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thomblake comments on When None Dare Urge Restraint, pt. 2 - Less Wrong
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Doesn't that presume barbarians who will reliably act in their own best interest?
If I assume that, then being able to offer barbarians a service they value in exchange for something they value less is sufficient to protect myself from barbarians, as long as I ensure I won't provide that service once attacked. But it's quite an assumption.
no, you use the threat against people who are rational to provide you with conventional air superiority. This protects you from stupid people.
Ah, I see.
So what protects them?
The stupid people? Their overwhelming numbers! ;)
How does air superiority protect you? Is that the question? It reliably does, the fact that modern empires are too chickenshit/stupid to use it correctly doesn't mean it doesn't work.
http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Air_Power/vietnam/AP40.htm
I am now confused.
It sounds like you are saying:
a) conventional air superiority is a reliable way of being left alone by barbarians, and
b) a credible deadman-switch doomsday device is the only way to be left alone by barbarians
I also believe:
c) conventional air superiority is not a credible deadman-switch doomsday device,
It seems that at least one of those statements must be false.
there are two types of barbarians, the kind that take a nuke seriously (current nation states) and the kind that are just insane. You use conventional means against the latter. you get supplied with conventional means by the former.