial that its utility function be one that is reasonably harmonious with what humans want. A "Friendly" utility function is one that is reasonably harmonious with what humans want, such that a "Friendly" AGI (FAI) would change the world for the better (by human standards) while an "Unfriendly" AGI (UFAI) would essentially wipe out humanity (or worse).
- Unless great care is taken specifically to make a utility function "Friendly," it will be "Unfriendly," since the things humans value are a tiny subset of the things that are possible.
- Therefore, it is crucially important to develop "Friendliness theory" that helps us to ensure that the first strong AGI's utility function will be "Friendly." The developer of Friendliness theory could use it to build an FAI directly or could disseminate the theory so that others working on AGI are more likely to build FAI as opposed to UFAI.
From the time I first heard this argument, it has seemed to me to be skipping important steps and making major unjustified assumptions. However, for a long time I believed this could easily be due to my inferior understanding of the relevant issues. I believed my own views on the argument to have only very low relevance (as I stated in my 2011 interview with SI representatives). Over time, I have had many discussions with SI supporters and advocates, as well as with non-supporters who I believe understand the relevant issues well. I now believe - for the moment - that my objections are highly relevant, that they cannot be dismissed as simple "layman's misunderstandings" (as they have been by various SI supporters in the past), and that SI has not published anything that addresses them in a clear way.
Below, I list my major objections. I do not believe that these objections constitute a sharp/tight case for the idea that SI's work has low/negative value; I believe, instead, that SI's own arguments are too vague for such a rebuttal to be possible. There are many possible responses to my objections, but SI's public arguments (and the private arguments) do not make clear which possible response (if any) SI would choose to take up and defend. Hopefully the dialogue following this post will clarify what SI believes and why.
Some of my views are discussed at greater length (though with less clarity) in a public transcript of a conversation I had with SI supporter Jaan Tallinn. I refer to this transcript as "Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011."
Objection 1: it seems to me that any AGI that was set to maximize a "Friendly" utility function would be extraordinarily dangerous.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that SI manages to create what it believes to be an FAI. Suppose that it is successful in the "AGI" part of its goal, i.e., it has successfully created an intelligence vastly superior to human intelligence and extraordinarily powerful from our perspective. Suppose that it has also done its best on the "Friendly" part of the goal: it has developed a formal argument for why its AGI's utility function will be Friendly, it believes this argument to be airtight, and it has had this argument checked over by 100 of the world's most intelligent and relevantly experienced people. Suppose that SI now activates its AGI, unleashing it to reshape the world as it sees fit. What will be the outcome?
I believe that the probability of an unfavorable outcome - by which I mean an outcome essentially equivalent to what a UFAI would bring about - exceeds 90% in such a scenario. I believe the goal of designing a "Friendly" utility function is likely to be beyond the abilities even of the best team of humans willing to design such a function. I do not have a tight argument for why I believe this, but a comment on LessWrong by Wei Dai gives a good illustration of the kind of thoughts I have on the matter:
What I'm afraid of is that a design will be shown to be safe, and then it turns out that the proof is wrong, or the formalization of the notion of "safety" used by the proof is wrong. This kind of thing happens a lot in cryptography, if you replace "safety" with "security". These mistakes are still occurring today, even after decades of research into how to do such proofs and what the relevant formalizations are. From where I'm sitting, proving an AGI design Friendly seems even more difficult and error-prone than proving a crypto scheme secure, probably by a large margin, and there is no decades of time to refine the proof techniques and formalizations. There's good recent review of the history of provable security, titled Provable Security in the Real World, which might help you understand where I'm coming from.
I think this comment understates the risks, however. For example, when the comment says "the formalization of the notion of 'safety' used by the proof is wrong," it is not clear whether it means that the values the programmers have in mind are not correctly implemented by the formalization, or whether it means they are correctly implemented but are themselves catastrophic in a way that hasn't been anticipated. I would be highly concerned about both. There are other catastrophic possibilities as well; perhaps the utility function itself is well-specified and safe, but the AGI's model of the world is flawed (in particular, perhaps its prior or its process for matching observations to predictions are flawed) in a way that doesn't emerge until the AGI has made substantial changes to its environment.
By SI's own arguments, even a small error in any of these things would likely lead to catastrophe. And there are likely failure forms I haven't thought of. The overriding intuition here is that complex plans usually fail when unaccompanied by feedback loops. A scenario in which a set of people is ready to unleash an all-powerful being to maximize some parameter in the world, based solely on their initial confidence in their own extrapolations of the consequences of doing so, seems like a scenario that is overwhelmingly likely to result in a bad outcome. It comes down to placing the world's largest bet on a highly complex theory - with no experimentation to test the theory first.
So far, all I have argued is that the development of "Friendliness" theory can achieve at best only a limited reduction in the probability of an unfavorable outcome. However, as I argue in the next section, I believe there is at least one concept - the "tool-agent" distinction - that has more potential to reduce risks, and that SI appears to ignore this concept entirely. I believe that tools are safer than agents (even agents that make use of the best "Friendliness" theory that can reasonably be hoped for) and that SI encourages a focus on building agents, thus increasing risk.
Objection 2: SI appears to neglect the potentially important distinction between "tool" and "agent" AI.
Google Maps is a type of artificial intelligence (AI). It is far more intelligent than I am when it comes to planning routes.
Google Maps - by which I mean the complete software package including the display of the map itself - does not have a "utility" that it seeks to maximize. (One could fit a utility function to its actions, as to any set of actions, but there is no single "parameter to be maximized" driving its operations.)
Google Maps (as I understand it) considers multiple possible routes, gives each a score based on factors such as distance and likely traffic, and then displays the best-scoring route in a way that makes it easily understood by the user. If I don't like the route, for whatever reason, I can change some parameters and consider a different route. If I like the route, I can print it out or email it to a friend or send it to my phone's navigation application. Google Maps has no single parameter it is trying to maximize; it has no reason to try to "trick" me in order to increase its utility.
In short, Google Maps is not an agent, taking actions in order to maximize a utility parameter. It is a tool, generating information and then displaying it in a user-friendly manner for me to consider, use and export or discard as I wish.
Every software application I know of seems to work essentially the same way, including those that involve (specialized) artificial intelligence such as Google Search, Siri, Watson, Rybka, etc. Some can be put into an "agent mode" (as Watson was on Jeopardy!) but all can easily be set up to be used as "tools" (for example, Watson can simply display its top candidate answers to a question, with the score for each, without speaking any of them.)
The "tool mode" concept is importantly different from the possibility of Oracle AI sometimes discussed by SI. The discussions I've seen of Oracle AI present it as an Unfriendly AI that is "trapped in a box" - an AI whose intelligence is driven by an explicit utility function and that humans hope to control coercively. Hence the discussion of ideas such as the AI-Box Experiment. A different interpretation, given in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011, is an AI with a carefully designed utility function - likely as difficult to construct as "Friendliness" - that leaves it "wishing" to answer questions helpfully. By contrast with both these ideas, Tool-AGI is not "trapped" and it is not Unfriendly or Friendly; it has no motivations and no driving utility function of any kind, just like Google Maps. It scores different possibilities and displays its conclusions in a transparent and user-friendly manner, as its instructions say to do; it does not have an overarching "want," and so, as with the specialized AIs described above, while it may sometimes "misinterpret" a question (thereby scoring options poorly and ranking the wrong one #1) there is no reason to expect intentional trickery or manipulation when it comes to displaying its results.
Another way of putting this is that a "tool" has an underlying instruction set that conceptually looks like: "(1) Calculate which action A would maximize parameter P, based on existing data set D. (2) Summarize this calculation in a user-friendly manner, including what Action A is, what likely intermediate outcomes it would cause, what other actions would result in high values of P, etc." An "agent," by contrast, has an underlying instruction set that conceptually looks like: "(1) Calculate which action, A, would maximize parameter P, based on existing data set D. (2) Execute Action A." In any AI where (1) is separable (by the programmers) as a distinct step, (2) can be set to the "tool" version rather than the "agent" version, and this separability is in fact present with most/all modern software. Note that in the "tool" version, neither step (1) nor step (2) (nor the combination) constitutes an instruction to maximize a parameter - to describe a program of this kind as "wanting" something is a category error, and there is no reason to expect its step (2) to be deceptive.
I elaborated further on the distinction and on the concept of a tool-AI in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011.
This is important because an AGI running in tool mode could be extraordinarily useful but far more safe than an AGI running in agent mode. In fact, if developing "Friendly AI" is what we seek, a tool-AGI could likely be helpful enough in thinking through this problem as to render any previous work on "Friendliness theory" moot. Among other things, a tool-AGI would allow transparent views into the AGI's reasoning and predictions without any reason to fear being purposefully misled, and would facilitate safe experimental testing of any utility function that one wished to eventually plug into an "agent."
Is a tool-AGI possible? I believe that it is, and furthermore that it ought to be our default picture of how AGI will work, given that practically all software developed to date can (and usually does) run as a tool and given that modern software seems to be constantly becoming "intelligent" (capable of giving better answers than a human) in surprising new domains. In addition, it intuitively seems to me (though I am not highly confident) that intelligence inherently involves the distinct, separable steps of (a) considering multiple possible actions and (b) assigning a score to each, prior to executing any of the possible actions. If one can distinctly separate (a) and (b) in a program's code, then one can abstain from writing any "execution" instructions and instead focus on making the program list actions and scores in a user-friendly manner, for humans to consider and use as they wish.
Of course, there are possible paths to AGI that may rule out a "tool mode," but it seems that most of these paths would rule out the application of "Friendliness theory" as well. (For example, a "black box" emulation and augmentation of a human mind.) What are the paths to AGI that allow manual, transparent, intentional design of a utility function but do not allow the replacement of "execution" instructions with "communication" instructions? Most of the conversations I've had on this topic have focused on three responses:
- Self-improving AI. Many seem to find it intuitive that (a) AGI will almost certainly come from an AI rewriting its own source code, and (b) such a process would inevitably lead to an "agent." I do not agree with either (a) or (b). I discussed these issues in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011 and will be happy to discuss them more if this is the line of response that SI ends up pursuing. Very briefly:
- The idea of a "self-improving algorithm" intuitively sounds very powerful, but does not seem to have led to many "explosions" in software so far (and it seems to be a concept that could apply to narrow AI as well as to AGI).
- It seems to me that a tool-AGI could be plugged into a self-improvement process that would be quite powerful but would also terminate and yield a new tool-AI after a set number of iterations (or after reaching a set "intelligence threshold"). So I do not accept the argument that "self-improving AGI means agent AGI." As stated above, I will elaborate on this view if it turns out to be an important point of disagreement.
- I have argued (in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011) that the relevant self-improvement abilities are likely to come with or after - not prior to - the development of strong AGI. In other words, any software capable of the relevant kind of self-improvement is likely also capable of being used as a strong tool-AGI, with the benefits described above.
- The SI-related discussions I've seen of "self-improving AI" are highly vague, and do not spell out views on the above points.
- Dangerous data collection. Some point to the seeming dangers of a tool-AI's "scoring" function: in order to score different options it may have to collect data, which is itself an "agent" type action that could lead to dangerous actions. I think my definition of "tool" above makes clear what is wrong with this objection: a tool-AGI takes its existing data set D as fixed (and perhaps could have some pre-determined, safe set of simple actions it can take - such as using Google's API - to collect more), and if maximizing its chosen parameter is best accomplished through more data collection, it can transparently output why and how it suggests collecting more data. Over time it can be given more autonomy for data collection through an experimental and domain-specific process (e.g., modifying the AI to skip specific steps of human review of proposals for data collection after it has become clear that these steps work as intended), a process that has little to do with the "Friendly overarching utility function" concept promoted by SI. Again, I will elaborate on this if it turns out to be a key point.
- Race for power. Some have argued to me that humans are likely to choose to create agent-AGI, in order to quickly gain power and outrace other teams working on AGI. But this argument, even if accepted, has very different implications from SI's view.
