As I understand, MWI is empirically equivalent to other interpretations of quantum mechanics.
It's also empirically equivalent to the theory that "The lady down the street is a witch; she did it."
a metaphysical commitment
Democracy! Freedom! My enemy kicks puppies! (Physics is just called physics, even when it is unintuitive.)
You should be able to justify any particular course of action without a metaphysical commitment to the reality of unobservable components of the universe's wave function.
No I shouldn't. I should use the best possible model that can be constructed of the universe's wave function based on the evidence available and ignore any demands that I justify my decisions according to systems that are artificially crippled.
It so happens that all my decisions can be justified using a single world map but this is entirely an artifact of my preferences and nothing to do with epistemic or decision theoretical considerations. (It would be weird and possibly 'insane' but not irrational to have decisions that were not reducible in this manner.)
Today's post, Living in Many Worlds was originally published on 05 June 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Why Quantum?, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.