Similarly, you can eliminate the sentence 'rational' from almost any sentence in which it appears. "It's rational to believe the sky is blue", "It's true that the sky is blue", and "The sky is blue", all convey exactly the same information about what color you think the sky is - no more, no less.

I might be missing the point of this paragraph, but it seems to me that "it's rational to believe the sky is blue" and "the sky is blue" do not convey the same information. I can conceive of situations in which it is rational to believe the sky is blue, and yet the sky is not blue. For example, the sky is green, but superintelligent alien pranksters install undetected nanotech devices into my optic and auditory nerves/brain, altering my perceptions and memories so that I see the green sky as blue, and hear (read) the word "blue" where other people have actually said (written) the word "green" when describing the sky.

Under these circumstances, all my evidence would indicate the sky is blue - and so it would be rational to believe that the sky is blue. And yet the sky is not blue. But the first statement doesn't feel like I am generalising over cognitive algorithms in the sense I took from the big paragraph.

Am I missing or misinterpreting something?