Conventional wisdom says it is extremely dangerous to empower a computer to act in the world until one is very sure that the computer will do its job in a way that is helpful rather than harmful. So if a programmer chooses to "unleash an AGI as an agent" with the hope of gaining power, it seems that this programmer will be deliberately ignoring conventional wisdom about what is safe in favor of shortsighted greed. I do not see why such a programmer would be expected to make use of any "Friendliness theory" that might be available. (Attempting to incorporate such theory would almost certainly slow the project down greatly, and thus would bring the same problems as the more general "have caution, do testing" counseled by conventional wisdom.) It seems that the appropriate measures for preventing such a risk are security measures aiming to stop humans from launching unsafe agent-AIs, rather than developing theories or raising awareness of "Friendliness."
One of the things that bothers me most about SI is that there is practically no public content, as far as I can tell, explicitly addressing the idea of a "tool" and giving arguments for why AGI is likely to work only as an "agent." The idea that AGI will be driven by a central utility function seems to be simply assumed. Two examples:
- I have been referred to Muehlhauser and Salamon 2012 as the most up-to-date, clear explanation of SI's position on "the basics." This paper states, "Perhaps we could build an AI of limited cognitive ability — say, a machine that only answers questions: an 'Oracle AI.' But this approach is not without its own dangers (Armstrong, Sandberg, and Bostrom 2012)." However, the referenced paper (Armstrong, Sandberg and Bostrom 2012) seems to take it as a given that an Oracle AI is an "agent trapped in a box" - a computer that has a basic drive/utility function, not a Tool-AGI. The rest of Muehlhauser and Salamon 2012 seems to take it as a given that an AGI will be an agent.
- I have often been referred to Omohundro 2008 for an argument that an AGI is likely to have certain goals. But this paper seems, again, to take it as given that an AGI will be an agent, i.e., that it will have goals at all. The introduction states, "To say that a system of any design is an 'artiďŹcial intelligence', we mean that it has goals which it tries to accomplish by acting in the world." In other words, the premise I'm disputing seems embedded in its very definition of AI.
The closest thing I have seen to a public discussion of "tool-AGI" is in Dreams of Friendliness, where Eliezer Yudkowsky considers the question, "Why not just have the AI answer questions, instead of trying to do anything? Then it wouldn't need to be Friendly. It wouldn't need any goals at all. It would just answer questions." His response:
To which the reply is that the AI needs goals in order to decide how to think: that is, the AI has to act as a powerful optimization process in order to plan its acquisition of knowledge, effectively distill sensory information, pluck "answers" to particular questions out of the space of all possible responses, and of course, to improve its own source code up to the level where the AI is a powerful intelligence. All these events are "improbable" relative to random organizations of the AI's RAM, so the AI has to hit a narrow target in the space of possibilities to make superintelligent answers come out.
This passage appears vague and does not appear to address the specific "tool" concept I have defended above (in particular, it does not address the analogy to modern software, which challenges the idea that "powerful optimization processes" cannot run in tool mode). The rest of the piece discusses (a) psychological mistakes that could lead to the discussion in question; (b) the "Oracle AI" concept that I have outlined above. The comments contain some more discussion of the "tool" idea (Denis Bider and Shane Legg seem to be picturing something similar to "tool-AGI") but the discussion is unresolved and I believe the "tool" concept defended above remains essentially unaddressed.
In sum, SI appears to encourage a focus on building and launching "Friendly" agents (it is seeking to do so itself, and its work on "Friendliness" theory seems to be laying the groundwork for others to do so) while not addressing the tool-agent distinction. It seems to assume that any AGI will have to be an agent, and to make little to no attempt at justifying this assumption. The result, in my view, is that it is essentially advocating for a more dangerous approach to AI than the traditional approach to software development.
Objection 3: SI's envisioned scenario is far more specific and conjunctive than it appears at first glance, and I believe this scenario to be highly unlikely.
SI's scenario concerns the development of artificial general intelligence (AGI): a computer that is vastly more intelligent than humans in every relevant way. But we already have many computers that are vastly more intelligent than humans in some relevant ways, and the domains in which specialized AIs outdo humans seem to be constantly and continuously expanding. I feel that the relevance of "Friendliness theory" depends heavily on the idea of a "discrete jump" that seems unlikely and whose likelihood does not seem to have been publicly argued for.
One possible scenario is that at some point, we develop powerful enough non-AGI tools (particularly specialized AIs) that we vastly improve our abilities to consider and prepare for the eventuality of AGI - to the point where any previous theory developed on the subject becomes useless. Or (to put this more generally) non-AGI tools simply change the world so much that it becomes essentially unrecognizable from the perspective of today - again rendering any previous "Friendliness theory" moot. As I said in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011, some of SI's work "seems a bit like trying to design Facebook before the Internet was in use, or even before the computer existed."
Perhaps there will be a discrete jump to AGI, but it will be a sort of AGI that renders "Friendliness theory" moot for a different reason. For example, in the practice of software development, there often does not seem to be an operational distinction between "intelligent" and "Friendly." (For example, my impression is that the only method programmers had for evaluating Watson's "intelligence" was to see whether it was coming up with the same answers that a well-informed human would; the only way to evaluate Siri's "intelligence" was to evaluate its helpfulness to humans.) "Intelligent" often ends up getting defined as "prone to take actions that seem all-around 'good' to the programmer." So the concept of "Friendliness" may end up being naturally and subtly baked in to a successful AGI effort.
The bottom line is that we know very little about the course of future artificial intelligence. I believe that the probability that SI's concept of "Friendly" vs. "Unfriendly" goals ends up seeming essentially nonsensical, irrelevant and/or unimportant from the standpoint of the relevant future is over 90%.
Other objections to SI's views
There are other debates about the likelihood of SI's work being relevant/helpful; for example,
- It isn't clear whether the development of AGI is imminent enough to be relevant, or whether other risks to humanity are closer.
- It isn't clear whether AGI would be as powerful as SI's views imply. (I discussed this briefly in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011.)
- It isn't clear whether even an extremely powerful UFAI would choose to attack humans as opposed to negotiating with them. (I find it somewhat helpful to analogize UFAI-human interactions to human-mosquito interactions. Humans are enormously more intelligent than mosquitoes; humans are good at predicting, manipulating, and destroying mosquitoes; humans do not value mosquitoes' welfare; humans have other goals that mosquitoes interfere with; humans would like to see mosquitoes eradicated at least from certain parts of the planet. Yet humans haven't accomplished such eradication, and it is easy to imagine scenarios in which humans would prefer honest negotiation and trade with mosquitoes to any other arrangement, if such negotiation and trade were possible.)
Unlike the three objections I focus on, these other issues have been discussed a fair amount, and if these other issues were the only objections to SI's arguments I would find SI's case to be strong (i.e., I would find its scenario likely enough to warrant investment in).
Wrapup
- I believe the most likely future scenarios are the ones we haven't thought of, and that the most likely fate of the sort of theory SI ends up developing is irrelevance.
- I believe that unleashing an all-powerful "agent AGI" (without the benefit of experimentation) would very likely result in a UFAI-like outcome, no matter how carefully the "agent AGI" was designed to be "Friendly." I see SI as encouraging (and aiming to take) this approach.
- I believe that the standard approach to developing software results in "tools," not "agents," and that tools (while dangerous) are much safer than agents. A "tool mode" could facilitate experiment-informed progress toward a safe "agent," rather than needing to get "Friendliness" theory right without any experimentation.
- Therefore, I believe that the approach SI advocates and aims to prepare for is far more dangerous than the standard approach, so if SI's work on Friendliness theory affects the risk of human extinction one way or the other, it will increase the risk of human extinction. Fortunately I believe SI's work is far more likely to have no effect one way or the other.
For a long time I refrained from engaging in object-level debates over SI's work, believing that others are better qualified to do so. But after talking at great length to many of SI's supporters and advocates and reading everything I've been pointed to as relevant, I still have seen no clear and compelling response to any of my three major objections. As stated above, there are many possible responses to my objections, but SI's current arguments do not seem clear on what responses they wish to take and defend. At this point I am unlikely to form a positive view of SI's work until and unless I do see such responses, and/or SI changes its positions.
Is SI the kind of organization we want to bet on?
This part of the post has some risks. For most of GiveWell's history, sticking to our standard criteria - and putting more energy into recommended than non-recommended organizations - has enabled us to share our honest thoughts about charities without appearing to get personal. But when evaluating a group such as SI, I can't avoid placing a heavy weight on (my read on) the general competence, capability and "intangibles" of the people and organization, because SI's mission is not about repeating activities that have worked in the past. Sharing my views on these issues could strike some as personal or mean-spirited and could lead to the misimpression that GiveWell is hostile toward SI. But it is simply necessary in order to be fully transparent about why I hold the views that I hold.
Fortunately, SI is an ideal organization for our first discussion of this type. I believe the staff and supporters of SI would overwhelmingly rather hear the whole truth about my thoughts - so that they can directly engage them and, if warranted, make changes - than have me sugar-coat what I think in order to spare their feelings. People who know me and my attitude toward being honest vs. sparing feelings know that this, itself, is high praise for SI.
One more comment before I continue: our policy is that non-public information provided to us by a charity will not be published or discussed without that charity's prior consent. However, none of the content of this post is based on private information; all of it is based on information that SI has made available to the public.
There are several reasons that I currently have a negative impression of SI's general competence, capability and "intangibles." My mind remains open and I include specifics on how it could be changed.
- Weak arguments. SI has produced enormous quantities of public argumentation, and I have examined a very large proportion of this information. Yet I have never seen a clear response to any of the three basic objections I listed in the previous section. One of SI's major goals is to raise awareness of AI-related risks; given this, the fact that it has not advanced clear/concise/compelling arguments speaks, in my view, to its general competence.
- Lack of impressive endorsements. I discussed this issue in my 2011 interview with SI representatives and I still feel the same way on the matter. I feel that given the enormous implications of SI's claims, if it argued them well it ought to be able to get more impressive endorsements than it has.
I have been pointed to Peter Thiel and Ray Kurzweil as examples of impressive SI supporters, but I have not seen any on-record statements from either of these people that show agreement with SI's specific views, and in fact (based on watching them speak at Singularity Summits) my impression is that they disagree. Peter Thiel seems to believe that speeding the pace of general innovation is a good thing; this would seem to be in tension with SI's view that AGI will be catastrophic by default and that no one other than SI is paying sufficient attention to "Friendliness" issues. Ray Kurzweil seems to believe that "safety" is a matter of transparency, strong institutions, etc. rather than of "Friendliness." I am personally in agreement with the things I have seen both of them say on these topics. I find it possible that they support SI because of the Singularity Summit or to increase general interest in ambitious technology, rather than because they find "Friendliness theory" to be as important as SI does.
Clear, on-record statements from these two supporters, specifically endorsing SI's arguments and the importance of developing Friendliness theory, would shift my views somewhat on this point.
- Resistance to feedback loops. I discussed this issue in my 2011 interview with SI representatives and I still feel the same way on the matter. SI seems to have passed up opportunities to test itself and its own rationality by e.g. aiming for objectively impressive accomplishments. This is a problem because of (a) its extremely ambitious goals (among other things, it seeks to develop artificial intelligence and "Friendliness theory" before anyone else can develop artificial intelligence); (b) its view of its staff/supporters as having unusual insight into rationality, which I discuss in a later bullet point.
SI's list of achievements is not, in my view, up to where it needs to be given (a) and (b). Yet I have seen no declaration that SI has fallen short to date and explanation of what will be changed to deal with it. SI's recent release of a strategic plan and monthly updates are improvements from a transparency perspective, but they still leave me feeling as though there are no clear metrics or goals by which SI is committing to be measured (aside from very basic organizational goals such as "design a new website" and very vague goals such as "publish more papers") and as though SI places a low priority on engaging people who are critical of its views (or at least not yet on board), as opposed to people who are naturally drawn to it.
I believe that one of the primary obstacles to being impactful as a nonprofit is the lack of the sort of helpful feedback loops that lead to success in other domains. I like to see groups that are making as much effort as they can to create meaningful feedback loops for themselves. I perceive SI as falling well short on this front. Pursuing more impressive endorsements and developing benign but objectively recognizable innovations (particularly commercially viable ones) are two possible ways to impose more demanding feedback loops. (I discussed both of these in my interview linked above).
- Apparent poorly grounded belief in SI's superior general rationality. Many of the things that SI and its supporters and advocates say imply a belief that they have special insights into the nature of general rationality, and/or have superior general rationality, relative to the rest of the population. (Examples here, here and here). My understanding is that SI is in the process of spinning off a group dedicated to training people on how to have higher general rationality.
