Vladimir_Nesov comments on Excuse me, would you like to take a survey? - Less Wrong

12 Post author: Yvain 26 April 2009 09:23PM

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Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 27 April 2009 02:59:52PM 1 point [-]

My source code contains a rule M that overrides everything else and is detectable by other agents. It says: I will precommit to cooperating (playing the Pareto-optimal outcome) if I can verify that the opponent's source code contains M. Like a self-printing program (quine), no infinite recursion in sight. And, funnily enough, this statement can persuade other agents to modify their source code to include M - there's no downside. Funky!

Something like this. Referring to an earlier discussion, "Cooperator" is an agent that implements M. Practical difficulties are all in signaling that you implement M, while actually implementing it may be easy (but pointless if you can't signal it and can't detect M in other agents).

The relation to Newcomb's problem is that there is no need to implant a special-purpose algorithm like M you described above, you can guide all of your actions by a single decision theory that implements M as a special case (generalizes M if you like), and also solves Newcomb's problem.

One inaccuracy here is that there are many Pareto optimal global strategies (in PD there are many if you allow mixed strategies), with different payoffs to different agents, and so they must first agree on which they'll jointly implement. This creates a problem analogous to the Ultimatum game, or the problem of fairness.

Comment author: cousin_it 27 April 2009 03:26:14PM *  1 point [-]

you can guide all of your actions by a single decision theory that implements M as a special case (generalizes M if you like), and also solves Newcomb's problem

Didn't think about that. Now I'm curious: how does this decision theory work? And does it give incentive to other agents to adopt it wholesale, like M does?

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 27 April 2009 04:35:43PM 1 point [-]

That's the idea. I more or less know how my version of this decision theory works, and I'm likely to write it up in the next few weeks. I wrote a little bit about it here (I changed my mind about causation, it's easy enough to incorporate it here, but I'll have to read up on Pearl first). There is also Eliezer's version, that started the discussion, and that was never explicitly described, even on a surface level.

Overall, there seem to be no magic tricks, only the requirement for a philosophically sane problem statement, with inevitable and long-known math following thereafter.

Comment author: cousin_it 27 April 2009 05:05:03PM 0 points [-]

OK, I seem to vaguely understand how your decision theory works, but I don't see how it implements M as a special case. You don't mention source code inspection anywhere.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 27 April 2009 05:26:25PM 0 points [-]

What matters is the decision (and its dependence on other facts). Source code inspection is only one possible procedure for obtaining information about the decision. The decision theory doesn't need to refer to a specific means of getting that information. I talked about a related issue here.