I'd also like to point out the flip side of the coin: by the same arguments, it doesn't make sense to talk about matter and energy separate from how it behaves - matter isn't some primordial grey blob, which, by its inaction, forces laws to be separate objects. What we'd call "matter" and "physical law" don't have to exist independently just because we have two words for them.

Agreed. Was this just meant to be an observation or do you think it creates a problem for my view? If the latter, I don't see it yet.

I'm confused why you would argue that physical law can't be some separate thing, "lording it over all matter," but still leave room in your picture for a really existing, similarly separate "locus of authority."

That particular sentence was uttered from the perspective of a prescriptivist. If I believed that laws were rules, and I also believed that non-fundamental laws were real, then I would be committed to there being multiple loci of authority. But I don't believe that any laws are rules, so on my picture there are no loci of authority. I've added the words "On this assumption,..." in front of the sentence. Hopefully that makes my point less confusing.

I think you're taking the lack of an immediate and obvious answer to a rhetorical question as more of an argument than it actually is.

I intend to address the specific point you bring up in my post on explanatory reductionism. I do see your point about the rhetorical question, though. I've edited that section. Thanks!