Yet I'm not aware of any of what I consider compelling evidence that SI staff/supporters/advocates have any special insight into the nature of general rationality or that they have especially high general rationality.
I have been pointed to the Sequences on this point. The Sequences (which I have read the vast majority of) do not seem to me to be a demonstration or evidence of general rationality. They are about rationality; I find them very enjoyable to read; and there is very little they say that I disagree with (or would have disagreed with before I read them). However, they do not seem to demonstrate rationality on the part of the writer, any more than a series of enjoyable, not-obviously-inaccurate essays on the qualities of a good basketball player would demonstrate basketball prowess. I sometimes get the impression that fans of the Sequences are willing to ascribe superior rationality to the writer simply because the content seems smart and insightful to them, without making a critical effort to determine the extent to which the content is novel, actionable and important.
I endorse Eliezer Yudkowsky's statement, "Be careful … any time you find yourself defining the [rationalist] as someone other than the agent who is currently smiling from on top of a giant heap of utility." To me, the best evidence of superior general rationality (or of insight into it) would be objectively impressive achievements (successful commercial ventures, highly prestigious awards, clear innovations, etc.) and/or accumulation of wealth and power. As mentioned above, SI staff/supporters/advocates do not seem particularly impressive on these fronts, at least not as much as I would expect for people who have the sort of insight into rationality that makes it sensible for them to train others in it. I am open to other evidence that SI staff/supporters/advocates have superior general rationality, but I have not seen it.
Why is it a problem if SI staff/supporter/advocates believe themselves, without good evidence, to have superior general rationality? First off, it strikes me as a belief based on wishful thinking rather than rational inference. Secondly, I would expect a series of problems to accompany overconfidence in one's general rationality, and several of these problems seem to be actually occurring in SI's case:
- Insufficient self-skepticism given how strong its claims are and how little support its claims have won. Rather than endorsing "Others have not accepted our arguments, so we will sharpen and/or reexamine our arguments," SI seems often to endorse something more like "Others have not accepted their arguments because they have inferior general rationality," a stance less likely to lead to improvement on SI's part.
- Being too selective (in terms of looking for people who share its preconceptions) when determining whom to hire and whose feedback to take seriously.
- Paying insufficient attention to the limitations of the confidence one can have in one's untested theories, in line with my Objection 1.
- Overall disconnect between SI's goals and its activities. SI seeks to build FAI and/or to develop and promote "Friendliness theory" that can be useful to others in building FAI. Yet it seems that most of its time goes to activities other than developing AI or theory. Its per-person output in terms of publications seems low. Its core staff seem more focused on Less Wrong posts, "rationality training" and other activities that don't seem connected to the core goals; Eliezer Yudkowsky, in particular, appears (from the strategic plan) to be focused on writing books for popular consumption. These activities seem neither to be advancing the state of FAI-related theory nor to be engaging the sort of people most likely to be crucial for building AGI.
A possible justification for these activities is that SI is seeking to promote greater general rationality, which over time will lead to more and better support for its mission. But if this is SI's core activity, it becomes even more important to test the hypothesis that SI's views are in fact rooted in superior general rationality - and these tests don't seem to be happening, as discussed above.
- Theft. I am bothered by the 2009 theft of $118,803.00 (as against a $541,080.00 budget for the year). In an organization as small as SI, it really seems as though theft that large relative to the budget shouldn't occur and that it represents a major failure of hiring and/or internal controls.
In addition, I have seen no public SI-authorized discussion of the matter that I consider to be satisfactory in terms of explaining what happened and what the current status of the case is on an ongoing basis. Some details may have to be omitted, but a clear SI-authorized statement on this point with as much information as can reasonably provided would be helpful.
A couple positive observations to add context here:
- I see significant positive qualities in many of the people associated with SI. I especially like what I perceive as their sincere wish to do whatever they can to help the world as much as possible, and the high value they place on being right as opposed to being conventional or polite. I have not interacted with Eliezer Yudkowsky but I greatly enjoy his writings.
- I'm aware that SI has relatively new leadership that is attempting to address the issues behind some of my complaints. I have a generally positive impression of the new leadership; I believe the Executive Director and Development Director, in particular, to represent a step forward in terms of being interested in transparency and in testing their own general rationality. So I will not be surprised if there is some improvement in the coming years, particularly regarding the last couple of statements listed above. That said, SI is an organization and it seems reasonable to judge it by its organizational track record, especially when its new leadership is so new that I have little basis on which to judge these staff.
Wrapup
While SI has produced a lot of content that I find interesting and enjoyable, it has not produced what I consider evidence of superior general rationality or of its suitability for the tasks it has set for itself. I see no qualifications or achievements that specifically seem to indicate that SI staff are well-suited to the challenge of understanding the key AI-related issues and/or coordinating the construction of an FAI. And I see specific reasons to be pessimistic about its suitability and general competence.
When estimating the expected value of an endeavor, it is natural to have an implicit "survivorship bias" - to use organizations whose accomplishments one is familiar with (which tend to be relatively effective organizations) as a reference class. Because of this, I would be extremely wary of investing in an organization with apparently poor general competence/suitability to its tasks, even if I bought fully into its mission (which I do not) and saw no other groups working on a comparable mission.
But if there's even a chance …
A common argument that SI supporters raise with me is along the lines of, "Even if SI's arguments are weak and its staff isn't as capable as one would like to see, their goal is so important that they would be a good investment even at a tiny probability of success."
I believe this argument to be a form of Pascal's Mugging and I have outlined the reasons I believe it to be invalid in two posts (here and here). There have been some objections to my arguments, but I still believe them to be valid. There is a good chance I will revisit these topics in the future, because I believe these issues to be at the core of many of the differences between GiveWell-top-charities supporters and SI supporters.
Regardless of whether one accepts my specific arguments, it is worth noting that the most prominent people associated with SI tend to agree with the conclusion that the "But if there's even a chance …" argument is not valid. (See comments on my post from Michael Vassar and Eliezer Yudkowsky as well as Eliezer's interview with John Baez.)
Existential risk reduction as a cause
I consider the general cause of "looking for ways that philanthropic dollars can reduce direct threats of global catastrophic risks, particularly those that involve some risk of human extinction" to be a relatively high-potential cause. It is on the working agenda for GiveWell Labs and we will be writing more about it.
However, I don't think that "Cause X is the one I care about and Organization Y is the only one working on it" to be a good reason to support Organization Y. For donors determined to donate within this cause, I encourage you to consider donating to a donor-advised fund while making it clear that you intend to grant out the funds to existential-risk-reduction-related organizations in the future. (One way to accomplish this would be to create a fund with "existential risk" in the name; this is a fairly easy thing to do and one person could do it on behalf of multiple donors.)
For one who accepts my arguments about SI, I believe withholding funds in this way is likely to be better for SI's mission than donating to SI - through incentive effects alone (not to mention my specific argument that SI's approach to "Friendliness" seems likely to increase risks).
How I might change my views
My views are very open to revision.
However, I cannot realistically commit to read and seriously consider all comments posted on the matter. The number of people capable of taking a few minutes to write a comment is sufficient to swamp my capacity. I do encourage people to comment and I do intend to read at least some comments, but if you are looking to change my views, you should not consider posting a comment to be the most promising route.
Instead, what I will commit to is reading and carefully considering up to 50,000 words of content that are (a) specifically marked as SI-authorized responses to the points I have raised; (b) explicitly cleared for release to the general public as SI-authorized communications. In order to consider a response "SI-authorized and cleared for release," I will accept explicit communication from SI's Executive Director or from a majority of its Board of Directors endorsing the content in question. After 50,000 words, I may change my views and/or commit to reading more content, or (if I determine that the content is poor and is not using my time efficiently) I may decide not to engage further. SI-authorized content may improve or worsen SI's standing in my estimation, so unlike with comments, there is an incentive to select content that uses my time efficiently. Of course, SI-authorized content may end up including excerpts from comment responses to this post, and/or already-existing public content.
I may also change my views for other reasons, particularly if SI secures more impressive achievements and/or endorsements.
One more note: I believe I have read the vast majority of the Sequences, including the AI-foom debate, and that this content - while interesting and enjoyable - does not have much relevance for the arguments I've made.
Again: I think that whatever happens as a result of my post will be positive for SI's mission, whether or not it is positive for SI as an organization. I believe that most of SI's supporters and advocates care more about the former than about the latter, and that this attitude is far too rare in the nonprofit world.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the following people for reviewing a draft of this post and providing thoughtful feedback (this of course does not mean they agree with the post or are responsible for its content): Dario Amodei, Nick Beckstead, Elie Hassenfeld, Alexander Kruel, Tim Ogden, John Salvatier, Jonah Sinick, Cari Tuna, Stephanie Wykstra.
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Comments (1270)
Holden, I think your assessment is accurate ... but I would venture to say that it does not go far enough.
My own experience with SI, and my background, might be relevant here. I am a member of the Math/Physical Science faculty at Wells College, in Upstate NY. I also have had a parallel career as a cognitive scientist/AI researcher, with several publications in the AGI field, including the opening chapter (coauthored with Ben Goertzel) in a forthcoming Springer book about the Singularity.
I have long complained about SI's narrow and obsessive focus on the "utility function" aspect of AI -- simply put, SI assumes that future superintelligent systems will be driven by certain classes of mechanism that are still only theoretical, and which are very likely to be superceded by other kinds of mechanism that have very different properties. Even worse, the "utility function" mechanism favored by SI is quite likely to be so unstable that it will never allow an AI to achieve any kind of human-level intelligence, never mind the kind of superintelligence that would be threatening.
Perhaps most important of all, though, is the fact that the alternative motivation mechanism might (and notice that I am being cautious here: might) lead to systems that are extremely stable. Which means both friendly and safe.
Taken in isolation, these thoughts and arguments might amount to nothing more than a minor addition to the points that you make above. However, my experience with SI is that when I tried to raise these concerns back in 2005/2006 I was subjected to a series of attacks that culminated in a tirade of slanderous denunciations from the founder of SI, Eliezer Yudkowsky. After delivering this tirade, Yudkowsky then banned me from the discussion forum that he controlled, and instructed others on that forum that discussion about me was henceforth forbidden.
Since that time I have found that when I partake in discussions on AGI topics in a context where SI supporters are present, I am frequently subjected to abusive personal attacks in which reference is made to Yudkowsky's earlier outburst. This activity is now so common that when I occasionally post comments here, my remarks are very quickly voted down below a threshold that makes them virtually invisible. (A fate that will probably apply immediately to this very comment).
I would say that, far from deserving support, SI should be considered a cult-like community in which dissent is ruthlessly suppressed in order to exaggerate the point of view of SI's founders and controllers, regardless of the scientific merits of those views, or of the dissenting opinions.
Obligatory link: You're Calling Who a Cult Leader?
Also, your impression might be different if you had witnessed the long, deep, and ongoing disagreements between Eliezer and I about several issues fundamental to SI — all while Eliezer suggested that I be made Executive Director and then continued to support me in that role.
Can you give an example of what you mean by "abusive personal attacks"?
If you being downvoted is the result of LW ruthlessly suppressing dissent of all kind, how do you explain this post by Holden Karnofsky getting massively upvoted?
eg:
It's not being upvoted by regulars/believers. It's a magnet for dissidents, and transient visitors with negative perceptions of SI.
It's high-profile,so it needs to be upvoted to put on a show of fair-mindedness.
I'm a regular, and I was impressed with it. Many other regulars have also said positive things about it, so possible explanation 1 is out. And unless I'm outright lying to you, 2, if true, would have to be entirely subconscious.
All possible. However, if you can explain anything, the explanation counts for nothing. The question is which explanation is the most likely, and "there is evidence for fair-mindedness (but it is mostly fake!)" is more contrived than "there is evidence for fair-mindedness", as an explanation for the upvotes of OP.
Yeah. But there's also evidence of unfair-mindedness.
Link to the juicy details cough I mean evidence?
Markus: Happy to link to the details, but where in the huge stream would you like to be linked to? The problem is that opinions can be sharply skewed by choosing to link to only selected items.
