Assume that science is about "useful model"
If model X and model Y produce equally useful predictions, they have equal value. If model X is simpler, then it gets you more value for your costs (time spent thinking, any exhaustion of "mental muscles", etc.)
One can also point out that the opposite (seek the most complex model) is impossible, since you can always add additional irrelevant factors.
I've been slowly training one of my friends to use Occam's Razor by complaining about needless complexity. It's weird realizing how much of a conscious appreciation it has given me :)
Assume that science is about "useful model"
I assume science is about falsifiable models, that are also hopefully more humane than not.
If model X and model Y produce equally useful predictions, they have equal value. If model X is simpler, then it gets you more value for your costs (time spent thinking, any exhaustion of "mental muscles", etc.)
Here I think we are saying similar things with different words. If model X is more simple, it can be more readily falsified and thus waste less.
Occam's Razor is so-so for science, but a rea...
Today's post, Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom was originally published on 08 July 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
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