Reading this piece is difficult.
The first sentence of the second paragraph starts off
But because theology has traditionally been mostly Christian
That's not true. It might be that you are only aware of Christian theology, but very similar issues have been extensively discussed in other religions. Islamic theology is a pretty strong example.
I'm going to skip commenting on most of the theological discussion (aside from noting that sentences being grammatically well-formed doesn't mean they have content) and per your request move directly to the part about Fermi issues.
imultaneous satisfaction of diverse preferences. What if some humans don't want to be affected by otherwordly influences, or even don't want such influences to exist at all, for anyone? Then the utilitarian solution would be to influence the people that want the superintelligence to influence them while simultaneously avoiding any impact on the people that don't want to be influenced. Furthermore, to somewhat satisfy the preferences of those who don't want any influence to exist for anyone at all, the superintelligence could pull off a Necker-cube-like illusion: whether or not you saw the superintelligent influences would depend on what preconceptions you had in mind when interpreting the w
This sounds extremely close to the claim that miracles happen but non-believers just don't see them or don't want to see them. This ignores the many times people sincerely pray for miracles and nothing happens. Many agnostics and atheists would much rather be in a universe with some sort of powerful intervention: but this one doesn't look like it. Moreover, some people who become irreligious do so precisely because of the apparent absence of miracles.
Your arguments for non-intervention are more interesting. I had not seen the idea of non-intervention being Schelling point which seems novel.
Your claim that we've explored a lot of the answerspace around the Fermi question seems to be highly questionable- the question has only been around for about fifty years, not many people have seriously thought about it, and our actual set of data that is useful for locating or ruling out hypotheses is tiny.
Your arguments for non-intervention are more interesting. I had not seen the idea of non-intervention being Schelling point which seems novel.
It also applies to the AI risk debate. I've made the argument in that context before here on LW. I believe User:Dmytry started to champion it at some point.
Here.
Long story short, it's an attempt to justify the planetarium hypothesis as a solution to the Fermi paradox. The first half is a discussion of how it and things like it are relevant to the intended purview of the blog, and the second half is the meat of the post. You'll probably want to just eat the meat, which I think is relevant to the interests of many LessWrong folk.
The blog is Computational Theology. It's new. I'll be the primary poster, but others are sought. I'll likely introduce the blog and more completely describe it in its own discussion post when more posts are up, hopefully including a few from people besides me, and when the archive will give a more informative indication of what to expect from the blog. Despite theism's suspect reputation here at LessWrong I suspect many of the future posts will be of interest to this audience anyway, especially for those of you who take interest in discussion of the singularity. The blog will even occasionally touch on rationality proper. So you might want to store the fact of the blog's existence somewhere deep in the back of your head. A link to the blog's main page can be found on my LessWrong user page if you forget the url.
I'd appreciate it if comments about the substance of the post were made on the blog post itself, but if you want to discuss the content here on LessWrong then that's okay too. Any meta-level comments about presentation, typos, or the post's relevance to LessWrong, should probably be put as comments on this discussion post. Thanks all!