I cite as evidence Oscar's choice, below, to link to a post by EY. In that post he makes a series of statements that are flagrant untruths. If you read that particular link, and take his word as trustworthy, you get one impression.
But if you knew that EY had to remove several quotes from their context and present them in a deceiptful manner, in order to claim that I said things that I did not, you might get a very different impression.
You might also get a different impression if you knew this. The comment that Oscar cites came shortly after I offered to submit the dispute to outside arbitration by an expert in the field we were discussing. I offered that ANYONE could propose an outside expert, and I would abide by their opinion.
It was only at that point that EY suddenly wrote the post that Oscar just referenced, in which he declared me to be banished from the list and (a short time later) that all discussion about the topic should cease.
That fact by itself speaks volumes.
I'll gladly start reading at any point you'll link me to.
The fact that you don't just provide a useful link but instead several paragraphs of excuses why the stuff I'm reading is untrustworthy I count as (small) evidence against you.
This is a very strong statement. Have you allowed for the possibility that your current judgement might be clouded by the events transpired some 6 years ago?
shminux, It is of course possible that my current judgement might be clouded by past events ... however, we have to assess the point at which judgements are "clouded" (in other words, poor because of confusion or emotion) by time, rather than being lessons learned that still apply.
In the time since those events I have found no diminution in the rate at which SI people intervene aggressively in discussions I am having, with the sole purposes of trying to tell everyone that I was banned from Yudkowsky's forum back in 2006.
This most recently happened just a few weeks ago. On that occasion Luke Muehlhauser (no less) took the unusual step of asking me to friend him on Facebook, after which he joined a discussion I was having and made scathing ad hominem comments about me -- which included trying to use the fact of the 2006 episode as a piece of evidence for my lack of credibility -- and then disappeared again. He made no reply when his ad hominem assertions were challenged.
Now: would you consider it to be a matter of clouded judgment on my part when Luke Muehlhauser is still, in 2012, engaging in that kind of attack?
On balance, then, I think my comments come from privileged insight (I am one of the few to have made technical objections to SI's cherished beliefs, and I was given valuable insight into their psychology when I experienced the violent reaction) rather than clouded judgement.
I myself employ a very strong heuristic, from years of trolling the internet: when a user joins a forum and complains about an out-of-character and strongly personal persecution by the moderation staff in the past, there is virtually always more to the story when you look into it.
Indeed, Dolores, that is an empirically sound strategy, if used with caution.
My own experience, however, is that people who do that can usually be googled quickly, and are often found to be unqualified cranks of one persuasion or another. People with more anger than self-control.
But that is not always the case. Recently, for example, a woman friended me on Facebook and then posted numerous diatribes against a respected academic acquaintance of mine, accusing him of raping her and fathering her child. These posts were quite blood-curdling. And their target appeared quite the most innocent guy you could imagine. Very difficult to make a judgement. However, about a month ago the guy suddenly came out and made a full and embarrassing frank admission of guilt. It was an astonishing episode. But it was an instance of one of those rare occasions when the person (the woman in this case) turned out to be perfectly justified.
I am helpless to convince you. All I can do is point to my own qualifications and standing. I am no lone crank crying in the wilderness. I teach Math, Physics and Cognitive Neuroscience at the undergraduate level, and I have coauthored a paper with one of the AGI field's leading exponents (Ben Goertzel), in a book about the Singularity that was at one point (maybe not anymore!) slated to be a publishing landmark for the field. You have to make a judgement.
Regardless of who was how much at fault in the SL4 incident, surely you must admit that Yudkowsky's interactions with you were unusually hostile relative to how he generally interacts with critics. I can see how you'd want to place emphasis on those interactions because they involved you personally, but that doesn't make them representative for purposes of judging cultishness or making general claims that "dissent is ruthlessly suppressed".
Steven. That does make it seem as though the only thing worth complaining about was the "unusually" hostile EY behavior on that occasion. As if it were exceptional, not repeated before or since.
But that is inaccurate. That episode was the culmination of a long sequence of derogatory remarks. So that is what came before.
What came after? I have made a number of attempts to open a dialog on the important issue at hand, which is not the personal conflict but the question of AGI motivation systems. My attempts have been rebuffed. And instead I have been subjected to repeated attacks by SI members.
That would be six years of repeated attacks.
So portraying it as an isolated incident is not factually correct. Which was my point, of course.
I'm interested in any compiled papers or articles you wrote about AGI motivation systems, aside from the forthcoming book chapter, which I will read. Do you have any links?
I initially upvoted this post, because the criticism seemed reasonable. Then I read the discussion, and switched to downvoting it. In particular, this:
Serious accusations there, with no links that would allow someone to judge the truth of them. And after reading the discussion, I suspect the reason people keep bringing up your 2006 banning is because they see your current behavior is part of a pattern of bad behavior, and that the behavior that led to your 2006 banning was also part of that same pattern of bad behavior.
I witnessed many of the emails in the 2006 banning. Richard disagreed with Eliezer often, and not very diplomatically. Rather than deal with Richard's arguments, Eliezer decided to label Richard as a stupid troll, which he obviously was not, and dismiss him. I am disappointed that Eliezer has apparently never apologized. The email list, SL4, slacked off in volume for months afterwords, probably because most participants felt disgusted by the affair; and Ben Goertzel made a new list, which many people switched to.
Hmmm...
The fact that many people quit the list / cut back their participation seems fairly strong evidence that Loosemore has a legitimate complaint here.
Though if so, he's done a poor job conveying it in this thread.
I'm not sure. People sometimes cut back participation in that sort of thing in response to drama in general. However, it is definitely evidence. Phil's remark makes me strongly update in the direction of Loosemore having a legitimate point.
I thought objections 1 and 2 were bogus. I thought Holden would be better off steering away from the more technical arguments and sticking to the line that these folk don't have a clearly-argued case regarding them doing a lot of good.
It is assumed that the lack of ability to persuade Holden results from lack of good arguments in support of rationally held beliefs. It appears to me that the lack of good arguments is result of lack of the rational basis for the beliefs themselves. (Same goes for meta-beliefs that are not conventionally substantiated)
But if there's even a chance …
Holden cites two posts (Why We Can’t Take Expected Value Estimates Literally and Maximizing Cost-effectiveness via Critical Inquiry). They are supposed to support the argument that small or very small changes to the probability of an existential risk event occurring are not worth caring about or donating money towards.
I think that these posts both have serious problems (see the comments, esp Carl Shulman's). In particular Why We Can’t Take Expected Value Estimates Literally was heavily criticised by Robin Hanson in On Fudge Factors.
Robin Hanson has been listed as the other major "intelligent/competent" critic of SIAI. That he criticises what seems to be the keystone of Holden's argument should be cause for concern for Holden. (after all, if "even a chance" is good enough, then all the other criticisms melt away).
This would be a much more serious criticism of SIAI if Holden and Hanson could come to agreement on what exactly the problem with SIAI is, and if Holden could sort out the problems with these two supporting posts*
(*of course they won't do that without substantial revision of one or both of their positions because Hanson is on the same page as the rest of SIAI with regard to expected utility, see On Fudge Factors. Hanson's disagreement with SIAI is a different one; approximately that Hanson thinks ems first is likely and that a singleton is both bad and unlikely, and Hanson's axiology is significantly unintuitive to the extent that he is not really on the same page as most people with regard to what counts as a good or bad outcome)
It seems like an odd thing to say. Why take the standpoint of the "relevant future"? History is written by the winners - but that doesn't mean that their perspective is shared by us. Besides the statement is likely wrong - "Friendly" and "Unfriendly" as defined by Yudkowsky are fairly reasonable and useful concepts.
Yes. There's something weird going on there. EY seems to want to constrain AI in various ways -- to be friendly, to be Bayesian and so on -- but how, then is the "G" justifiied? Human intelligence is general enough to consider and formulate multiple theories of probability. Why should we consider something as being at least as smart as us and at least as general as us, when we can think things it can't think.
"Friendliness" is (the way I understand it) a constraint on the purposes and desired consequences of the AI's actions, not on what it is allowed to think. It would be able to think of non-Friendly actions, if only for the purposes of e.g. averting them when necessary.
As for Bayesianism, my guess is that even a Seed AI has to start somehow. There's no necessary constraint on it remaining Bayesian if it manages to figure out some even better theory of probability (or if it judges that a theory humans have developed is better). If an AI models itself performing better according to its criteria if it used some different theory, it will ideally self-modify to use that theory...
I'm mildly surprised that this post has not yet attracted more criticism. My initial reaction was that criticisms (1) and (2) seemed like strong ones, and almost posted a comment saying so. Then I thought, "I should look for other people discussing those points and join that discussion." But after doing that, I feel like people haven't given much in the way of objections to (1) and (2). Perceptions correct? Do lots of other people agree with them?
Regarding tools versus agent AGI's, I think the desired end game is still an Friendly Agent AGI. I am open to tool AIs being useful in the path to building such an agent. Similar ideas advocated by SI include use of automated theorem provers in formally proving Friendliness, and creating a seed AI to compute the Coherent Extropolated Volition of humanity and build an FAI with the appropiate utility function.
Existential risk reduction is a very worthy cause. As far as I can tell there are a few serious efforts - they have scenarios which by outside view have non-negligible chances, and in case of many of these scenarios these efforts make non-negligible difference to the outcome.
Such efforts are:
That's about the entire list I'm aware of (are there any others?)
And then there's huge number of efforts which claim to do something based on existential risk, but either theories behind risk they're concerning themselves with, or theories behind why their efforts are likely to help, are based on assumptions not shared by vast majority of competent people.
All FAI-related stuff suffers from both of these problems - their risk is not based on any established science, and their answer is even less based in reality. If it suffered from only one of these problems it might be fixable, but as far as I can tell it is extremely unlikely to join the category of serious efforts ever.
The best claim those non-serious effort can make is that tiny chance that the risk is real * tiny change the organization will make a difference * huge risk is still a big number, but that's not a terribly convincing argument.
I'm under impression that we're doing far less than everything we can with these serious efforts, and we haven't really identified everything that can be dealt with with such serious effort. We should focus there (and on a lot of things which are not related to existential risk).
Maybe I'm just jaded, but this critique doesn't impress me much. Holden's substantive suggestion is that, instead of trying to design friendly agent AI, we should just make passive "tool AI" that only reacts to commands but never acts on its own. So when do we start thinking about the problems peculiar to agent AI? Do we just hope that agent AI will never come into existence? Do we ask the tool AI to solve the friendly AI problem for us? (That seems to be what people want to do anyway, an approach I reject as ridiculously indirect.)
(Perhaps I should note that I find your approach to be too indirect as well: if you really understand how justification works then you should be able to use that knowledge to make (invoke?) a theoretically perfectly justified agent, who will treat others' epistemic and moral beliefs in a thoroughly justified manner without your having to tell it "morality is in mind-brains, figure out what the mind-brains say then do what they tell you to do". That is, I think the correct solution should be just clearly mathematically and meta-ethically justified, question-dissolving, reflective, non-arbitrary, perfect decision theory. Such an approach is closest in spirit to CFAI. All other approaches, e.g. CEV, WBE, or oracle AI, are relatively arbitrary and unmotivated, especially meta-ethically.)
Not only does this seem wrong, but if I believed it I would want SI to look for the correct decision theory (roughly what Eliezer says he's doing anyway). It fails to stress the possibility that Eliezer's whole approach is wrong. In fact it seems willfully (heh) ignorant of the planning fallacy and similar concerns: even formalizing the 'correct' prior seems tricky to me, so why would it be feasible to formalize "correct" meta-ethics even if it exists in the sense you mean? And what reason do we have to believe that a version with no pointers to brains exists at all?
At least with reflective decision theory I see no good reason to think that a transparently-written AGI is impossible in principle (our neurons don't just fire randomly, nor does evolution seem like a particularly good searcher of mindspace), so a theory of decisions that can describe said AGI's actions should be mathematically possible barring some alternative to math. (Whether, eg, the description would fit in our observable universe seems like another question.)
As a separate point, people talk about AI friendliness as a safety precaution, but I think an important thing to remember is a truly friendly self improving AGI would probably be the greatest possible thing you could do for the world. It's possible the risk of human destruction from the pursuit of FAI is larger than the possible upside, but if you include the FAI's ability to mitigate other existential risks I don't think that's the case.
