JGWeissman comments on Reply to Holden on 'Tool AI' - Less Wrong
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Thanks for the response. To clarify, I'm not trying to point to the AIXI framework as a promising path; I'm trying to take advantage of the unusually high degree of formalization here in order to gain clarity on the feasibility and potential danger points of the "tool AI" approach.
It sounds to me like your two major issues with the framework I presented are (to summarize):
(1) There is a sense in which AIXI predictions must be reducible to predictions about the limited set of inputs it can "observe directly" (what you call its "sense data").
(2) Computers model the world in ways that can be unrecognizable to humans; it may be difficult to create interfaces that allow humans to understand the implicit assumptions and predictions in their models.
I don't claim that these problems are trivial to deal with. And stated as you state them, they sound abstractly very difficult to deal with. However, it seems true - and worth noting - that "normal" software development has repeatedly dealt with them successfully. For example: Google Maps works with a limited set of inputs; Google Maps does not "think" like I do and I would not be able to look at a dump of its calculations and have any real sense for what it is doing; yet Google Maps does make intelligent predictions about the external universe (e.g., "following direction set X will get you from point A to point B in reasonable time"), and it also provides an interface (the "route map") that helps me understand its predictions and the implicit reasoning (e.g. "how, why, and with what other consequences direction set X will get me from point A to point B").
Difficult though it may be to overcome these challenges, my impression is that software developers have consistently - and successfully - chosen to take them on, building algorithms that can be "understood" via interfaces and iterated over - rather than trying to prove the safety and usefulness of their algorithms with pure theory before ever running them. Not only does the former method seem "safer" (in the sense that it is less likely to lead to putting software in production before its safety and usefulness has been established) but it seems a faster path to development as well.
It seems that you see a fundamental disconnect between how software development has traditionally worked and how it will have to work in order to result in AGI. But I don't understand your view of this disconnect well enough to see why it would lead to a discontinuation of the phenomenon I describe above. In short, traditional software development seems to have an easier (and faster and safer) time overcoming the challenges of the "tool" framework than overcoming the challenges of up-front theoretical proofs of safety/usefulness; why should we expect this to reverse in the case of AGI?
Explaining routes is domain specific and quite simple. When you are using domain specific techniques to find solutions to domain specific problems, you can use domain specific interfaces where human programmers and designers do all the heavy lifting to figure out the general strategy of how to communicate to the user.
But if you want a tool AGI that finds solutions in arbitrary domains, you need a cross domain solution for communicating tool AGI's plans to the user. This is as much a harder problem than showing a route on a map, as cross domain AGI is a harder problem than computing the routes. Instead of the programmer figuring out how to plot road tracing curves on a map, the programmer has to figure out how to get the computer to figure out that displaying a map with route traced over it is a useful thing to do, in a way that generalizes figuring out other useful things to do to communicate answers to other types of questions. And among the hard subproblems of programming computers to find useful things to do in general problems is specifying the meaning of "useful". If that is done poorly, the tool AGI tries to trick the user into accepting plans that achieve some value negating distortion of what we actually want, instead of giving information that helps provide a good evaluation. Doing this right requires solving the same problems required to do FAI right.