If you're thinking of building any strange philosophies around many-worlds, you probably shouldn't - that's not what it's for.
This includes any discussion of quantum immortality/suicide and MWI-based arguments for decision theories, anthropic biases etc. If you can construct a certain line of reasoning about observed world using MWI, you should be able to do the same if you assume that only this single world "exists". Granted, it might not be as obvious, but it must be doable.
There is nothing wrong with using MWI for inspiration, there is everything wrong with saying that some argument is true "because MWI!".
If you can construct a certain line of reasoning about observed world using MWI, you should be able to do the same if you assume that only this single world "exists".
If the two theories make the same predictions, what is the point? Why not just stick with the old fuddy duddy one reality? Is MWI just a fashion statement? Just a theory that falls under Quine's "inscrutability of translation"?
Note that a hidden variable theory does make a prediction - that there are hidden variables we may one day discover and use to make better predict...
Today's post, Living in Many Worlds was originally published on 05 June 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Why Quantum?, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
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