Thank you very much for writing this. I, um, wish you hadn't posted it literally directly before the May Minicamp when I can't realistically respond until Tuesday. Nonetheless, it already has a warm place in my heart next to the debate with Robin Hanson as the second attempt to mount informed criticism of SIAI.
To those who think Eliezer is exaggerating: please link me to "informed criticism of SIAI."
It is so hard to find good critics.
Edit: Well, I guess there are more than two examples, though relatively few. I was wrong to suggest otherwise. Much of this has to do with the fact that SI hasn't been very clear about many of its positions and arguments: see Beckstead's comment and Hallquist's followup.
It would help if you could elaborate on what you mean by "informed".
Most of what Holden wrote, and much more, has been said by other people, excluding myself, before.
I don't have the time right now to wade through all those years of posts and comments but might do so later.
And if you are not willing to take into account what I myself wrote, for being uninformed, then maybe you will however agree that at least all of my critical comments that have been upvoted to +10 (ETA changed to +10, although there is a lot more on-topic at +5) should have been taken into account. If you do so you will find that SI could have updated some time ago on some of what has been said in Holden's post.
It looks to me as though Holden had the criticisms he expresses even before becoming "informed", presumably by reading the sequences, but was too intimidated to share them. Perhaps it is worth listening to/encouraging uninformed criticisms as well as informed ones?
I'm very impressed by Holden's thoroughness and thoughtfulness. What I'd like to know is why his post is Eliezer-endorsed and has 191 up-votes, while my many posts over the years hammering on Objection 1, and my comments raising Objection 2, have never gotten the green button, been frequently down-voted, and never been responded to by SIAI. Do you have to be outside the community to be taken seriously by it?
I don't work for SI and this is not an SI-authorized response, unless SI endorses it later. This comment is based on my own understanding based on conversations with and publications of SI members and general world model, and does not necessarily reflect the views or activities of SI.
The first thing I notice is that your interpretation of SI's goals with respect to AGI are narrower than the impression I had gotten, based on conversations with SI members. In particular, I don't think SI's research is limited to trying to make AGI friendliness provable, but on a variety of different safety strategies, and on the relative win-rates of different technological paths, eg brain uploading vs. de-novo AI, classes of utility functions and their relative risks, and so on. There is also a distinction between "FAI theory" and "AGI theory" that you aren't making; the idea, as I see it, is that to the extent to which these are separable, "FAI theory" covers research into safety mechanisms which reduce the probability of disaster if any AGI is created, while "AGI theory" covers research that brings the creation of any AGI closer. Your first objection - that a maximizing FAI would be very dangerous - seems to be based on a belief, first, that SI is researching a narrower class of safety mechanisms than it really is, and second, that SI researches AGI theory, which I believe it explicitly does not.
You seem a bit sore that SI hasn't talked about your notion of Tool-AI, but I'm a bit confused by this, since it's the first time I've heard that term used, and your link is to an email thread which, unless I'm missing something, was not disseminated publicly or through SI in general. A conversation about tool-based AI is well worth having; my current perspective is that it looks like it interacts with the inevitability argument and the overall AI power curve in such a way that it's still very dangerous, and that it amounts to a slightly different spin on Oracle AI, but this would be a complicated discussion. But bringing it up effectively for the first time, in the middle of a multi-pronged attack on SI's credibility, seems really unfair. While there may have been a significant communications failure in there, a cursory reading suggests to me that your question never made it to the right person.
The claim that SI will perform better if they don't get funding seems very strange. My model is that it would force their current employees to leave and spend their time on unrelated paid work instead, which doesn't seem like an improvement. I get the impression that your views of SI's achievements may be getting measured against a metric of achievements-per-organization, rather than achievements-per-dollar; in absolute budget terms, SI is tiny. But they've still had a huge memetic influence, difficult as that is to measure.
All that said, I applaud your decision to post your objections and read the responses. This sort of dialogue is a good way to reach true beliefs, and I look forward to reading more of it from all sides.
This post is highly critical of SIAI — both of its philosophy and its organizational choices. It is also now the #1 most highly voted post in the entire history of LessWrong — higher than any posts by Eliezer or myself.
I shall now laugh harder than ever when people try to say with a straight face that LessWrong is an Eliezer-cult that suppresses dissent.
How's about you also have a critical discussion of 'where can be we wrong and how do we make sure we are actually competent' and 'can we figure out what the AI will actually do, using our tools?' instead of 'how do we communicate our awesomeness better' and 'are we communicating our awesomeness right' ?
This post is something that can't be suppressed without losing big time, and you not suppressing it is only a strong evidence that you are not completely stupid (which is great).
Well perhaps the normal practice is cult-like and dissent-suppressing and this is an atypical break. Kind of like the fat person who starts eating salad instead of nachos while he watches football. And congratulates himself on his healthy eating even though he is still having donuts for breakfast and hamburgers and french fries for lunch.
Seems to me the test for suppression of dissent is not when a high-status person criticizes. The real test is when someone with medium or low status speaks out.
And my impression is that lesswrong does have problems along these lines. Not as bad as other discussion groups, but still.
I wish I could upvote this ten times.
Let's say that the tool/agent distinction exists, and that tools are demonstrably safer. What then? What course of action follows?
Should we ban the development of agents? All of human history suggests that banning things does not work.
With existential stakes, only one person needs to disobey the ban and we are all screwed.
Which means the only safe route is to make a friendly agent before anyone else can. Which is pretty much SI's goal, right?
So I don't understand how practically speaking this tool/agent argument changes anything.
The organization section touches on something that concerns me. Developing a new decision theory sounds like it requires more mathematical talent than the SI yet has available. I've said before that hiring some world-class mathematicians for a year seems likely to either get said geniuses interested in the problem, to produce real progress, or to produce a proof that SI's current approach can't work. In other words, it seems like the best form of accountability we can hope for given the theoretical nature of the work.
Now Eliezer is definitely looking for people who might help. For instance, the latest chapter of "Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality" mentioned
It also says,
So they technically have something already. And if there exists a high-school student who can help with the problem, or learn to do so, that person seems relatively likely to enjoy HP:MoR. But I worry that Eliezer is thinking too much in terms of his own life story here, and has not had to defend his approach enough.
I agree with timtyler's comment that Objections 1 and 2 are bogus, especially 2. The tool-AGI discussion reveals significant misunderstanding, I feel. Despite this, I think it is still a great and useful post.
Another sort of tangential issue is that this post fails to consider whether or not lots of disparate labs are just going to undertake AGI research regardless of SIAI. If lots of labs are doing that, it could be dangerous (if SIAI arguments are sound). So one upside to funding an organization like SIAI is that it will kind of rake the attention to a central point. Remember that one of SIAI's short term goals is to decelerate generic AGI research in favor of accelerating AGI safety research.
This post doesn't seem to account for the fact that by not funding SIAI you simply face the same number of counterfactual disparate labs pursuing AGI with their own willy-nilly sources of funding, but no aggregator organization to serve as a kind of steering committee. Regardless of whether SIAI's specific vision is the one that happens to come true, something should be said for the inherent danger of a bunch of labs trying to build their own stand-alone paperclip maxmizers, which they may very well believe are tool-AGIs, and then bam, game over.
Wow, I'm blown away by Holden Karnofsky, based on this post alone. His writing is eloquent, non-confrontational and rational. It shows that he spent a lot of time constructing mental models of his audience and anticipated its reaction. Additionally, his intelligence/ego ratio appears to be through the roof. He must have learned a lot since the infamous astroturfing incident. This is the (type of) person SI desperately needs to hire.
Emotions out of the way, it looks like the tool/agent distinction is the main theoretical issue. Fortunately, it is much easier than the general FAI one. Specifically, to test the SI assertion that, paraphrasing Arthur C. Clarke,
Any sufficiently advanced tool is indistinguishable from an agent.
one ought to formulate and prove this as a theorem, and present it for review and improvement to the domain experts (the domain being math and theoretical computer science). If such a proof is constructed, it can then be further examined and potentially tightened, giving new insights to the mission of averting the existential risk from intelligence explosion.
If such a proof cannot be found, this will lend further weight to the HK's assertion that SI appears to be poorly qualified to address its core mission.
If it is true (i.e. if a proof can be found) that "Any sufficiently advanced tool is indistinguishable from agent", then any RPOP will automatically become indistinguishable from an agent once it has self-improved past our comprehension point.
This would seem to argue against Yudkowsky's contention that the term RPOP is more accurate than "Artificial Intelligence" or "superintelligence".
First, I am not fond of the term RPOP, because it constrains the space of possible intelligences to optimizers. Humans are reasonably intelligent, yet we are not consistent optimizers. Neither do current domain AIs (they have bugs that often prevent them from performing optimization consistently and predictably).That aside, I don't see how your second premise follows from the first. Just because RPOP is a subset of AI and so would be a subject of such a theorem, it does not affect in any way the (non)validity of the EY's contention.
I do not think this is even true.
I routinely try to turn sufficiently reliable tools into agents wherever possible, per this comment.
I suppose we could use a definition of "agent" that implied greater autonomy in setting its own goals. But there are useful definitions that don't.
Agreed. I normally try not to post empty "me-too" replies; the upvote button is there for a reason. But now I feel strongly enough about it that I will: I'm very impressed with the good will and effort and apparent potential for intelligent conversation in HoldenKarnofsky's post.
Now I'm really curious as to where things will go from here. With how limited my understanding of AI issues is, I doubt a response from me would be worth HoldenKarnofsky's time to read, so I'll leave that to my betters instead of adding more noise. But yeah. Seeing SI ideas challenged in such a positive, constructive way really got my attention. Looking forward to the official response, whatever it might be.
Holden, do you believe that charitable organizations should set out deliberately to impress donors and high-status potential endorsers? I would have thought that a donor like you would try to ignore the results of any attempts at that and to concentrate instead on how much the organization has actually improved the world because to do otherwise is to incentivize organizations whose real goal is to accumulate status and money for their own sake.
For example, Eliezer's attempts to teach rationality or "technical epistemology" or whatever you want to call it through online writings seem to me to have actually improved the world in a non-negligible way and seem to have been designed to do that rather than designed merely to impress.
ADDED. The above is probably not as clear as it should be, so let me say it in different words: I suspect it is a good idea for donors to ignore certain forms of evidence ("impressiveness", affiliation with high-status folk) of a charity's effectiveness to discourage charities from gaming donors in ways that seems to me already too common, and I was a little surprised to see that you do not seem to ignore those forms of evidence.
In other words, I tend to think that people who make philanthropy their career and who have accumulated various impressive markers of their potential to improve the world are likely to continue to accumulate impressive markers, but are less likely to improve the world than people who have already actually improved the world.
And of the three core staff members of SI I have gotten to know, 2 (Eliezer and another one who probably does not want to be named) have already improved the world in non-negligible ways and the third spends less time accumulating credentials and impressiveness markers than almost anyone I know.
This is key: they support SI despite not agreeing with SI's specific arguments. Perhaps you should, too, at least if you find folks like Thiel and Kurzweil sufficiently impressive.
In fact, this has always been roughly my own stance. The primary reason I think SI should be supported is not that their arguments for why they should be supported are good (although I think they are, or at least, better than you do). The primary reason I think SI should be supported is that I like what the organization actually does, and wish it to continue. The Less Wrong Sequences, Singularity Summit, rationality training camps, and even HPMoR and Less Wrong itself are all worth paying some amount of money for. Not to mention the general paying-of-attention to systematic rationality training, and to existential risks relating to future technology.
Strangely, the possibility of this kind of view doesn't seem to be discussed much, even though it is apparently the attitude of some of SI's most prominent supporters.
I furthermore have to say that to raise this particular objection seems to me almost to defeat the purpose of GiveWell. After all, if we could rely on standard sorts of prestige-indicators to determine where our money would be best spent, everybody would be spending their money in those places already, and "efficient charity" wouldn't be a problem for some special organization like yours to solve.
I think Holden seems to believe that Thiel and Kurzweil endorsing SIAI's UFAI-prevention methods would be more like a leading epidemiologist endorsing the malaria-prevention methods of the Against Malaria Foundation (AMF) than it would be like Celebrity X taking a picture with some children for the AMF. There are different kinds of "prestige-indicator," some more valuable to a Bayesian-minded charity evaluator than others.
