Ah, one meta thing to keep in mind, is that as a Bayesian it's actually sort of hard to even understand what Gigerenzer could possibly mean sometimes. Gigerenzer understands and appreciates Bayesianism, so I knew I had to just be entirely missing something about what he was saying. E.g., I was shocked when he said that the conjunction rule wasn't a fundamental rule of probability and only applied in certain cases. I mean, what? It falls directly out of the axioms! Nonetheless when I reread his arguments a few times I realized he actually had an important meta-statistical point. Anyway, that's just one point to keep in mind when reading Gigerenzer, since you and I lean Bayesian. (As we should: Bayes really is a lot better.)

I can only see a little from your links, but what I do see misses Gigerenzer's point. Kahneman (and Tversky's?) replies to Gigerenzer also miss the point. Also note that some of Gigerenzer's studies contradict some of Tversky and Kahneman's results, or at least the conclusions that are frequently drawn from those results. E.g., overconfidence disappearing when you use frequencies instead of subjective probabilities. That said, I generally like Stanovich, so I'll look closer at what he says specifically.

I should note, it's really unfortunate that this word "normative" isn't tabooed more.

Also, Dawes is often totally out to lunch—you've seen a few reasons why in a highly upvoted comment on one of your posts. Do you agree that Dawes and his cadre of researchers are not trustworthy? (Note that Eliezer often recommends Dawes' book, "Rational Choice in an Uncertain World". I read an '80s edition of that book and was horrified at the poor scholarship. Before then I'd had a high opinion of H&B.)

I'm interested in our disagreement, in my view it seems pretty important, because it shapes our priors for how much respect we should give to the common man's opinion. I'll read more from your links (e.g. buy or steal a book or two) and give you my updated opinion.