= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
Eugine_Nier comments on [SEQ RERUN] Is Morality Preference? - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (66)
If you accept as "true" some statements that are not testable, and other statements that are testable, than perhaps we just have a labeling problem? We would have "true-and-I-can-prove-it" and "true-and-I-can't-prove-it." I'd be surprised if given those two categories there would be many people who wouldn't elevate the testable statements above the untestable one in "truthiness."
Where would mathematical statements fit in this classification of yours? They can be proven, but many of them can't tested and even for the ones that can be tested the proof is generally considered better evidence than the test.
In fact, you are implicitly relying on a large untested (and mostly untestable) framework to describe the relationship between whatever sense input constitutes the result of one of your tests, and the proposition being tested.
There's another category, necessary truths. The deductive inferences from premises are not susceptible to disproof.
Thus, the categories for this theory of truthful statements are: necessary truths, empirical truths ("i-can-prove-it"), and "truth-and-i-can't-prove-it."
Generally, this categorization scheme will put most contentious moral assertions into the third category.
Agreed except for your non-conventional use of the word "prove" which is normal restricted to things in the first category.