My biggest criticism of SI is that I cannot decide between:
A. promoting AI and FAI issues awareness will decrease the chance of UFAI catastrophe; or B. promoting AI and FAI issues awareness will increase the chance of UFAI catastrophe
This criticism seems district from the ones that Holden makes. But it is my primary concern. (Perhaps the closest example is Holden's analogy that SI is trying to develop facebook before the Internet).
A seems intuitive. Basically everyone associated with SI assumes that A is true, as far as I can tell. But A is not obviously true to me. It seems to me at least plausible that:
A1. promoting AI and FAI issues will get lots of scattered groups around the world more interested in creating AGI A2. one of these groups will develop AGI faster than otherwise due to A1 A3. the world will be at greater risk of UFAI catastrophe than otherwise due to A2 (i.e. the group creates AGI faster than otherwise, and fails at FAI)
More simply: SI's general efforts, albeit well intended, might accelerate the creation of AGI, and the acceleration of AGI might decrease the odds of the first AGI being friendly. This is one path by which B, not A, would be true.
SI might reply that, although it promotes AGI, it very specifically limits its promotion to FAI. Although that is SI's intention, it is not at all clear that promoting FAI will not have the unintended consequence of accelerating UFAI. By analogy, if a responsible older brother goes around promoting gun safety all the time, the little brother might be more likely to accidentally blow his face off, than if the older brother had just kept his mouth shut. Maybe the older brother shouldn't have kept his mouth shut, maybe he should have... it's not clear either way.
If B is more true than A, the best thing that SI could do would probably be develop clandestine missions to assassinate people who try to develop AGI. SI does almost the exact opposite.
SI's efforts are based on the assumption that A is true. But it's far from clear to me that A, instead of B, is true. Maybe it is, maybe it is. SI seems overconfident that A is true. I've never heard anyone at SI (or elsewhere) really address this criticism.
I like your gun safety analogy. Actually however, it seems to me that a significant portion of LW shares your doubts, or even favors view B. I second your call for some (more?) direct discussion on the question.
Firstly, I'd like to add to the chorus saying that this is an incredible post; as a supporter of SI, it warms my heart to see it. I disagree with the conclusion - I would still encourage people to donate to SI - but if SI gets a critique this good twice a decade it should count itself lucky.
I don't think GiveWell making SI its top rated charity would be in SI's interests. In the long term, SI benefits hugely when people are turned on to the idea of efficient charity, and asking them to swallow all of the ideas behind SI's mission at the same time will put them off. If I ran GiveWell and wanted to give an endorsement to SI, I might break the rankings into multiple lists: the most prominent being VillageReach-like charities which directly do good in the near future, then perhaps a list for charities that mitigate broadly accepted and well understood existential risks (if this can be done without problems with politics), and finally a list of charities which mitigate more speculative risks.
Holden does a great job but makes two major flaws:
1) His argument about Tool-AI is irrelevant, because creating Tool-AI does almost nothing to avoid Agent-AI, which he agrees is dangerous.
2) He too narrowly construes SI's goals by assuming they are only working on Friendly AI rather than AGI x-risk reduction in general.
Is it just me, or do Luke and Eliezer's initial responses appear to send the wrong signals? From the perspective of an SI critic, Luke's comment could be interpreted as saying "for us, not being completely incompetent is worth bragging about", and Eliezer's as "we're so arrogant that we've only taken two critics (including Holden) seriously in our entire history". These responses seem suboptimal, given that Holden just complained about SI's lack of impressive accomplishments, and being too selective about whose feedback to take seriously.
It's the correct signals. The incompetents inherently signal incompetence, the competence can't be faked beyond superficial level (and faking competence is all about signalling that you are sure you are competent). The lack of feedback is inherent in the assumption behind 'we are sending wrong signal' rather than 'maybe, we really are incompetent'.
I think it's unfair to take Eliezer's response as anything other than praise for this article. He noted already that he did not have time to respond properly.
And why even point out that a human's response to anything is "suboptimal"? It will be notable when a human does something optimal.
Luke isn't bragging, he's admitting that SI was/is bad but pointing out it's rapidly getting better. And Eliezer is right, criticisms of SI are usually dumb. Could their replies be interpreted the wrong way? Sure, anything can be interpreted in any way anyone likes. Of course Luke and Eliezer could have refrained from posting those replies and instead posted carefully optimized responses engineered to send nothing but extremely appealing signals of humility and repentance.
But if they did turn themselves into politicians, we wouldn't get to read what they actually think. Is that what you want?
But the accomplishments he listed (e.g., having a strategic plan, website redesign) are of the type that Holden already indicated to be inadequate. So why the exhaustive listing, instead of just giving a few examples to show SI is getting better and then either agreeing that they're not yet up to par, or giving an argument for why Holden is wrong? (The reason I think he could be uncharitably interpreted as bragging is that he would more likely exhaustively list the accomplishments if he was proud of them, instead of just seeing them as fixes to past embarrassments.)
I'd have no problem with "usually" but "all except two" seems inexcusable.
Do their replies reflect their considered, endorsed beliefs, or were they just hurried remarks that may not say what they actually intended? I'm hoping it's the latter...
I read Luke's comment just as "I'm aware these are issues and we're working on it." I didn't read him as "bragging" about the ones that have been solved. Eliezer's... I see the problem with. I initially read it as just commenting Holden on his high-quality article (which I agree was high-quality), but I can see it being read as backhanded at anyone else who's criticized SIAI.
Really? I personally feel pretty embarrassed by SI's past organizational competence. To me, my own comment reads more like "Wow, SI has been in bad shape for more than a decade. But at least we're improving very quickly."
Also, I very much agree with Beckstead on this: "Most extant presentations of SIAI's views leave much to be desired in terms of clarity, completeness, concision, accessibility, and credibility signals. This makes it harder to make high quality objections." And also this: "We haven't gotten great critics. That probably means that we need to work on our arguments and their presentation."
Yes, I think it at least gives a bad impression to someone, if they're not already very familiar with SI and sympathetic to its cause. Assuming you don't completely agree with the criticisms that Holden and others have made, you should think about why they might have formed wrong impressions of SI and its people. Comments like the ones I cited seem to be part of the problem.
That's good to hear, and thanks for the clarifications you added.
While I have sympathy with the complaint that SI's critics are inarticulate and often say wrong things, Eliezer's comment does seem to be indicative of the mistake Holden and Wei Dai are describing. Most extant presentations of SIAI's views leave much to be desired in terms of clarity, completeness, concision, accessibility, and credibility signals. This makes it harder to make high quality objections. I think it would be more appropriate to react to poor critical engagement more along the lines of "We haven't gotten great critics. That probably means that we need to work on our arguments and their presentation," and less along the lines of "We haven't gotten great critics. That probably means that there's something wrong with the rest of the world."
Agree with all this.
This. I've been trying to write something about Eliezer's debate with Robin Hanson, but the problem I keep running up against is that Eliezer's points are not clearly articulated at all. Even making my best educated guesses about what's supposed to go in the gaps in his arguments, I still ended up with very little.
This. Well, the issue is the probability that it's just gaps. Ultimately, its the sort of thing that would only constitute a weak argument from authority iff the speaker had very very impressive accomplishments. Otherwise you're left assuming simplest explanation which doesn't involve presence of unarticulated points of any importance.
A gapless argument, like math proof, could trump authority if valid... an argument with gaps, on the other hand, is the one that is very prone to being trumped.
Karnofsky's focus on "tool AI" is useful but also his statement of it may confuse matters and needs refinement. I don't think the distinction between "tool AI" and "agent AI" is sharp, or in quite the right place.
For example, the sort of robot cars we will probably have in a few years are clearly agents-- you tell them to "come here and take me there" and they do it without further intervention on your part (when everything is working as planned). This is useful in a way that any amount and quality of question answering is not. Almost certainly there will be various flavors of robot cars available and people will choose the ones they like (that don't drive in scary ways, that get them where they want to go even if it isn't well specified, that know when to make conversation and when to be quiet, etc.) As long as robot cars just drive themselves and people around, can't modify the world autonomously to make their performance better, and are subject to continuing selection by their human users, they don't seem to be much of a threat.
The key points here seem to be (1) limited scope, (2) embedding in a network of other actors and (3) humans in the loop as evaluators. We could say these define "tool AIs" or come up with another term. But either way the antonym doesn't seem to be "agent AIs" but maybe something like "autonomous AIs" or "independent AIs" -- AIs with the power to act independently over a very broad range, unchecked by embedding in a network of other actors or by human evaluation.
Framed this way, we can ask "Why would independent AIs exist?" If the reason is mad scientists, an arms race, or something similar then Karnofsky has a very strong argument that any study of friendliness is beside the point. Outside these scenarios, the argument that we are likely to create independent AIs with any significant power seems weak; Karnofsky's survey more or less matches my own less methodical findings. I'd be interested in strong arguments if they exist.
Given this analysis, there seem to be two implications:
We shouldn't build independent AIs, and should organize to prevent their development if they seem likely.
We should thoroughly understand the likely future evolution of a patchwork of diverse tool AIs, to see where dangers arise.
For better or worse, neither of these lend themselves to tidy analytical answers, though analytical work would be useful for both. But they are very much susceptible to investigation, proposals, evangelism, etc.
These do lend themselves to collaboration with existing AI efforts. To the extent they perceive a significant risk of development of independent AIs in the foreseeable future, AI researchers will want to avoid that. I'm doubtful this is an active risk but could easily be convinced by evidence -- not just abstract arguments -- and I'm fairly sure they feel the same way.
Understanding the long term evolution of a patchwork of diverse tool AIs should interest just about all major AI developers, AI project funders, and long term planners who will be affected (which is just about all of them). Short term bias and ceteris paribus bias will lead to lots of these folks not engaging with the issue, but I think it will seem relevant to an increasing number as the hits keep coming.
Yes I agree. Evidently, the environment cars work in is too fast-paced and quickly changing for "tool ai" to be close in usefulness to "agent ai." To drive safely and effectively, you need to be making and implementing decisions on the time frame of a split second.
At the same time, the lesson to be learned is that useful ai can have a utility function which is pretty mundane -- e.g. "find a fast route from point A to point B while minimizing the chances of running off the road or running into any people or objects."
Similarly, instead of telling AI to "improve human welfare" we can tell it to do things like "find ways to kill cancerous cells while keeping collateral damage to a minimum." The higher level decisions about improving human welfare can be left to the traditional institutions - legislatures, courts, and individual autonomy.
Self-driving cars aren't piloted by AGIs in the first place, let alone dangerous "world-optimization" AGIs.
The whole point of Friendly AI is that we want something which is more effective at improving human welfare than our existing institutions. Our existing institutions are, by FAI standards, Unfriendly and destructive. Not existentially destructive, this is true (except on rare occasions like World War II), but neither are they trustworthy when handed, for instance, power over the life-and-death of Earth's ecosystem (which they are currently failing to save, despite our having no other planet to go to).
"how do I build an automated car?"
Some comments on objections 1 and 2.
Both (with the caveat that SI's plans are to implement an extrapolation procedure for the values, and not the values themselves).
I think such a Tool-AI will be much less powerful than an equivalent Agent-AI, due to the bottleneck of having to summarize its calculations in a human-readable form, and then waiting for the human to read and understand the summary and then make a decision. It's not even clear that the huge amounts of calculations that a Tool-AI might do in order to find optimal actions can be summarized in any useful way, or this process of summarization can be feasibly developed before others create Agent-AIs. (Edit: See further explanation of this problem here.) Of course you do implicitly acknowledge this:
I do accept this argument (and have made similar arguments), except that I advocate trying to convince AGI researchers to slow down development of all types of AGI (including Tool-AI, which can be easily converted into Agent-AI), and don't think "security measures" are of much help without a world government that implements a police state to monitor what goes on in every computer. Convincing AGI researchers to slow down is also pointless without a simultaneous program to create a positive Singularity via other means. I've written more about my ideas here, here, and here.
Is compiler an agent by your definition? We don't read it's output, usually. And it may try to improve runtime performance. It however differs in one fundamental way from agents - the value for the code actually running is not implemented into the compiler.
