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pragmatist comments on Boltzmann Brains and Anthropic Reference Classes (Updated) - Less Wrong
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I hope this is not the case, since I don't believe this. I think it's pretty likely that our universe will contain many Boltzmann brain type observers whose subjective experience is not a reliable record of their causal history (or any sort of record at all, really). Could you clarify where my objection relies on this assumption?
The problem is often presented (including by Bostrom) as a straight Bayesian disconfirmation of models like Boltzmann's. That seems like a different argument from the one you present.
Why? The other three premises do not imply that I am a Boltzmann brain. They only imply that model X predicts I'm a Boltzmann brain. That doesn't conflict with the second premise.
That was poorly worded. I'd already updated the grandparent before you posted this; hopefully the revised version will be clearer.
I was talking about my formulation of the problem, not yours. Assuming you're not a Boltzmann brain does lead to a contradiction with one of my premises, specifically the one about invalid observations.