= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
MarkusRamikin comments on Nash Equilibria and Schelling Points - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (76)
Watched the first one. It was very different from the scenario we're discussing. No one's life was at stake. Also the shares were unequal from the start, so there was no fair scenario being denied, to get outraged about.
I'm not in favor of "reasoning via outrage" in general. I'm simply in favor of possessing a (known) inclination to turn down overly skewed deals (like humans generally have, usefully I might add); if I have it, and your life is at stake, you'd have to be suicidal to propose a 98 0 1 0 1 if I'm one of the people whose vote you need.
What makes it different from the video example is that, in the pirate example, if I turn down the deal the proponent loses far, far more than I do. Not just 98 coins to my 1, but their life, which should be many orders of magnitude more precious. So there's clearly room for a more fair deal. The woman in that case wasn't like my proposed E or C, she was like a significantly stupider version of A, wanting an unfairly good deal in a situation when there was no reason for her to believe her commitment could reliably prevail over the other players' ability to do the same.
A suggestion to randomize was made and denied. They fail at thinking. Especially Jo, who kept trying to convince herself and others that she didn't care about money. Sour grapes---really pathetic.
Whenever I come across highly counterintuitive claims along these lines, I code them up and see how they perform over many iterations.
This is a lot trickier to do in this case compared to, say, the Monty Hall problem, but if you restricted it just to cases in which Pirate A retained 98 of the coins, you could demonstrate whether the [98, 0, 1, 0, 1] distribution was stable or not.
Also, I'd suggest thinking about this in a slightly different way to the way you're thinking about it. The only pirate in the scenario who doesn't have to worry about dying is pirate E, who can make any demands he likes from pirate D. What distribution would he suggest?
Edit: Rereading the wording of the scenario, pirate E can't make any demands he likes from pirate D, and pirate D himself also doesn't need to worry about dying.