I agree with much of this post, but find a disconnect between the specific criticisms and the overall conclusion of withholding funds from SI even for "donors determined to donate within this cause", and even aside from whether SI's FAI approach increases risk. I see a couple of ways in which the conclusion might hold.
So neither of these ways to fill in the missing part of the argument seems very strong. I'd be interested to know what Holden's own thoughts are, or if anyone else can make stronger arguments on his behalf.
If Holden believes that:
A) reducing existential risk is valuable, and
B) SI's effectiveness at reducing existential risk is a significant contributor to the future of existential risk, and
C) SI is being less effective at reducing existential risk than they would be if they fixed some set of problems P, and
D) withholding GiveWell's endorsement while pre-committing to re-evaluating that refusal if given evidence that P has been fixed increases the chances that SI will fix P...
...it seems to me that Holden should withhold GiveWell's endorsement while pre-committing to re-evaluating that refusal if given evidence that P has been fixed.
Which seems to be what he's doing. (Of course, I don't know whether those are his reasons.)
What, on your view, ought he do instead, if he believes those things?
Holden must believe some additional relevant statements, because A-D (with "existential risk" suitably replaced) could be applied to every other charity, as presumably no charity is perfect.
I guess what I most want to know is what Holden thinks are the reasons SI hasn't already fixed the problems P. If it's lack of resources or lack of competence, then "withholding ... while pre-committing ..." isn't going to help. If it's wrong beliefs, then arguing seems better than "incentivizing", since that provides a permanent instead of temporary solution, and in the course of arguing you might find out that you're wrong yourself. What does Holden believe that causes him to think that providing explicit incentives to SI is a good thing to do?
Update: My full response to Holden is now here.
As Holden said, I generally think that Holden's objections for SI "are either correct (especially re: past organizational competence) or incorrect but not addressed by SI in clear argumentative writing (this includes the part on 'tool' AI)," and we are working hard to fix both categories of issues.
In this comment I would merely like to argue for one small point: that the Singularity Institute is undergoing comprehensive changes — changes which I believe to be improvements that will help us to achieve our mission more efficiently and effectively.
Holden wrote:
Louie Helm was hired as Director of Development in September 2011. I was hired as a Research Fellow that same month, and made Executive Director in November 2011. Below are some changes made since September. (Pardon the messy presentation: LW cannot correctly render tables in comments.)
SI before Sep. 2011: Very few peer-reviewed research publications.
SI today: More peer-reviewed publications coming in 2012 than in all past years combined. Additionally, I alone have a dozen papers in development, for which I am directing every step of research and writing, and will write the final draft, but am collaborating with remote researchers so as to put in only 5%-20% of the total hours required myself.
SI before Sep. 2011: No donor database / a very broken one.
SI today: A comprehensive donor database.
SI before Sep. 2011: Nearly all work performed directly by SI staff.
SI today: Most work outsourced to remote collaborators so that SI staff can focus on the things that only they can do.
SI before Sep. 2011: No strategic plan.
SI today: A strategic plan developed with input from all SI staff, and approved by the Board.
SI before Sep. 2011: Very little communication about what SI is doing.
SI today: Monthly progress reports, plus three Q&As with Luke about SI research and organizational development.
SI before Sep. 2011: No list of the research problems SI is working on.
SI today: A long, fully-referenced list of research problems SI is working on.
SI before Sep. 2011: Very little direct management of staff and projects.
SI today: Luke monitors all projects and staff work, and meets regularly with each staff member.
SI before Sep. 2011: Almost no detailed tracking of the expense of major SI projects (e.g. Summit, papers, etc.). The sole exception seems to be that Amy was tracking the costs of the 2011 Summit in NYC.
SI today: Detailed tracking of the expense of major SI projects for which this is possible (Luke has a folder in Google docs for these spreadsheets, and the summary spreadsheet is shared with the Board).
SI before Sep. 2011: No staff worklogs.
SI today: All staff members share their worklogs with Luke, Luke shares his worklog with all staff plus the Board.
SI before Sep. 2011: Best practices not followed for bookkeeping/accounting; accountant's recommendations ignored.
SI today: Meetings with consultants about bookkeeping/accounting; currently working with our accountant to implement best practices and find a good bookkeeper.
SI before Sep. 2011: Staff largely separated, many of them not well-connected to the others.
SI today: After a dozen or so staff dinners, staff much better connected, more of a team.
SI before Sep. 2011: Want to see the basics of AI Risk explained in plain language? Read The Sequences (more than a million words) or this academic book chapter by Yudkowsky.
SI today: Want to see the basics of AI Risk explained in plain language? Read Facing the Singularity (now in several languages, with more being added) or listen to the podcast version.
SI before Sep. 2011: Very few resources created to support others' research in AI risk.
SI today: IntelligenceExplosion.com, Friendly-AI.com, list of open problems in the field, with references, AI Risk Bibliography 2012, annotated list of journals that may publish papers on AI risk, a partial history of AI risk research, and a list of forthcoming and desired articles on AI risk.
SI before Sep. 2011: A hard-to-navigate website with much outdated content.
SI today: An entirely new website that is easier to navigate and has much new content (nearly complete; should launch in May or June).
SI before Sep. 2011: So little monitoring of funds that $118k was stolen in 2010 before SI noticed. (Note that we have won stipulated judgments to get much of this back, and have upcoming court dates to argue for stipulated judgments to get the rest back.)
SI today: Our bank accounts have been consolidated, with 3-4 people regularly checking over them.
SI before Sep. 2011: SI publications exported straight to PDF from Word or Google Docs, sometimes without even author names appearing.
SI today: All publications being converted into slick, useable LaTeX template (example), with all references checked and put into a central BibTeX file.
SI before Sep. 2011: No write-up of our major public technical breakthrough (TDT) using the mainstream format and vocabulary comprehensible to most researchers in the field (this is what we have at the moment).
SI today: Philosopher Rachael Briggs, whose papers on decision theory have been twice selected for the Philosopher's Annual, has been contracted to write an explanation of TDT and publish it in one of a select few leading philosophy journals.
SI before Sep. 2011: No explicit effort made toward efficient use of SEO or our (free) Google Adwords.
SI today: Highly optimized use of Google Adwords to direct traffic to our sites; currently working with SEO consultants to improve our SEO (of course, the new website will help).
(Just to be clear, I think this list shows not that "SI is looking really great!" but instead that "SI is rapidly improving and finally reaching a 'basic' level of organizational function.")
And note that these improvements would not and could not have happened without more funding than the level of previous years - if, say, everyone had been waiting to see these kinds of improvements before funding.
Really? That's not obvious to me. Of course you've been around for all this and I haven't, but here's what I'm seeing from my vantage point...
Recent changes that cost very little:
Stuff that costs less than some other things SI had spent money on, such as funding Ben Goertzel's AGI research or renting downtown Berkeley apartments for the later visiting fellows:
Do you disagree with these estimates, or have I misunderstood what you're claiming?
Things that cost money:
Donald Rumsfeld
...this was actually a terrible policy in historical practice.
That only seems relevant if the war in question is optional.
I don't think this response supports your claim that these improvements "would not and could not have happened without more funding than the level of previous years."
I know your comment is very brief because you're busy at minicamp, but I'll reply to what you wrote, anyway: Someone of decent rationality doesn't just "try things until something works." Moreover, many of the things on the list of recent improvements don't require an Amy, a Luke, or a Louie.
I don't even have past management experience. As you may recall, I had significant ambiguity aversion about the prospect of being made Executive Director, but as it turned out, the solution to almost every problem X has been (1) read what the experts say about how to solve X, (2) consult with people who care about your mission and have solved X before, and (3) do what they say.
When I was made Executive Director and phoned our Advisors, most of them said "Oh, how nice to hear from you! Nobody from SingInst has ever asked me for advice before!"
That is the kind of thing that makes me want to say that SingInst has "tested every method except the method of trying."
Donor database, strategic plan, staff worklogs, bringing staff together, expenses tracking, funds monitoring, basic management, best-practices accounting/bookkeeping... these are all literally from the Nonprofits for Dummies book.
Maybe these things weren't done for 11 years because SI's decision-makers did make good plans but failed to execute them due to the usual defeaters. But that's not the history I've heard, except that some funds monitoring was insisted upon after the large theft, and a donor database was sorta-kinda-not-really attempted at one point. The history I've heard is that SI failed to make these kinds of plans in the first place, failed to ask advisors for advice, failed to read Nonprofits for Dummies, and so on.
Money wasn't the barrier to doing many of those things, it was a gap in general rationality.
I will agree, however, that what is needed now is more money. We are rapidly becoming a more robust and efficient and rational organization, stepping up our FAI team recruiting efforts, stepping up our transparency and accountability efforts, and stepping up our research efforts, and all those things cost money.
At the risk of being too harsh… When I began to intern with the Singularity Institute in April 2011, I felt uncomfortable suggesting that people donate to SingInst, because I could see it from the inside and it wasn't pretty. (And I'm not the only SIer who felt this way at the time.)
But now I do feel comfortable asking people to donate to SingInst. I'm excited about our trajectory and our team, and if we can raise enough support then we might just have a shot at winning after all.
That book looks like the basic solution to the pattern I outline here, and from your description, most people who have any public good they want to achieve should read it around the time they think of getting a second person involved.
This inspired me to make a blog post: You need to read Nonprofit Kit for Dummies.
... which Eliezer has read and responded to, noting he did indeed read just that book in 2000 when he was founding SIAI. This suggests having someone of Luke's remarkable drive was in fact the missing piece of the puzzle.
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I remember that, when Anna was managing the fellows program, she was reading books of the "for dummies" genre and trying to apply them... it's just that, as it happened, the conceptual labels she accidentally happened to give to the skill deficits she was aware of were "what it takes to manage well" (i.e. "basic management") and "what it takes to be productive", rather than "what it takes to (help) operate a nonprofit according to best practices". So those were the subjects of the books she got. (And read, and practiced.) And then, given everything else the program and the organization was trying to do, there wasn't really any cognitive space left over to effectively notice the possibility that those wouldn't be the skills that other people afterwards would complain that nobody acquired and obviously should have known to. The rest of her budgeted self-improvement effort mostly went toward overcoming self-defeating emotional/social blind spots and motivated cognition. (And I remember Jasen's skill learning focus was similar, except with more of the emphasis on emotional self-awareness and less on management.)
I remember Anna went out of her way to get advice from people who she already knew, who she knew to be better than her at various aspects of personal or professional functioning. And she had long conversations with supporters who she came into contact with for some other reasons; for those who had executive experience, I expect she would have discussed her understanding of SIAI's current strategies with them and listened to their suggestions. But I don't know how much she went out of her way to find people she didn't already have reasonably reliable positive contact with, to get advice from them.
I don't know much about the reasoning of most people not connected with the fellows program about the skills or knowledge they needed. I think Vassar was mostly relying on skills tested during earlier business experience, and otherwise was mostly preoccupied with the general crisis of figuring out how to quickly-enough get around the various hugely-saliently-discrepant-seeming-to-him psychological barriers that were causing everyone inside and outside the organization to continue unthinkingly shooting themselves in the feet with respect to this outside-evolutionary-context-problem of existential risk mitigation. For the "everyone outside's psychological barriers" side of that, he was at least successful enough to keep SIAI's public image on track to trigger people like David Chalmers and Marcus Hutter into meaningful contributions to and participation in a nascent Singularity-studies academic discourse. I don't have a good idea what else was on his mind as something he needed to put effort into figuring out how to do, in what proportions occupying what kinds of subjective effort budgets, except that in total it was enough to put him on the threshold of burnout. Non-profit best practices apparently wasn't one of those things though.
But the proper approach to retrospective judgement is generally a confusing question.
The general pattern, at least post-2008, may have been one where the people who could have been aware of problems felt too metacognitively exhausted and distracted by other problems to think about learning what to do about them, and hoped that someone else with more comparative advantage would catch them, or that the consequences wouldn't be bigger than those of the other fires they were trying to put out.
There were also several attempts at building parts of a strategy document or strategic plan, which together took probably 400-1800 hours. In each case, the people involved ended up determining, from how long it was taking, that, despite reasonable-seeming initial expectations, it wasn't on track to possibly become a finished presentable product soon enough to justify the effort. The practical effect of these efforts was instead mostly just a hard-to-communicate cultural shared understanding of the strategic situation and options -- how different immediate projects, forms of investment, or conditions in the world might feed into each other on different timescales.
