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TheOtherDave comments on Holden's Objection 1: Friendliness is dangerous - Less Wrong
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I agree that psychopaths have preferences, and would find living in a world that anti-implemented their preferences intolerable.
If you mean to suggest that the fact that the former phrase gets used in place of the latter is compelling evidence that we all agree about who to include, I disagree.
If you mean to suggest that it would be more accurate to use the latter phrase when that's what we mean, I agree.
Ditto "CEV(that set of preference-havers which value X, Y, and Z)".
I definitely meant the second interpretation of that phrase.
I hope that everyone who discusses CEV understands that a very hard part of building a CEV function would be defining the criteria for inclusion in the subset of people whose values are considered. It's almost circular, because figuring out who to exclude as "insufficiently moral" almost inherently requires the output of a CEV-like function to process.
How committed are you to the word "subset" here?
I'm not sure I understand the question. In reference to the sociopath issue, I think it is clearer to say:
(1) "I don't want sociopaths (and the like) in the subset from which CEV is drawn"
than to say that
(2) "CEV is drawn from all humanity but sociopaths are by definition not human."
Nonetheless, I don't think (1) and (2) are different in any important respect. They just define key terms differently in order to say the same thing. In a rational society, I suspect it would make no difference, but in the current human society, ways words can be wrong makes (2) likely to lead to errors of reasoning.
Sorry, I'm being unclear. Let me try again.
For simplicity, let us say that T(x) = TRUE if x is sufficiently moral to include in CEV, and FALSE otherwise. (I don't mean to posit that we've actually implemented such a test.)
I'm asking if you mean to distinguish between:
(1) CEV includes x where T(x) = TRUE and x is human, and
(2) CEV includes x where T(x) = TRUE
I'm still not sure I understand the question. That said, there are two issues here.
First, I would expect CEV(Klingon) to output something if CEV(human) does, but I'm not aware of any actual species that I would expect CEV(non-human species) to output for. If such a species existed (i.e. CEV(dolphins) outputs a morality), I would advocate strongly for something very like equal rights between humans and dolphins.
But even in that circumstance, I would be very surprised if CEV(all dolphins & all humans) outputted something other than "Humans, do CEV(humanity). Dolphins, do CEV(dolphin)"
Of course, I don't expect CEV(all of humanity ever) to output because I reject moral realism.
I think that answers my question. Thanks.