I don't think you and I are talking about the same thing when we refer to "the map/territory distinction".

The way I use the "map/territory" expression, it doesn't make sense to ask which of MWI or collapse "is the territory". Both are relatively high-level analogies for explaining (in English) the mathematical models (in algebra) that describe the results (numerical measurements) of physics experiments. In other words, they are both "maps of maps of maps of the territory."

We can ask which map introduces fewer extraneous terms, or leads to less confusion, or is more internally consistent; or which is more "physical" and less "magical"; but neither one "is the territory".

I don't presume the existence of something you call the territory (an absolute immutable and unobservable entity, of which only some weak glimpses can be experienced). I'm pretty happy with a hierarchy of models as ontologically fundamental, and map/territory being one of those models.

It seems to me that this sort of subjectivism runs into difficulty when we notice that sometimes our models are wrong; sometimes the map has a river on it that the territory doesn't, and that as result if we dive into it we go crash instead of splash. See the ending of "The Simple Truth". But perhaps I have misconstrued what you're getting at here?

It looks like you're reading a lot into that statement. I certainly didn't read anything against "extensive experimental testing".

I don't feel as confused as I was. I think we're just using different definitions of "fallacy".