There was an accountant (who herself already cost like $33k/yr as the CFO, despite being split three ways with two other nonprofits) who would have been the one informally expected to have been monitoring for that sort of thing, and to have told someone about it if she saw something, out of the like three paid administrative slots at the time... well, yeah, that didn't happen.
I agree with a paraphrase of John Maxwell's characterization: "I'd rather hear Eliezer say 'thanks for funding us until we stumbled across some employees who are good at defeating their akrasia and [had one of the names of the things they were aware they were supposed to] care about [happen to be "]organizational best practices["]', because this seems like a better depiction of what actually happened." Note that this was most of the purpose of the Fellows program in the first place -- to create an environment where people could be introduced to the necessary arguments/ideas/culture and to help sort/develop those people into useful roles, including replacing existing management, since everyone knew there were people who would be better at their job than they were and wished such a person could be convinced to do it instead.
Seems like a fair paraphrase.
FWIW, I never knew the purpose of the VF program was to replace existing SI management. And I somewhat doubt that you knew this at the time, either. I think you're just imagining this retroactively given that that's what ended up happening. For instance, the internal point system used to score people in the VFs program had no points for correctly identifying organizational improvements and implementing them. It had no points for doing administrative work (besides cleaning up the physical house or giving others car rides). And it had no points for rising to management roles. It was all about getting karma on LW or writing conference papers. When I first offered to help with the organization directly, I was told I was "too competent" and that I should go do something more useful with my talent, like start another business... not "waste my time working directly at SI."
A lot of charities go through this pattern before they finally work out how to transition from a board-run/individual-run tax-deductible band of conspirators to being a professional staff-run organisation tuned to doing the particular thing they do. The changes required seem simple and obvious in hindsight, but it's a common pattern for it to take years, so SIAI has been quite normal, or at the very least not been unusually dumb.
(My evidence is seeing this pattern close-up in the Wikimedia Foundation, Wikimedia UK (the first attempt at which died before managing it, the second making it through barely) and the West Australian Music Industry Association, and anecdotal evidence from others. Everyone involved always feels stupid at having taken years to achieve the retrospectively obvious. I would be surprised if this aspect of the dynamics of nonprofits had not been studied.)
edit: Luke's recommendation of The Nonprofit Kit For Dummies looks like precisely the book all the examples I know of needed to have someone throw at them before they even thought of forming an organisation to do whatever it is they wanted to achieve.
My hope is that the upcoming deluge of publications will answer this objection, but for the moment, I am unclear as to the justification for the level of resources being given to SIAI researchers.
This level of freedom is the dream of every researcher on the planet. Yet, it's unclear why these resources should be devoted to your projects. While I strongly believe that the current academic system is broken, you are asking for a level of support granted to top researchers prior to have made any original breakthroughs yourself.
If you can convince people to give you that money, wonderful. But until you have made at least some serious advancement to demonstrate your case, donating seems like an act of faith.
It's impressive that you all have found a way to hack the system and get paid to develop yourselves as researchers outside of the academic system and I will be delighted to see that development bear fruit over the coming years. But, at present, I don't see evidence that the work being done justifies or requires that support.
Because some people like my earlier papers and think I'm writing papers on the most important topic in the world?
Note that this isn't uncommon. SI is far from the only think tank with researchers who publish in academic journals. Researchers at private companies do the same.
Isn't this very strong evidence in support for Holden's point about "Apparent poorly grounded belief in SI's superior general rationality" (excluding Luke, at least)? And especially this?
This topic is something I've been thinking about lately. Do SIers tend to have superior general rationality, or do we merely escape a few particular biases? Are we good at rationality, or just good at "far mode" rationality (aka philosophy)? Are we good at epistemic but not instrumental rationality? (Keep in mind, though, that rationality is only a ceteris paribus predictor of success.)
Or, pick a more specific comparison. Do SIers tend to be better at general rationality than someone who can keep a small business running for 5 years? Maybe the tight feedback loops of running a small business are better rationality training than "debiasing interventions" can hope to be.
Of course, different people are more or less rational in different domains, at different times, in different environments.
This isn't an idle question about labels. My estimate of the scope and level of people's rationality in part determines how much I update from their stated opinion on something. How much evidence for Hypothesis X (about organizational development) is it when Eliezer gives me his opinion on the matter, as opposed to when Louie gives me his opinion on the matter? When Person B proposes to take on a totally new kind of project, I think their general rationality is a predictor of success — so, what is their level of general rationality?
In the world in which a varied group of intelligent and especially rational people are organizing to literally save humanity, I don't see the relatively trivial, but important, improvements you've made in a short period of time being made because they were made years ago. And I thought that already accounting for the points you've made.
I mean, the question this group should be asking themselves is "how can we best alter the future so as to navigate towards FAI?" So, how did they apparently miss something like opportunity cost? Why, for instance, has their salaries increased when they could've been using it to improve the foundation of their cause from which everything else follows?
(Granted, I don't know the history and inner workings of the SI, and so I could be missing some very significant and immovable hurdles, but I don't see that as very likely; at least, not as likely as Holden's scenario.)
Holden implies (and I agree with him) that there's very little evidence at the moment to suggest that SI is good at instrumental rationality. As for epistemic rationality, how would we know ? Is there some objective way to measure it ? I personally happen to believe that if a person seems to take it as a given that he's great at epistemic rationality, this fact should count as evidence (however circumstantial) against him being great at epistemic rationality... but that's just me.
Why did you start referring to yourself in the first person and then change your mind? (Or am I missing something?)
Brain fart: now fixed.
(Why was this downvoted? If it's because the downvoter wants to see fewer brain farts, they're doing it wrong, because the message such a downvote actually conveys is that they want to see fewer acknowledgements of brain farts. Upvoted back to 0, anyway.)
Thanks for taking the time to express your views quite clearly--I think this post is good for the world (even with a high value on your time and SI's fundraising ability), and that norms encouraging this kind of discussion are a big public good.
I think the explicit objections 1-3 are likely to be addressed satisfactorily (in your judgment) by less than 50,000 words, and that this would provide a good opportunity for SI to present sharper versions of the core arguments---part of the problem with existing materials is certainly that it is difficult and unrewarding to respond to a nebulous and shifting cloud of objections. A lot of what you currently view as disagreements with SI's views may get shifted to doubts about SI being the right organization to back, which probably won't get resolved by 50,000 words.
I find it unfortunate that none of the SIAI research associates have engaged very deeply in this debate, even LessWrong regulars like Nesov and cousin_it. This is part of the reason why I was reluctant to accept (and ultimately declined) when SI invited me to become a research associate, that I would feel less free to to speak up both in support of SI and in criticism of it.
I don't think this is SI's fault, but perhaps there are things it could do to lessen this downside of the research associate program. For example it could explicitly encourage the research associates to publicly criticize SI and to disagree with its official positions, and make it clear that no associate will be blamed if someone mistook their statements to be official SI positions or saw them as reflecting badly on SI in general. I also write this comment because just being consciously aware of this bias (in favor of staying silent) may help to counteract it.
I don't usually engage in potentially protracted debates lately. A very short summary of my disagreement with Holden's object-level argument part of the post is (1) I don't see in what way can the idea of powerful Tool AI be usefully different from that of Oracle AI, and it seems like the connotations of "Tool AI" that distinguish it from "Oracle AI" follow from an implicit sense of it not having too much optimization power, so it might be impossible for a Tool AI to both be powerful and hold the characteristics suggested in the post; (1a) the description of Tool AI denies it goals/intentionality and other words, but I don't see what they mean apart from optimization power, and so I don't know how to use them to characterize Tool AI; (2) the potential danger of having a powerful Tool/Oracle AI around is such that aiming at their development doesn't seem like a good idea; (3) I don't see how a Tool/Oracle AI could be sufficiently helpful to break the philosophical part of the FAI problem, since we don't even know which questions to ask.
Since Holden stated that he's probably not going to (interactively) engage the comments to this post, and writing this up in a self-contained way is a lot of work, I'm going to leave this task to the people who usually write up SingInst outreach papers.
Reading Holden's transcript with Jaan Tallinn (trying to go over the whole thing before writing a response, due to having done Julia's Combat Reflexes unit at Minicamp and realizing that the counter-mantra 'If you respond too fast you may lose useful information' was highly applicable to Holden's opinions about charities), I came across the following paragraph:
I've been previously asked to evaluate this possibility a few times, but I think the last time I did was several years ago, and when I re-evaluated it today I noticed that my evaluation had substantially changed in the interim due to further belief shifts in the direction of "Intelligence is not as computationally expensive as it looks" - constructing a non-self-modifying predictive super-human intelligence might be possible on the grounds that human brains are just that weak. It would still require a great feat of cleanly designed, strong-understanding-math-based AI - Holden seems to think this sort of development would happen naturally with the sort of AGI researchers we have nowadays, and I wish he'd spent a few years arguing with some of them to get a better picture of how unlikely this is. Even if you write and run algorithms and they're not self-modifying, you're still applying optimization criteria to things like "have the humans understand you", and doing inductive learning has a certain inherent degree of program-creation to it. You would need to have done a lot of "the sort of thinking you do for Friendly AI" to set out to create such an Oracle and not have it kill your planet.
Nonetheless, I think after further consideration I would end up substantially increasing my expectation that if you have some moderately competent Friendly AI researchers, they would apply their skills to create a (non-self-modifying) (but still cleanly designed) Oracle AI first - that this would be permitted by the true values of "required computing power" and "inherent difficulty of solving problem directly", and desirable for reasons I haven't yet thought through in much detail - and so by Conservation of Expected Evidence I am executing that update now.
Flagging and posting now so that the issue doesn't drop off my radar.
This is not relevant to FAI per se, but Michael and Susan Leigh Anderson have suggested (and begun working on) just that in the field of Machine Ethics. The main contention seems to be that creating an ethical oracle is easier than creating an embodied ethical agent because you don't need to first figure out whether the robot is an ethical patient. Then once the bugs are out, presumably the same algorithms can be applied to embodied robots.
ETA: For reference, I think the relevant paper is "Machine Metaethics" by Susan Leigh Anderson, in the volume Machine Ethics - I'm sure lukeprog has a copy.
The heck? Why would you not need to figure out if an oracle is an ethical patient? Why is there no such possibility as a sentient oracle?
Is this standard religion-of-embodiment stuff?
I may have the terminology wrong, but I believe he's thinking more about commercial narrow-AI researchers.
Now if they produce results like these, that would push the culture farther towards letting computer programs handle any hard task. Programming seems hard.
"Intelligence is not as computationally expensive as it looks"
How sure are you that your intuitions do not arise from typical mind fallacy and from you attributing the great discoveries and inventions of mankind to the same processes that you feel run in your skull and which did not yet result in any great novel discoveries and inventions that I know of?
I know this sounds like ad-hominem, but as your intuitions are significantly influenced by your internal understanding of your own process, your self esteem will stand hostage to be shot through in many of the possible counter arguments and corrections. (Self esteem is one hell of a bullet proof hostage though, and tends to act more as a shield for bad beliefs).
There is a lot of engineers working on software for solving engineering problems, including the software that generates and tests possible designs and looks for ways to make better computers. Your philosophy-based natural-language-defined in-imagination-running Oracle AI may have to be very carefully specified so that it does not kill imaginary mankind. And it may well be very difficult to build such a specification. Just don't confuse it with the software written to solve definable problems.
Ultimately, figuring out how to make a better microchip involves a lot of testing of various designs, that's how humans do it, that's how tools do it. I don't know how you think it is done. The performance is a result of a very complex function of the design. To build a design that performs you need to reverse this ultra complicated function, which is done by a mixture of analytical methods and iteration of possible input values, and unless P=NP, we have very little reason to expect any fundamentally better solutions (and even if P=NP there may still not be any). Meaning that the AGI won't have any edge over practical software, and won't out-foom it.
Jaan's reply to Holden is also correct:
Obviously you wouldn't release the code of such an Oracle - given code and understanding of the code it would probably be easy, possibly trivial, to construct some form of FOOM-going AI out of the Oracle!