Luke_A_Somers comments on Malthusian copying: mass death of unhappy life-loving uploads - Less Wrong

12 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 02 July 2012 04:37PM

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Comment author: Luke_A_Somers 03 July 2012 11:38:11AM -1 points [-]

WTF? Given the general non-existence of p-zombies, that's ludicrous.

Comment author: shminux 03 July 2012 03:23:16PM -2 points [-]

Given the general non-existence of qualia, this is perfectly reasonable.

More details: qualia is the way things seem and feel from the inside, though unobservable from the outside. P-zombie is an accusation of someone lacking qualia, which can never be refuted, given that qualia is unobservable. Who but a p-zombie would make such an accusation?

Comment author: [deleted] 05 July 2012 04:49:09AM 1 point [-]

I am also deeply suspiscious of this qualia thing, but you can't use arguments about qualia as evidence of p-zombie. (because pzombie and "conscious being" are supposed to be observably equivalent)

Comment author: shminux 05 July 2012 05:30:08AM *  0 points [-]

My original comment was intended as a (apparently failed) sarcasm, given that the RolfAndreassen's argument

The assumption is that the bits are conscious and experience qualia.

has no testable predictions. Qualia is no better concept than a p-zombie.

Comment author: [deleted] 05 July 2012 05:39:42AM 0 points [-]

My original comment was intended as a (apparently failed) sarcasm

I got that it was sarcastic. I was sortof sarcastically picking at your sarcasm-logic.

Qualia is no better concept than a p-zombie.

Yes I know. What would the non-qualia case even feel like? What does it even mean for red to have a redness to it, besides the fact that it is distinguishable from green and connected to a bunch of other concepts?

Comment author: TheOtherDave 05 July 2012 06:05:14AM 1 point [-]

The closest analog I have for this is how it felt to not feel like I had free will, which I discuss here. I imagine not feeling like I have qualia would be a similar experience of not having my sense of personal identity engaged with my sense of perceiving red.

Comment author: Luke_A_Somers 27 July 2012 01:41:44PM -1 points [-]

Okay, so you were being sarcastic. I don't see what is wrong with qualia as a notion, so long as you recognize that they're inseparable from their implementation, and that goes both ways.

Comment author: shminux 27 July 2012 05:22:33PM 0 points [-]

I don't see what is wrong with qualia as a notion, so long as you recognize that they're inseparable from their implementation, and that goes both ways.

Exactly that. Qualia is a redundant term. A perfect upload feels the same thing a meat person does.

The original issue is spawning and terminating clones, in whichever form. I suppose I have no problem with painlessly terminating clones completing their tasks, as long as they have no advanced knowledge or anguish about it. I also have no problem with a clone who finds out about its impending termination, and being unhappy about it, fighting for its life.

Comment author: Luke_A_Somers 30 July 2012 02:32:38PM 1 point [-]

Exactly that. Qualia is a redundant term.

No more than any other regular noun like 'bicycle' is a redundant term. They're inseparable from their implementations too.